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Abstract
In the last twenty years or so a key issue in political philosophy has been the 
debate betw een so-called com m unitarian philosophers such as MacIntyre, 
Sandel, W alzer and Taylor, and those w ho suppo rt form s of liberal 
individualism  such as that found in Rawls's Theory of Justice. In this debate 
reference has quite often been made to Aristotle. This is particularly so in the 
case of MacIntyre who is frequently seen as presenting a neo-Aristotelian view. 
But w riters from the liberal-individualist camp, such as Miller, have also 
invoked Aristotle's authority. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
appropria tion  of A ristotle in this debate. I analyse six key concepts: 
com m unity, teleology, happiness, justice, friendship and liberty. These 
concepts play a leading role in both com m unitarian and liberal political 
philosophy bu t they are of course also central to A ristotle 's account. In 
choosing these concepts I do not mean to suggest that there are not other issues 
which are also im portant, bu t these are both characteristic of A ristotle's 
thought and of obvious relevance to the liberal-communitarian debate.
I argue that neither the com m unitarian nor the liberal appropriations 
do justice to A ristotle's political theory. Both seem to attribute their own 
aspirations to the Aristotelian text and to rely on Aristotle's authority in order 
to substantiate their argum ents. I conclude that Aristotle's political theory, 
when carefully examined within the debate, comes out as neither liberal nor 
communitarian. Aristotelian political philosophy is consistent neither w ith a 
liberal-indiv idualist nor w ith  a com m unitarian  view  that gives such a 
prom inent role to the concept of community. Neither of the two parties to the 
debate therefore seems entitled to cite Aristotle in support of their position.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Though words be the signs we have of another's opinions and intentions; yet, because of the 
equivocation of them is so frequent according to the diversity of contexture, and the company 
wherewith they go (which the presence of mm that speaketh, our sight of his actions and 
conjecture of his intentions, must help to discharge us of): It must be extremely hard to find out 
the opinions and meanings of those men that are gone from us long ago, ana have left us no 
other signification thereof but their books; which cannot possibly be understood without 
history enough to discover those aforementioned circumstances, and also without great
prudence to observe them.
Hobbes, Human Nature
1.1 Aristotle and the liberal-communitarian debate
My interest in this thesis is to examine the appropriation of Aristotle in the so- 
called liberal-communitarian debate. Aristotle's Politics has been a pivotal text 
in the debates on the extent and limits of unity and liberty in the state. Indeed, 
co m m u n ita rian s  freq u en tly  invoke A ris to tle 's  a u th o rity  and  his 
understanding of political community when they complain that our political 
life often resembles something like a Hobbesian account of the state of nature: 
"nothing but civil w ar carried on by other means, a w ar of all against all we 
make for ourselves, not out of whole cloth but out of an intentional distortion 
of our social natures".
Although it w ould be wrong to suggest that there is a single line of 
argum ent shared by all comm unitarian thinkers, it is characteristic of many 
com m unitarians to argue that persons are not asocial or unencum bered 
individuals but that they require a place in a well-functioning community in 
order to flourish. Such comm unitarian argum ents usually concentrate on the 
concept of the community and on the concept of the hum an good which is the 
aim of the community. This doctrine, according to the com m unitarian critics 
of liberalism, can be traced back to Aristotle's political theory for the priority of 
the polis to the individual, since, as Aristotle maintains, individuals can attain 
perfection only if they are morally habituated under the polis and its laws, and,
1 Yack (1993), p. 2.
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indeed, it is upon Aristotelian theory that m uch com m unitarian theory is 
based.
A lasdair MacIntyre has recently suggested that, although it was "a 
prophetic exaggeration when in 1848 Marx and Engels declared that the spectre 
of communism was haunting Europe, nowadays the spectre of contemporary 
com m un ita rian ism  h a u n ts  only liberal p e rio d ica ls  and  u n iv ers ity  
departm ents of philosophy and political science". In a similar way, though, 
one can equally observe that contemporary comm unitarianism  is haunted in 
turn by the spectre of Aristotle.
A great deal of contemporary communitarian argum ent is based on an 
endeavour to reconstruct such an Aristotelian theory, or better to produce a 
neo-Aristotelian one, which would provide a strong and sufficient framework 
for the founding of their argum ents against liberal theories of the good. But, 
nevertheless, it still rem ains to be seen w hether an exam ination of the 
Aristotelian arguments, as presented in the Politics, shows that they do indeed 
accord w ith the theory of Aristotle as presented by the Alasdair MacIntyre of 
After Virtue, and whether, in general, Aristotle's political theory really does 
support any particular position in contemporary political philosophy.
Indeed, Aristotle's influence can most explicitly be shown in MacIntyre's 
work (mainly in After Virtue) where the presence of the Aristotelian tradition 
is very strong. MacIntyre is definitely the one com m unitarian philosopher 
who is clearly neo-Aristotelian beyond any doubt. One should also point out 
th a t M acIntyre 's thesis has in general influenced g reatly  the o ther 
com m unitarian philosophers and has provided the historical basis for their 
argum ents. Therefore, the focus of my examination will concentrate mainly 
on MacIntyre's arguments.
MacIntyre (1995), p. 34.
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This is most apparent in the work of Sandel (1982).
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However, there has recently been a tendency among some Aristotelian 
scholars to adopt another kind of line of argum ent regarding Aristotle's 
political philosophy. Their approach of Aristotle's political philosophy is 
liberal, in the sense that, through the arguments that they provide in favour of 
Aristotelian political theory, Aristotle appears to be some kind of a liberal 
thinker, or even libertarian, in the weak sense of the term. Therefore, I will 
also focus on the examination of these arguments.
Throughout my study, I will analyse six key concepts (community, 
teleology, happiness, justice, friendship and liberty) which can be found in 
Aristotle, bu t which also are key concepts of both com m unitarianism  and 
liberalism, although they get to be very m uch differently interpreted in each 
case. The m ain questions that I will have in mind, whenever I will examine 
Aristotelian or Aristotelian comm unitarian or Aristotelian liberal argum ents, 
w ould  be w hether A ristotle 's political philosophy is indeed liberal or 
com m unitarian .
It should also be noted that, whenever I use the w ords TiberaT and 
'liberalism 7 in relation to Aristotelian thought, I actually have in m ind w hat I 
have called before "liberal accounts of A ristotle 's political ph ilosophy7. 
However, my scope is broader than that, since I will not narrow  myself to 
presenting only liberal or communitarian accounts of Aristotle but also to try 
to answer to the question 'H ow  liberal or comm unitarian was Aristotle?7. In 
this sense, I shall also present and examine liberal and com m unitarian 
arguments relevant to the discussion of Aristotelian politics.4
In this thesis I will focus therefore only on these six m ain concepts of 
Aristotelian political philosophy-com m unity , teleology, happiness, justice, 
friendship and liberty—not because there are not m any other issues also of
 ^ For the purposes of this chapter I shall assume that there is an opposition between  
com munitarianism and liberalism. Some may argue that the real opposition is between  
communitarianism and individualism and that liberals do not have to be individualists in the 
relevant sense.
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great importance, but because those six are, according to my opinion, the most 
characteristic of his thought in relation to the liberal-communitarian debate. 
W hat is interesting is that those six concepts are key ones in both liberal and 
com m unitarian  thought in the same way that they are for Aristotelian 
philosophy. All three theories focus on these six concepts and consider them 
im portant for political philosophy despite the fact that they deal w ith them 
differently. My aim in this thesis would be to examine w hether Aristotelian 
political theory has any affinities w ith either of the other two and to show in 
which ways it is appropriated in the liberal-communitarian debate.
According to Beiner, the moral self-understanding of liberalism would 
be notably strengthened, both theoretically and practically, if it were to shift 
from a Kantian discourse of rights and individual autonomy to an Aristotelian 
discourse of virtues and character formation.5 So, in fact, there are two ways of 
going if Aristotelianism is to be incorporated into the liberal agenda: either one 
tries to make liberalism change perspective and argues in favour of Aristotle 
w ithout denying liberalism at the same time, or one tries to prove that there 
are affinities between Aristotle and liberal theory. One has, therefore, to decide 
whether a shift of liberal principles to Aristotelian ones is required, or whether 
Aristotelianism  already has affinities w ith liberal values. This w ould mean 
bringing Aristotelian argum ent back to our contemporary moral and political 
liberal agenda, but not w ithout difficulties. Such a project—if plausible at all— 
cannot go on w ithout first tackling several problems that come up.
First, this w ould mean that Aristotle should be seen as part of liberal 
tradition and in fact be incorporated in it. Seeing Aristotle as part of a liberal 
tradition would require us to prove first that such a liberal tradition exists, and, 
second, that Aristotelian political theory has affinities w ith the central claims 
of liberalism. But at the same time one should try to define w hat exactly is 
meant by 'liberalism 7. Even if it is proved that liberalism forms a sort of a
5 Beiner (1983).
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trad ition  w hich starts from w hat is called 'classical liberalism ' of the 
seventeenth century onw ards and goes on until now  and the 'political 
liberalism ' of John Rawls (Nozickean libertarianism  being included as an 
extreme form of w hat can be called 'hard-core' liberalism), still one has to 
define w ith which part of that tradition Aristotle has affinities: classical o r « 
contem porary liberalism?
Second, one w ould have to meet the challenges of com m unitarian 
argum ent where Aristotle is part of the critique of liberal individualism  and is 
seen as an essential part of the comm unitarian tradition. It should be noted 
that one of the main difficulties of accomplishing such a project has been that 
the co m m u n ita rian s have in fact in co rp o ra ted  A risto tle  in their 
com m unitarian  agenda by provid ing  both historical and philosophical 
argum ent. In fact, many liberals in their effort to refute com m unitarianism  
have in the past focused on criticising Aristotelian argum ents w ithout always 
realising that w hat they were actually attacking was the com m unitarian 
interpretation of Aristotle's thought and not necessarily Aristotle himself.
In this introductory chapter, I will, first, outline roughly the debate 
between liberals and com m unitarians by presenting two ideal models of a 
fully-blooded liberal and a fully-blooded comm unitarian respectively. Then I 
will go on to identify the differences between the main exponents of liberalism 
and com m unitarianism  and try to classify their theories. These outlines of 
liberalism and com m unitarianism  will be used as guides throughout my 
thesis w hen trying to identify Aristotle w ith one or the other or clarify 
relevant questions. Second, I will discuss the question associated w ith the 
debate of w hether the four main exponents of comm unitarianism  (MacIntyre, 
Sandel, Taylor and Walzer) do indeed deserve the title of 'com m unitarian', 
since almost all of them have actually renounced it. This is a serious problem— 
at least as far as MacIntyre is concerned—since one could really place him as 
being a neo-Aristotelian but not a communitarian.
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In the last section of this chapter, I will examine the m ain historical 
com m unitarian  argum ent against m odernity  w hich can be found in 
MacIntyre's conception of an 'Aristotelian or classical tradition'. It is there that 
the historicist m ethodology of the com m unitarian argum ent at least in 
relation to Aristotle is fundam entally based. In fact, M acIntyre has been 
described as being "the past, present, future and all-tim e philosophical 
h istorian 's historian of philosophy".6 In this way, by having examined the 
main communitarian historical appropriation, I will consider in the rest of the 
thesis rationalistic appropriations.
I will not embark in general into an extensive discussion of the liberal- 
communitarian debate; nor will I try to offer a solution to this debate. My aim 
is to consider the Aristotelian appropriations that take place in this debate and 
to examine Aristotle's political theory. The liberal-com m unitarian debate is 
well known and over discussed if anything else, so I will assume knowledge of 
the arguments of each side and of the main positions.
1.2 The liberal-communitarian debate 
1. 2.1 Sketching the debate
Traditionally, the debate in political philosophy has been between two main 
concepts, liberty and equality, and around these two concepts two opposing 
political theories have actually been shaped, liberalism and socialism. The one 
is incom patible w ith the other it is thought. The debate in the nineteenth 
century was as to which one should be preferred at the expense of the other in 
both political and economic theory.
 ^Teichman (1990), p. 14.
6
Liberalism is usually referred to as "a historically im portant approach to 
political theory shared by a wide variety of political theorists, from Rawls to 
the libertarians". In fact, "because of the lengthy prominence of liberalism in 
w estern politics, it has sometimes seemed impossible to define it w ithout 
identifying it w ith western civilisation in its entirety, back as far as the Pre-
Q
Socratic philosophers". Liberalism, as its name anyway suggests, was~at least 
until the nineteenth  century—actually concerned w ith  liberty which was 
considered to be the natural hum an condition, while political association was 
considered to be artificial and political au thority  conventional. Liberal 
thinking was actually built up around "the absence of positive moral guidance 
in nature, the priority of liberty over authority, the secularisation of politics, 
and the prom otions of constitutions of government and principles of law that 
establish the lim its of governm ent and the rights of citizens against 
governm ent".9
Liberalism has actually taken a turn  in a new direction of considering 
equality as well as liberty in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
when the liberal justification for state intervention was re-deployed, as it can 
been seen for example in the works of T. H. Green, L. T. Hobhouse and J. M. 
Keynes. These political thinkers have actually shifted away from extreme 
individualism  and tried to reconcile individual liberty w ith  the notion of 
hum an welfare, and to provide the foundations of a welfare liberal state. This 
kind of liberalism has actually been called 'social liberalism'.
Rawls's publication of A  Theory of Justice in 1971 has agitated the then 
utilitarian dom inated field of analytical political philosophy and gave a new 
turn to political discussion. At a time when some believed political philosophy 
to be dead, Rawls has contributed to its revival by abandoning utilitarianism
 ^Hampton (1997), p. 170. 
® Zvesper (1997), p. 285.
 ^ Zvesper (1997), ibid.
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and placing himself in the tradition of social contract theories and Kantian 
liberalism. Rawls has in fact brought forward questions of political obligation 
and the state, but, most important, he has raised the issues of justice and the 
welfare state. W hat Rawls actually tried to do was to settle the old quarrel 
between liberty and equality, and to try to show that liberty could be made 
compatible with equality.
After the publication of A  Theory of Justice, several responses have been 
made from the utilitarian camp, but also most im portant from the hard-core 
wing of liberalism, those calling themselves libertarians—like Robert Nozick 
for example—who have strongly argued that in no way could liberty ever be 
compatible w ith equality, since any egalitarian principle w ould necessarily 
pose a threat to liberty. Nozick's theory—or Nozickean libertarianism  as it is 
often called—has actually created an internal debate within the liberal tradition 
itself which in fact continues the old quarrel between liberty and equality.10
But, a stronger and different kind of criticism against contem porary 
liberalism was to emerge from a quite different camp of political thinkers, 
those calling themselves communitarians. This debate between liberalism and 
com m unitarianism  has dom inated the 80's, and still dom inates political 
discussion, although the debate has taken a different direction in the sense that 
the tendency now is more to reconcile both sides by presenting a new theory 
that w ould actually compromise between the two theories. Com munitarians 
have criticised liberalism for its individualism, its neglect of community and 
its conception of justice. Crudely speaking, one can say that liberalism holds 
the claim that "the individual is prior to society", while com m unitarianism  
holds the counter claim that "society is prior to the individual". The central 
question which dominates the debate really is: "Should the ideally just state be
10 It should be noted that it has been pointed out by G. A. Cohen and others that Rawls and the 
'new liberals' should be actually called 'social democrats', since they reject the principle of 'self­
ownership' which characterised one form of classical liberalism, as in Locke for example. (See 
Kymlicka (1989), p. 10.) But I do not really see why some notion of self-ownership at least has 
not survived in the principle of 'self-determination' of the 'new liberals'.
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constructed from the standpoint of how to realise an ideal com m unity ,  or 
should it be constructed from the standpoint of how to foster the well-being of 
individuals in that society?"11
Com m unitarianism  is nevertheless a vague label and—although the
m ain exponents of com m unitarianism  (Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor,
Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Walzer) have widely differing outlooks—it can
be said that they all share certain general themes. Liberalism is also a vague
label in the sense that one can find different sorts of liberalisms, varying from
'classical liberalism ' to contem porary 'egalitarian  liberalism ' (which can
actually be d istinguished into 'political liberalism ' and 'com prehensive
liberalism') or to 'libertarian liberalism', or to 'hard-core liberalism', or even to
extreme forms of individualism . "Liberals", in the words of Michael Sandel,
"often take pride in defending what they oppose—pornography, for example, or
12unpo pu lar view s". Indeed, liberals in general hold that the state should 
respect and protect the rights of individuals by being neutral between the 
different conceptions of the good. Even though the tradition of liberalism 
includes a spectrum  of m odern liberals ranging from w elfare liberals to 
libertarians, they all in general agree to a 'negative' definition of liberty, and 
they oppose the comm unitarian principle of community on the grounds that 
the state w ould violate the rights of individuals if it forced them to conform to 
an official code of morality.
In fact, the case is that both liberalism and com m unitarianism  are 
cluster labels attributed to political theorists who do not always consistently 
hold all the parts of the cluster at the same time. Therefore, those engaged in 
the debate betw een liberalism and com m unitarianism  often find themselves 
criticising views which are not really sustained by the opponents they have in 
mind. This is a problem deeply inherited in the debate in the sense that a lot of
11 Hampton (1997), p. 169.
12 Sandel (1984), p. 1.
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confusion is created while trying to define terms, since criticisms or responses 
to criticisms might often miss the point entirely if A criticises p but B in fact 
replies having in mind q.
In o rd e r to be able to u n d e rs ta n d  w h a t libe ra lism  and 
communitarianism are respectively, it would be useful to try to imagine what 
a "fully blooded liberal' and a 'fully blooded communitarian' would be.13
Let's start our analysis by trying to imagine w hat a full-blooded liberal 
would be like. This would be a person who endorses all liberal arguments at 
once, but who would primarily be some kind of a Rawlsian liberal since it is 
m ostly around Rawlsian liberalism that the debate has been shaped. She 
would believe in the liberty principle, in the principle of self-determination, in 
the priority of the right over the good, in state neutrality and in tolerance. She 
would actually make claims of seven sorts:
(1) First, and most important, she w ould endorse the liberty principle. 
She w ould hold, that is, a conception of negative liberty. 'Negative liberty', 
according to Berlin's fam ous distinction, is involved in answ ering the 
question of the area within which persons or groups of persons should be left 
to do w hat they want w ithout interference by others, while 'positive liberty' on 
the other hand is involved in answering the question what, or who, is or 
should be the source of control or interference that can determine someone to 
do or be one thing rather than another. Negative freedom is in this sense 
freedom from, w hereas positive freedom is freedom to. Therefore, our full 
blooded liberal would endorse Mill's liberty principle according to which state 
interference should not be left to arbitrary custom and popular morality (Mill's 
greatest enemy), but limitation of a person's freedom of action is justifiable by 
the state only if it threatens harm  to another person: "The only purpose for
I3 The liberal in m y account is depicted as female while the communitarian as male. Usually, it
is the other w ay round, as in Bell's dialogue (1993). But, since all the main communitarians are
male, while there are many female liberals around, I thought that this sex classification would  
be more appropriate.
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which pow er can be rightfully exercised over any m em ber of a civilised 
comm unity, against his will, is to prevent harm  to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient w arran t/'14
(2) Related to the liberty principle is the principle of self-determination. 
She w ould believe that we prom ote people's interests by letting them choose 
for themselves what sort of life they want to lead, and that to deny people this 
self-determination is to fail to treat them as equals. Although she might leave 
some space for acts of paternalism (in our relations w ith children for example), 
she would insist that every competent adult be provided with a sphere of self- 
determ ination which m ust be respected by others. The argum ent for self- 
determination, in its extreme formulation would go like that: "no one may be 
in a better position than I am to know my own good. Even if I am not always 
right, I may be more likely to be right than anyone else".15
(3) She w ould also hold the view that the state should be neutral 
between competing conceptions of the good. The state m ust exhibit a kind of 
impartiality to different conceptions of the good which is captured by an anti­
perfectionist ideal of liberal neutrality. She would associate perfectionism with 
intolerance. Some fam iliar exam ples of perfectionism  w hich lead to the 
association of perfectionism  and intolerance include legal prohibition of 
hom osexual activity, legally m andated school prayer and m oralistically 
inspired censorship of pornography. Thus, she would actually endorse Rawls 
argum ent that "his account of self-determination should lead us to endorse a 
'neutral state', i.e. a state which does not justify its actions on the basis of the 
intrinsic superiority or inferiority of conceptions of the good life, and which 
does not deliberately attem pt to influence people's judgem ents of the value of
14 Mill (1989), p. 135.
15 Kymlicka (1990), p. 203.
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these different conceptions".16 But it should be noted that 'neutrality ' is a fairly 
new liberal concept that was not always associated with liberalism.
(4) Consequently, she w ould also have to base the distribution of 
prim ary goods on a 'th in  theory of the good', which can be used to advance 
many different ways of life. This 'thin theory of the good' actually relates to the 
liberal deontological principle of the priority of the right over the good.
(5) Since she is a 'new ' liberal, she should of course also be committed to 
"equality of the people in the political society, and to the idea that the state's
17role m ust be defined such that it enhances freedom and equality".
(6) She will not however endorse scepticism because scepticism does not
in fact support self-determination. "If people cannot make mistakes in their
choices, then neither can governments. If all ways of life are equally valuable,
then no one can complain when the government chooses a particular way of
18life for the community."
(7) And, lastly, after the publication of Rawls's Political Liberalism in 
1993, she w ould also distinguish between reasonable and rational conceptions 
of the good, from which two the reasonable ones are to be preferred. In general, 
liberalism is committed to the idea that "reason is the tool by which the liberal 
state governs. W hatever the religious, moral, or m etaphysical views of the 
people, they are expected to deal w ith one another in the political arena 
through rational argum ent and reasonable attitudes, and the legitim ating 
argum ents directed at individuals in order to procure their consent m ust be
19based on reason". She would also adopt Scanlonian contractualism according 
to which "an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be 
disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation of behaviour
16 Kymlicka (1990), p. 205.
17 Hampton (1997), p. 179.
18 Kymlicka (1990), pp. 201-202.
^  Hampton (1997), p. 181.
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which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general
. / /  20 agreem ent .
Let's now in turn try to imagine what a 'fully blooded com m unitarian7 
would be. This would be a person who endorses all communitarian arguments 
at once. He would criticise liberalism—and mostly Rawlsian liberalism— on its 
notion of the self and on the connected issues of neutrality and the good, and 
he w ould hold that liberalism does not sufficiently take into account the 
importance of community for personal identity, moral and political thinking
and judgem ents about well-being in the contem porary w orld. He w ould
21actually make claims of seven sorts:
(1) First, he would criticise the liberal conception of 'negative7 liberty by 
holding the alternative view of 'positive' liberty which allows for individuals 
to make their own informed choices about how it is best to live. People cannot 
be m ade free if left alone and freedom is not about being free f ro m  any 
restraint, but about being free to make the right choices. To be able to make the 
right choices involves socialisation and education about one's 'real interests'. 
Since no one has an interest in anything that underm ines their society (since 
this w ould at the same time involve underm ining their identity), positive 
liberty—although it does not allow the individual to engage in actions contrary 
to custom ary m orality—is not considered to be lim ited, as opposed to its 
negative conception.22
(2) Second, he would hold that the liberal notion of the self, according to 
which the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it, is false. It ignores 
the fact that the self is 'em bedded ' or 'situated ' or 'encum bered' in existing 
social practices which we cannot always stand back from and opt out of them.
2  ^Scanlon (1983), p. 110.
21 For this exposition of communitarianism I mostly rely on Mulhall and Swift (1996). I also 
draw from Kymlicka (1989), Bell (1993), Taylor (1989), pp. 159-182 and from Walzer (1990), pp. 
6-23.
22 Wolff (1996), p. 145.
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In deciding how to lead our lives, we "all approach our own circumstances as 
bearers of a particular social identity. Hence w hat is good for me has to be the
23good for one who inhabits these roles". It is only from within some socially 
located standpoint that we recognise those higher, strongly evaluated goods 
that generate moral obligations, goods which we may subsequently endorse 
retrospectively. The most celebrated advocate of this view is of course Sandel; 
bu t M acIntyre and Taylor also develop a substan tia l com m unitarian  
conception of the self as 'embedded'.
(3) Third, he w ould object to the notion of asocial individualism  that 
liberalism—according to his opinion—advocates, and instead he would argue 
that it should be abandoned for a politics of the common good. By 'asocial 
individualism ' he has in m ind the liberal assum ption that any individual’s 
ends, values and identity can be thought of as existing independently of the 
w ider comm unities of which he is a member, and also the liberal error of 
failing to acknowledge the true significance of those particular hum an goods 
whose content or focus is inherently communal, such as the good of political 
community. MacIntyre and Taylor develop argum ents that aim to underm ine 
this view of asocial individualism.
(4) Fourth, he would object to the concept of neutrality that liberals hold 
since he w ould think that Rawlsian liberalism is far less neutral betw een 
competing conceptions of the good than it is usually thought to be. Related to 
that is a further view that he would hold according to which there is indeed an 
objective good, rather than a plurality of contending goods, which at least 
compromises and possibly underm ines the negative liberty w ith which liberals 
traditionally  associated their theories. One im portant aspect of Rawlsian 
liberalism is that its theory of justice, which incorporates strong rights to 
negative liberty, m ust be prior to and independent of a theory of the good. This 
is im portan t in view  of the requ irem ent tha t any adequate  theory
^  MacIntyre (1985), pp. 204-205.
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accommodates a plurality of contending views of the good, no one of which is 
capable of eliciting public assent to it. Again, Sandel, MacIntyre and Taylor 
criticise liberal anti-perfectionism and the concept of neutrality.
(5) Fifth, he would also argue that there are claims about how, within 
our ow n social order, we have to rely on historically generated shared 
understandings in moral discourse with others (Taylor, Walzer).
(6) Sixth, he w ould challenge the liberal self-determ ination principle 
according to which the individual's choices of ends, values and conceptions of 
the good are arbitrary expressions of preference. Liberal justice is intended for 
rational ind iv iduals who freely choose their ow n w ay of life, on the 
assum ption that we have a 'highest-order' interest in choosing our central 
projects and life plans, regardless of what it is that is chosen. But this view 
accord ing  to com m unitarian ism  does no t cap tu re  ou r actual self- 
understandings.
(7) Finally, a seventh set of beliefs addresses issues about the nation as a 
principal locus of community. He would hold that the state should promote 
some conceptions of the good over others. As it has been pointed out, "full­
blown comm unitarians make three claims of increasing commitment: (1) The 
state should prom ote some conceptions of the good over others, (2) The 
conceptions to be favoured are those that have a significant degree of reliance 
on common goods, and, (3) The correct common goods to favour for any 
particular state are given by its social traditions or folkways".24 But, although 
most com m unitarians w ould hold (1) and (2), historicist comm unitarianism  
need only hold (3). MacIntyre is the only one who denies (7), as I will show in 
the following section of this chapter, since he believes it would be a mistake to 
charge the state w ith the duty of advancing common goods (Sandel, Taylor, 
Walzer).
24 Wolff (1997), p. 35.
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1. 2. 2 Denouncing the communitarian title
Another problem  associated w ith com m unitarian theory in general has been 
that almost all comm unitarian philosophers have strongly resented the label 
and have publicly tried to disassociate themselves from it. In fact, the only 
com m unitarian philosopher who actually calls himself a com m unitarian is 
Daniel Bell (1993). This is a problem in the sense that one could argue that it 
would be unfair to drag philosophers like MacIntyre and Taylor who are in fact 
neo-A ristotelians into the political debate, which has actually been often 
associated w ith popular but not philosophical works of political activists like 
Amitai Etzioni (1995) that many contem porary politicians have claimed to 
have read and admire. But also, most important, their rejection of the label 
com m unitarian  should be considered, since—com m unitarianism  being a 
cluster concept—they may be rejecting parts of the cluster which they take to be 
essential and we view as accidental.
As Bell points out, all four moral and political philosophers—MacIntyre, 
Sandel, Taylor and W alzer—who are typically labelled as 'com m unitarian 
critics of liberal political theory' have actually disassociated themselves from
25the 'com m unitarian movement'. Taylor (1984) leaves himself out when he 
distinguishes betw een two teams (team L and team  C) involved in the 
contemporary debate in social theory and, in particular, in the theory of justice. 
A lso, W alzer (1990) critic ises cu rre n t A m erican  vers ions of the 
com m unitarian critique and offers a less powerful version of his own, one 
more available for incorporation within liberal (or social democratic) politics. 
But, Walzer actually avoids any mention in this article of the comm unitarian 
critique of universalist liberal methodology that is norm ally associated with 
his own book Spheres of Justice (1983). Lastly, Sandel, although he is really the 
only one w ho on different occasions has identified  him self w ith  the
25 Bell (1993), p. 4 and p. 17, n. 14.
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communitarian camp, it can be suggested that in his Liberalism and Its Critics 
(1984) "he is presenting leading statements of liberal theory and some largely, 
negative challenges to it, as opposed to contrasting two fully developed 
theories".26
But, from  all four, it is really M acIntyre who has very strongly 
dissociated him self from contem porary com m unitarians w henever he had
27had the opportunity. In The Responsive Community, for example, he opens 
a letter strenuously disowning the label communitarian:
In spite of rum ours to the contrary, I am not and never have been 
a com m unitarian . For my judgem ent is that the political, 
economic, and m oral structures of advanced m odernity in this 
country, as elsewhere, exclude the possibility of realising any of the 
worthwhile types of political community which at various times 
in the past have been achieved, even if always in imperfect forms.
And also I believe that attem pts to remake m odern societies in
system atically  com m unitarian  w ays w ill alw ays be either
28ineffective or disastrous.
Also, at the end of his "Reply" in After MacIntyre he briefly indicates that he 
has m odified some of his views, and that he never considered himself a 
com m unitarian .29
MacIntyre finds himself opposing contemporary com m unitarians who 
advance their proposals as a contribution to the politics of the nation-state. It is 
in this sense, that he does not think that the state should prom ote some 
conceptions of the good over others, that he rejects the label communitarian. 
But does he really differ from the other communitarians, and could it be said 
that he is no communitarian at all?
26 Bell (1993), p. 17.
22 MacIntyre (1991), pp. 91-2, and MacIntyre (1994), p. 302.
2  ^MacIntyre (1991), p. 91.
29 MacIntyre (1994).
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In saying that he is no contemporary communitarian, MacIntyre makes 
actually two different points which are related to one another. First, he admits 
that liberals have rightly resisted the view of the modern nation-state as an all- 
embracing community out of fear that such a view would generate totalitarian 
and other evils. And, second, that a genuinely Aristotelian conception of the 
polis has to be a relatively small-scale and local form of political association, 
totally distinct from any communitarian conception of a m odern nation-state.
For those who hold an Aristotelian conception of the polis the nation­
state is not and cannot be the locus of com m unity. These Aristotelian 
conceptions of the state should not be fused with the distinctively romantic 
vision of nations which conceived of them  as actual or potential communities, 
whose unity could be expressed through the institutions of the state. As 
MacIntyre puts it, "When practice-based forms of Aristotelian community are 
generated in the m odern world they are always, and could not but be, small- 
scale and local".30
MacIntyre, as we have seen, holds all the above positions except for (7) 
and it is indeed due to this seventh set of beliefs that all the other three 
co m m u n ita rian  th in k e rs  share  th a t he has ren o u n ced  the  label 
com m unitarian. In brief, on MacIntyre's account of the relationship of the 
individual to the community, any attem pt to give a coherent account of the 
person and of m orality understood as a rational enterprise should take 
reference to the participation of individuals in essentially social phenomena 
such as practices and traditions. "Com m unal m em bership is not merely 
essential to one sort of hum an good, bu t is integral to the possibility of
31attaining any sort of hum an goods whatever."
It is true that MacIntyre does reject one part of the cluster concept of 
com m unitarianism  that I have outlined above. But this is not such an
3  ^MacIntyre (1991), p. 91.
31 Mulhall and Swift (1996), p. 161.
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essential part of the cluster concept in order to disqualify him  from being a
32c o m m u n ita r ia n . In fact, by arguing for (2), (4) and (5) above, and by 
advocating that the correct common goods to favour for any particular 
community are given by its social traditions or folkways, he is one of the main
33advocates of historicist communitarianism.
In M acIntyre's project of After Virtue Aristotle's account of the virtues 
plays a very im portant role in the form ulation of M acIntyre's critique of 
modernity. In fact, as he characteristically says, Aristotle is "the protagonist 
against whom  I have matched the voices of liberal m odernity."34 Indeed, in 
After Virtue he reconstructs a neo-Aristotelian theory of the virtues in the 
third part of the book, which he calls 'the Aristotelian trad ition ' and, by 
pleading passionately for the revival of this tradition, he considers it to be an 
antidote to the disease of m odernism . M odern philosophical discourse of 
m oral concepts and ethical problem s suffers gravely and, according to 
MacIntyre, the etiology of these flaws of m odernity can be traced back to the 
beginning of m odern tim es, w hen the system atic repud ia tion  of 'the 
Aristotelian tradition' began.
Although he does not systematically argue against the specific writings 
of contemporary political thinkers--in the way that Sandel does for example-- 
and although many of the issues of moral philosophy that he examines do not 
explicitly m anifest their connection w ith issues of contem porary political 
philosophy, the im portance of his w ritings and his contribution tow ards 
comm unitarianism  lies in the fact that his critical analysis is focused on the 
origins, the developm ent and the decline of W estern m oral and political 
culture in such a way as to provide a strong historical framework that supports 
on the one hand his critique against the flaws of m odernity and on the other
32 Wolff (1997), pp. 5-6.
33 Wolff (1997), ibid.
3  ^MacIntyre (1985), p. 146.
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hand provides at the same time historical evidence of his alternative theory 
that establishes in a m uch m ore profound  way, than  others do, the 
com m unitarian theory.35
M acIntyre starts his enquiry in After Virtue w ith  a "d isqu ieting  
suggestion", a vivid hypothetical example denoting that contemporary moral 
and political culture is in a state of confusion. All we possess are fragments of 
knowledge, as if, in the case that the natural sciences were to suffer the effects 
of a catastrophe, and the knowledge of experiments was detached from any 
know ledge of the theoretical context that gave them  significance, bu t 
nonetheless all these fragments are re-embodied in a set of practices that go 
under the revived names of physics, chemistry and biology. Everybody argues 
about these theses but almost nobody realises that what they were doing is not 
natural science in any proper sense at all, "for everything that they do and say 
conforms to certain canons of consistency and coherence and those contexts 
which would be needed to make sense of w hat they are doing have been lost, 
perhaps irretrievably".36
This is exactly the situation that, according to MacIntyre, modern liberal 
democracies are in today. We are all troubled with argum ents between people 
advocating opposing moral positions on different moral and political issues, 
such as the rightness of abortion, the justifiability of doctrines of deterrence in 
a nuclear age and the structure of truly just societies, but the problem is that no 
sort of agreement can be established between these opposing positions. Our 
moral language on the surface, according to MacIntyre, is the language of 
objectivity, rationality and truth. But this language deceives us since the 
concepts that it engages on have become so etiolated that they can no longer do 
any serious moral work, nor are they able to provide criteria by which to decide 
what, in a moral context, counts as rational. The condition of m odernity is,
35 Mulhall and Swift (1996), p. 70.
3  ^MacIntyre (1985), p. 1.
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therefore, one in which we possess only "fragments of a conceptual scheme, 
parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance was 
derived. We possess indeed the simulacra of morality, we continue to use 
many of the key expressions. But we have—very largely, if not entirely—lost our
37comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of m orality." As Horton and 
M endus pu t it, "After Virtue is the story of how we came to be in this parlous 
state, how we continue to be deceived by it, and how we might escape it".38
1. 3 Aristotelianism as a tradition
Com m unitarianism  bases part of its theory in the notion of tradition. The 
living practices of a com m unity define the activities of its members. As 
MacIntyre argues,
m an is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, 
essentially a story-telling animal... the key conception for men is 
not about their own authorship; I can only answer the question 
'W hat am I to do?' if I can answer the prior question 'of w hat story 
or stories do I find myself a part?' We enter hum an society, that is, 
w ith one or more im puted characters—roles into which we have 
been drafted—and we have to learn what they are in order to be able 
to understand how others respond to us and how our responses to
39them are apt to be construed.
But this is not always true. In fact, one could argue (echoing Anderson's 
Imagined Communities)40 that such 'stories' are usually nothing but a 'm yth'. 
A sort of literature or mythology one builds among oneself, like people who 
are in love or nations who rally round a common cause. Com munities, 
associations of any kind in general, usually do create such m yths and build on
3  ^MacIntyre (1985), p. 2.
38 Horton and Mendus (1994), p. 6.
39 MacIntyre (1985), p. 204.
^  Anderson (1983).
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them, when respectively they say for example—in a case of a relationship—the 
belief that it was fate that brought two people together for x reasons, or—in the 
case of a nation-state—the untrue belief that they suffered disastrous events at 
the hands of an enemy nation-state. But one should move on beyond myths. 
Myths might be useful in order to start a relationship or to establish national 
identity at some point of history, but if individuals or nations remain attached 
to them and fail to realise the deceptions involved in them, then progress or 
change of any kind would be impossible and several disasters could very easily 
occur, like for example loss or war.
In fact, this has been all along the liberal's complaint against state power 
and authority and their fear of perfectionism, that it could eventually lead to 
totalitarianism. And MacIntyre actually, as we have seen above, admits to the 
fact that this liberal fear has been justifiable. As Ham pton points out, "for this 
reason in their argum entation liberals start from the individual. By insisting 
that the individual is the focus of moral concern, the liberal gets the critical 
moral distance from community and the government that the communitarian 
lacks".41
Communitarianism has in fact tried to create a similar sort of a "story7 or 
"myth7 for itself which is called an "Aristotelian" or "classical" tradition. This 
concept of an "Aristotelian tradition" has mainly been argued by MacIntyre. It is 
clear that th roughou t After Virtue  M acIntyre m akes a conjunction of 
philosophical and historical argument. As he explicitly says:
The role of Aristotelianism in my argum ent is not entirely due to 
its historical importance. In the ancient and m edieval worlds it 
was always in conflict w ith other standpoints, and the various 
ways of life of which it took itself to be the best theoretical 
interpreter had other sophisticated theoretical protagonists. It is 
true that no doctrine vindicated itself in so w ide a variety of 
contexts as did A ristotelianism : Greek, Islamic, Jewish and
^  Hampton (1997), p .188.
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Christian; and that when modernity made its assaults on an older 
w orld  its m ost perceptive exponents understood that it was 
Aristotelianism that had to be overthrown. But all these historical 
truths, crucial as they are, are unim portant compared w ith the fact 
that Aristotelianism  is philosophically the most powerful of pre­
m odern modes of moral thought. If a pre-m odern view of morals 
and politics is to be vindicated against m odernity, it will be in 
som ething like A risto telian  term s or not at all. W hat the 
conjunction of philosophical and historical argum ent reveals is 
that either one m ust follow through the aspirations and the 
collapse of the different versions of the Enlightenm ent project 
un til there rem ains only the N ietzschean diagnosis and the 
Nietzschean problematic or one m ust hold that the Enlightenment 
project w as not only m istaken, bu t should never have been 
commenced in the first place.42
In relation to this, it should be noted that MacIntyre himself sets his 
project of reviving the Aristotelian tradition by setting his m ethod of enquiry 
in such a way as to indicate that:
it will be necessary to consider Aristotle's own moral philosophy 
not merely as it is expressed in key texts in his own writings, but as 
an attem pt to inherit and to sum up a good deal that had gone 
before and in turn as a source of stimulus to much later thought. It 
will be necessary, that is, to write a short history of conceptions of 
the virtues in which Aristotle provides a central point of focus, but 
which yield the resources of a whole tradition of acting, thinking 
and discourse of which Aristotle's is only a part, a tradition of 
which I spoke earlier as 'the classical tradition' and whose view of 
m an I called 'the classical view of m an'.43
Moreover, in chapter twelve of After Virtue, where he mainly discusses 
the Aristotelian account of the virtues, he makes it clear, in the beginning of 
his analysis, that since Aristotle is the protagonist against w hom  he has 
matched the voices of liberal modernity, he is clearly committed to giving a
^  MacIntyre (1985), p. 118.
^  MacIntyre (1985), p. 119.
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central place to his own highly specific account of the virtues. But, at the same 
time, MacIntyre is also determined to treat Aristotle as part of a tradition and, 
although he realises that this is a very unAristotelian thing to do, his analysis 
is focused on regarding Aristotle not as an individual theorist but as the 
representative of a long trad ition  w ho articulates w hat a num ber of 
predecessors also articulate with varying degrees of success.44
So, as we can see, M acIntyre's m ethodology relies on the historicist 
account of the concept of the Aristotelian tradition. A lthough M acIntyre 
realises that the crucial fact is for Aristotelianism to be philosophically the 
m ost pow erful of pre-m odern m odes of m oral thought, he nevertheless 
embarks on proving this philosophical value by relying on historical facts; in 
this way, he is applying a purely historicist methodology.
MacIntyre is clearly committed in accomplishing two tasks concerning 
Aristotle's own moral philosophy: to consider it, first, as it is expressed in key 
texts in his own writings, and, second, as an attem pt to inherit and to sum up a 
good deal that had gone before and in turn  as a source of stim ulus to much 
later thought. He does the first by writing a short history of conceptions of the 
virtues in which Aristotle provides a central point of focus, and the second by 
using the resources of the Aristotelian or classical tradition.
Obviously, MacIntyre's claim about his argum ent, that it will be given 
in something like Aristotelian terms or not at all, does not commit him to the 
role of the uncritical follow er of A ristotle 's argum ents, since like any 
comm entator and exponent of Aristotelian thought he is allowed his own 
reading of the text. Nevertheless, it is not clear w hether M acIntyre always 
presents a plausible interpretation of Aristotle's arguments.
But, p rim arily , w hat is m ost im portan t concerns the historical 
foundations of the concept of the Aristotelian tradition. If, as I will try to argue, 
MacIntyre articulates an unhistorical view of w hat he names as Aristotelian
44 MacIntyre (1985), p. 146.
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tradition, then his is a forced view of methodology that has to fail. But if this 
'embedded', historicist methodology fails, then MacIntyre's argum ent loses its 
strength. He would have to support it by using rationalistic methodology, since 
all his historicist m ethodology is unhistorical, bu t this w ould m ean using 
argum entative resources that he does not have, since he has refused 
philosophical argum ent based to alleged first principles available to us all.
I would like here to concentrate on MacIntyre's historical account of an 
Aristotelian or classical tradition and to examine w hether this notion, on 
which most of his argum ent is based, can be adequately sustained. A serious 
objection that can be raised against MacIntyre's conception of the Aristotelian 
tradition amounts to whether this conception is based on a historical fact or on 
a fictitious understanding .45 If we take into account the historical, political, 
cultural, religious and philosophical changes that occurred in the Hellenistic, 
the Graeco-Roman, the Byzantine and the Medieval periods, then a historical 
account of the Aristotelian or classical tradition—presum ably foreshadowed in 
the Homeric epics and completed much later by the Christian Gospels—seems 
more like a m yth than a fact. This is im portant if we take into consideration 
the fact that his criticism of m odernity and his plea for the revival of the 
Aristotelian tradition rest on the assum ption that there was a time when such 
a tradition actually existed. In fact, MacIntyre's historicist methodology is based 
on this concept of an Aristotelian tradition. If it can be show n that this 
tradition is not a historical fact but merely a M aclntyrean construction, then 
the historicist argum ent that supports his thesis becomes baseless.
M acIntyre's m ain thesis involving the concept of the A ristotelian 
tradition can be summarised in two points. First, that all attem pts of modern 
philosophers to provide a rational justification of morality have utterly failed. 
The cause of this failure is the fact that m odern individualism  and liberalism 
have succeeded in cutting our ties with the Aristotelian tradition of virtues as
^  Evangeliou (1989), p. 162.
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understood and practised in Antiquity and later as expanded and transformed 
during the Middle Ages. This Aristotelian tradition can be rationally defended 
even today, provided that it is appropriately am ended. MacIntyre's second 
claim is, therefore, that rational justification of moral choices and practices is 
possible within the Aristotelian tradition of moral virtues. W hat we need in 
order to achieve this is to go back to Aristotle who has provided us w ith a 
classical statement of the virtues developed in Greek society since Homer.
What I will try to prove by the brief historical account that follows is not 
only that the talk of a single Aristotelian tradition involves discontinuities 
and illusions and, therefore, could never be successfully sustained—let alone 
revived, since som ething that never existed cannot be rev ived—but, 
furtherm ore, that individualism  and the em otivist self are not m odern 
inventions of the Enlightenment Project—as MacIntyre argues—but that they 
were already embedded in the everyday practical activities of classical Greece 
and in the philosophy of the Sophistic m ovem ent, the so-called Greek 
Enlightenm ent.
If this last po in t is true, a further im plication for M acIntyre's 
predicament of m odernity arises: likewise, his criticism of m odern systems of 
morality as deviations from the Aristotelian tradition becomes deprived of any 
methodology. N ot only does MacIntyre's proposal of a new  telos for the 
m odern man, being just an updated version of a long Aristotelian tradition, 
fail in view of the historical fact that such a tradition is a fiction, but also the 
disquieting suggestion that he offers in the beginning of After Virtue fails too. 
In fact, we possess no fragments or simulacra of morality, since there never 
was a disarray in the sense that MacIntyre has argued and we never had a 
tradition expressing a single m orality, in order for this single m orality to 
become fragmented. The state we are in, modernity, is not something that was 
invented by the Enlightenment thinkers all at once; in fact, if anything ever
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existed in A ntiquity, this was a fragm ented trad ition  that incorporated 
different conceptions of the good.
My historical account will focus on four issues, related to MacIntyre's 
concept of a tradition, in order to prove my point: first, on the history of Greece 
of Aristotle's historical period; second, on the historical account of the Greek 
city-state; third, on the philosophical traditions that existed before and after 
Aristotle; and, fourth, on the tradition of the Aristotelian commentators in the 
Ancient, Byzantine and Medieval periods.
Let me begin, first, by giving an historical account of Classical Greece at 
the time of Aristotle. When Aristotle returned to Athens in 335-4 BC where he 
established the Lyceum, Philip of Macedon had already defeated the Athenians 
and the Thebans in the battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC. The destruction of 
Thebes, the leading city at the time, m eant the unconditional surrender of 
Athens and the voluntary death of Isocrates—the advocate of a peaceful pan- 
Hellenic union. During the same year, Philip—having acquired effective 
control over Greece—announced at the congress in Corinth his intention to 
invade Persia, a plan pu t into practice by his son Alexander after Philip's 
assassination in 336 BC. These events ended for good the existence of the Greek 
city-states as independent and political units. But, Aristotle's political doctrines 
envisioned the traditional Greek polis—as it historically existed—as the sine qua 
non condition of the good life for man. As Barker points out:
By 330, while Aristotle was still teaching the theory of the polis in the 
Lyceum, Alexander was already planning an empire in which he should 
be equally lord of Greeks and Persians, and both should be equally knit 
together by intermarriage and common m ilitary service. This m eant a 
great revolution. It m eant the appearance of the cosmopolis in place and 
instead of the polis. It meant the appearance of the idea of the equality of 
all men in that cosmopolis.46
^  Barker (1958), p. xxiv.
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The consequence these political developm ents had is that they made 
Aristotle's theory rapidly irrelevant and that, despite incidents like the attempt 
of the A ristotelian philosopher, Dem etrius of Phaleron, to rule Athens, 
Aristotelianism  as an ethical and political theory could not successfully 
compete w ith the fashionable new doctrines, Epicurean and Stoic, which were 
to dominate the scene for the subsequent centuries by appealing to man as a 
citizen of one cosmopolis rather than any particular Hellenic polis.47
Second, it is important, so far as the concept of the polis is concerned, to 
understand w hat exactly Aristotle means w hen he refers to it. This special 
com m unity of the polis, w hat actually m ade the polis thus and so, was a 
unique historical phenom enon that only took place in classical Greece of the 
fifth and sixth centuries and that had actually faded out from the time of 
Aristotle w ith the creation of the Hellenistic world which was marked by the 
conquests of Alexander the Great, the pupil of Aristotle. For Aristotle, politics 
implies the polis, the Greek city-state, scattered over the Greek mainland and 
the maritim e area of the Greek dispersion. As Barker says, "it presupposes a 
small M editerranean world which was a world of 'urbanity' or civic republics 
(the largest w ith an area of 1,000 square miles, but many w ith 100 or less) and 
which stood, as such, in contrast w ith the w orld of 'rurality ' in which the 
nations or ethne  lived. There was some notion am ong the Greeks of a
48community called 'H ellas', bu t it was in no sense a political community." 
This Greek polis provided a unique type of civilised life, well-suited for the 
full development of hum an potential, since "small as it was, it is complete in 
itself: it is self-sufficient, in the sense that it meets from its own resources—its 
own accumulated moral tradition and the physical yield of its own soil and 
w aters—all the m oral and m aterial needs of its m em bers".49 And most
47 Evangeliou (1989), p. 163. See also, Evangeliou (1983), pp. 132-134.
48 Barker (1958), p. vii.
4  ^ Barker(1958), p. viii.
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important, as Barker again remarks, this polis being whole and complete, with 
a rounded life of its own, rises to a still higher dignity than that of self 
sufficiency: "It is conceived as 'naturaT--as a scheme of life which, granted the 
nature of man, is inevitable and indefeasible"50. This notion of self-sufficiency 
that determines the polis has a value only in the context of the ancient Greek 
polis , w ith its special landscape w hich provided  and secured the self- 
sufficiency of the polis necessary for its economic and political independence. 
Self-sufficiency in this context is not an abstract term but a very specific and
51practical political one.
Furthermore, it would be unfair to the Greeks, let alone to Aristotle, to 
claim that their tradition was Aristotelian in the sense that MacIntyre uses the 
term. The Greek polis, and especially Athens, was a big centre that attracted a 
lot of foreigners for commercial and cultural reasons. A ristotle was, for 
example, a foreigner himself. Athens possessed at that time an understanding 
of w hat now adays is usually called m ulti-cultural citizenship.52 Athenians 
interacted w ith other civilisations and gained from them. Individuality was 
well understood and protected, and so was individual freedom; and there were 
few restrictions at the time on what one could or not do. Hence, to try to apply 
a communitarian ideal to the every day life of classical Athens does not seem, 
at least historically speaking, to be plausible at all.
Third, as far as the philosophical tradition that preceded and succeeded 
Aristotle's political theory is concerned, it should be noted that there are at 
least two movements ignored in MacIntyre's discussion: the Sophists and the 
Stoics. I will not go on to elaborate their theories here; I will m erely try to
Barker (1958), ibid.
51 The abbreviated account of the history of Ancient Greece derives from Barker (1958), pp. xi- 
xxvi and Evangeliou (1989), pp. 159-167.
^  See Pecirka (1967), pp. 23-26 and Mosse (1967), pp. 17-21. See also J. Dover (1974).
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indicate some points related to these two philosophical traditions in order to 
support my position.53
As Kerferd points out, the Sophists were part of the movement that was 
producing the new  Athens of Pericles, a social phenom enon w ithin the 
context of fifth century Athens.54 According to Kerferd, there were two 
elements in Athens responsible for the Sophistic movement: the social and 
political conditions and Pericles. Periclean dem ocracy rested upon two 
norm ative assum ptions. The first assum ption can be sum m ed up from 
Thucydides (II. 37. 1): "It is called a democracy because the conduct of affairs is 
entrusted not to a few but to many, but while there is equality for all in civil 
affairs established by law, we allow full play to individual w orth in public 
affairs". The second assum ption was that high offices carrying the right to 
advise and act for the people should be entrusted to those best fitted and most 
able to carry out these functions.55
Furthermore, MacIntyre has ignored the philosophical tradition of the 
Stoics in his account of the classical tradition. As Long has argued, MacIntyre 
has overlooked the fact that Stoicism was the accepted ethical tradition for the 
Graeco-Rom an w orld  from 300 BC to 300 AC approxim ately , having 
incorporated some non-political aspects of A ristotelianism  and having 
influenced C hristian m orality because of their m any m oral affinities.56 
According to Long, "given M acIntyre's requirem ents of a successful moral 
philosophy, Stoicism, in at least some of its approaches, suits his book even
57better than Aristotle himself".
53 As far as MacIntyre's analysis of the Homeric virtues is concerned (1985, Ch, 10), virtues 
which he takes to echo the Aristotelian tradition, I believe that MacIntyre there also follows a 
weak line of argument, but I will not deal with this issue here.
54 Kerferd (1981), pp. 15-16.
55 Kerferd (1981), ibid.
56 Long (1983), pp. 184-185.
57 Long (1983), p. 185.
30
Finally, I w ould like to turn  to the fourth issue of my historical 
exposition, the tradition of the Aristotelian com m entators in the Ancient, 
Byzantine and the Medieval periods. What can be justified is, I think, to speak 
of a scholarly Aristotelian tradition of com m entary in logic, physics and 
metaphysics but not in ethics and politics. But, let us see, first, whether an 
Aristotelian tradition of commentators, in which, according to MacIntyre, "the
58Aristotelian m oral and political texts are canonical" , can be established 
during the period of Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman culture. Although in 44 
BC Cicero was writing that Aristotle was ignored by all but a few philosophers, 
soon after an explosion of interest in Aristotle started which occupied the rest 
of the century.59 Andronicus of Rhodes produced a scholarly edition of the 
A risto telian  corpus in the first century which forms the basis of today's 
editions and accompanied some of the treatises w ith commentaries. After 
Andronicus, several other editions followed until the end of the first century: 
five different com m entaries on the Categories, a Doric version of the 
Categories purporting to be the work of the old Pythagorean Archytas, and two 
com pendia of the philosophy of Aristotle.60 The interest in the Categories 
remained strong until the end of the second century; in fact, the Categories 
acted as a catalyst and attracted comm entaries from three schools, Stoic, 
Platonist and Aristotelian.61
By the th ird  century, though, the viability of Aristotle's categorical
scheme has started to be questioned. Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonism,
62was critical of the Categories in his Enneads. Porphyry, nevertheless, who 
flourished at the end of the third century AD (232-309)--and Iamblichus and 
Dexippus who followed—managed to produce a synthesis of Aristotelianism
^  MacIntyre (1985), p. 261.
59 Sorabji (1990).
^  Sorabji (1990).
61 Sorabji (1990).
^  Enneads,  6.1-3.
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and Platonism which made Aristotle's logic and a selection of his other texts 
become a standard  prerequisite  for Platonic studies in the Neoplatonic
63schools. It has to be acknowledged though that N eoplatonism  was the 
dom inant philosophy of the time.64
As far as the Ethics are concerned, Porphyry saved very little from the 
Aristotelian doctrine of the virtues which were eventually incorporated in the 
grand Neoplatonic synthesis and in this way passed on to Byzantium and to 
Christianity in the West. A lthough Porphyry included some account of the 
Aristotelian doctrine of virtues, he however placed Aristotle's politikai aretai 
first in the grade of h ierarchy of v irtues below the k a r th a t ik a i ,  the 
paradeigmatikai and the noetikai aretai—having at the same time degraded the 
classical cardinal virtues of sophia, dikaiosyne, andreia and sophrosyne, which 
eventually were embraced by the Fathers of the Christian-Orthodox Church 
who gave priority to the theological virtues of pistis, elpis and agape (faith, 
hope and love-charity).65
Likewise, it is not possible to defend the existence of an ethical 
Aristotelian tradition during Byzantine and Mediaeval times. As Praechter has 
remarked, "anyone looking at the list of works of Aristotle commented upon 
in late antiquity or early Byzantine times is struck by three gaps—the Politics, 
the Rhetoric ,  and the zoological and anthropological w orks".66 Anna 
Comnena, the daughter of Emperor Alexios, had made the same observation 
eight hundred years before and placed under her protection two Byzantine 
scholars: Eustratius, M etropolitan of Nicaea, and Michael of Ephesus. The 
form er com m ented upon  certain books of the Nicomachean Ethics and 
sections of the Organon, while the latter on other books of the Ethics, sections 
of the O rganon ,  the Rhetoric,  the Physics ,  the Politics, and a num ber of
63 Hadot (1990).
^  Sorabji (1990), p. 2.
Evangeliou (1989), p. 163.
66 Browning (1990), pp. 399-400.
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zoological and anthropological works. In fact, it has been argued that for the 
Ethics, following the plan  of Anna Comnena, they each com m ented on 
different books so that the whole of the treatise could be covered.67 Michael of 
Ephesus, who M acIntyre does not mention, was indeed one of the most 
im portant commentators on Aristotle's Ethics and Politics but still he was only 
one enlightened exception. But, although Michael of Ephesus is known as an 
A ristotelian, it should be em phasised—as M ercken points ou t—that "his 
A ristotelianism  is never a m ilitant one".68 His philosophical language is 
coloured by Neoplatonism and, although this is a feature he shares w ith his 
contemporaries, nowhere in his commentary on the Ethics does he show an 
interest in attacking Plato and the Platonists in the name of Aristotle and the 
Peripatetic school.69 In addition, this revival of Aristotelian scholarship did not 
go much beyond the activities of Michael and Eustratius and it was confined to 
exegesis, not extending to a revival of Aristotelian philosophy.70
In general, it should be noted that, the standard view is that Aristotelian 
political philosophy was totally neglected during Byzantine times. Five facts 
have been cited to dem onstrate this: (i) by the fact that in the m anuscript 
tradition—as we can see in the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca edition 
(Berlin 1882-1909) and in earlier editions of the H um anists of sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries—the Politics in particular are not commented upon, (ii) 
by the historical fact that the Politics were rare in the libraries of the Roman 
Empire, and, therefore, did not reach the Byzantine Empire as well, (iii) that 
the Politics remained unknown to the Arabs, (vi) that even earlier Augustine 
did not make any use of them at all, and, (v) that it does not seem that the 
Politics played any role in the formation of the first Italian Republics of
67 Browning (1990), pp. 399-404.
^  Mercken (1990), p. 434.
^  Mercken (1990). In this article, Mercken argues extensively  against the so-called  
Aristotelianism of the Greek commentators on Aristotle's Ethics.
70 Mercken (1990), p. 437.
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eleventh and twelfth centuries, since until that period it is obvious that the 
West is inclined to prefer Latin political writers and Roman political thought
71in general.
Finally, in the W estern section of the Roman Empire, Boethius was 
executed before he had the opportunity to complete the translation of the 
Aristotelian treatises into Latin, although it can be said that in any case it is 
m ore likely that he w ould have followed Porphyry, as he did in his
72comm entaries on the Categories. Abelard—for whom  M acIntyre says that 
"what Abelard took to be Aristotle's definition of a virtue, transm itted to him 
by Boethius, is put to use to provide a corresponding definition of a vice'—does 
mention Aristotle's definition of virtue in his Ethics but still his contribution 
cannot be considered as seriously advancing the formation of an Aristotelian 
tradition of Ethics and Politics. In fact, it should be noted that up to the 12th 
century there is not even a single quotation of the Politics in the West until 
1260, w hen in Corinth William of Moerbeke produced the first translation of 
the Politics in Latin. This translation, which was received enthusiastically by 
Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great, is in fact the second ever form of the 
text of the Politics in Antiquity. Furthermore, it is very difficult to consider 
St. Thomas and his commentaries as evidence for the existence of a tradition, 
since as MacIntyre himself acknowledges: "It is therefore im portant to stress 
both that Aquinas' version of Aristotle on the virtues is not the only version 
and that Aquinas is an uncharacteristic medieval thinker, even if the greatest
71 Benakis (1985), p. 230.
77 Evangeliou (1989), p. 167.
73 Benakis (1985), p. 235. It should be noted that Benakis has argued that Aristotelian political 
and ethical philosophy was in fact em bedded in the educational system  of the Byzantine 
Empire in contrast to the West, despite the lack of documentary evidence (See Benakis (1985), 
pp. 230-236 and Benakis (1996), pp. 252-256). If this point is true, then a further implication for 
MacIntyre's argument arises when we take into consideration the philosophical tradition of the 
N eohellen ic Enlightenm ent w hich  w as—am ong other th ings—strongly  influenced by  
Aristotelianism. MacIntyre having ignored both the Byzantine and the Neohellenic periods of 
Hellas, might be m issing the only geographical landscape where a sense of the Aristotelian 
tradition at least in the philosophical texts might have ever existed. See also Begzos (1996), pp. 
228-239.
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of m edieval theorists".74 To sum m arise, according to Sorabji, in the CAG 
edition from sixty-two commentaries that have survived only seven are on 
the Nicomachean Ethics and none on the Politics. From those seven on the 
Nicomachean Ethics only two are on all the books, while the others are on
75individual books.
In addition, a last point that can be made against MacIntyre's concept of 
a tradition is against his notion of 'w e' that is echoed in Aristotle's texts.76 By 
asking in the Nicomachean Ethics the question 'W hat do we say on such and 
such a topic?' and not 'W hat do I say?', A ristotle reflects, according to 
MacIntyre, w ith the use of 'w e', an account of the virtues that is implicit in the 
thought, utterance and action of an educated Athenian. But this is totally 
wrong. Although the explanation that I am going to offer is philological rather 
than philosophical, nevertheless MacIntyre's point about the use of the word 
'w e' is also based on an observation of the Aristotelian text that focuses on the 
translation of it rather than on its actual meaning. The personal pronoun T  
(eyco), is never used in the ancient Greek language—nor in m odern Greek— 
directly in written speech, only in oral speech. In fact, the use of the pronoun 
syto directly in a w ritten text m ust always be avoided, in contrast with the 
English language where T  is widely used. This is due mainly to three reasons, 
two grammatical and one psychological: first, because in order to indicate the 
person speaking you need not use the pronoun, since the verbs have 
conjugations; second, because one's personal opinion can be expressed in the 
third person singular by using the optative mood; and, third, because the use 
of syco is somehow connected w ith the showing off of one's self for purely 
selfish motives. When Aristotle writes in the Nicomachean Ethics (1094bl4),
See also Bosley and Tweedale (1991).
75 These commentaries are: 1) Aspasius in E N  2) Heliodorus in E N  3) Eustratius in E N  1, 6, 4) 
Adrastus (derivative) in E N  2-5, 5) Anonymous in E N  7, 6) Michael of Ephesus in E N  9-10, and 7) 
Michael of Ephesus in E N  5. (See R. Sorabji, ibid., pp. 27-29).
^  MacIntyre (1985), pp. 147-148.
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therefore, Aeyotro cxv ucavcog, and we translate "Our treatm ent of this science 
will be adequate", w hat the "our" stands for, or the "we" in other cases, is the 
impersonal "it can be said" which indirectly refers to the personal opinion of
77the writer, that is the T . There are cases where Aristotle mentions 'w e' in NE  
Book I, Ch. 3 but even there he is referring to Plato's Academy, hence 'w e ' is 
appropriate there.
Even though M acIntyre is a neo-A ristotelian, there is indeed a 
philosophical significance to the claim that his position differs significantly 
from Aristotle's real view. There are two sort of questions that can be raised 
against M acIntyre's project in After Virtue : Q uestions of substance and 
questions of method. My argum ent against MacIntyre's project focuses against 
the second set of questions, those of methodology. As we know, two kinds of 
methodology can be distinguished: rationalistic and pragmatic or historicist. As 
I have tried to show, MacIntyre's m ethodology m ostly is of the second kind. 
MacIntyre bases this historicist or em bedded m ethodology that he applies in 
support of his argum ent in two m ain claims: First, in his conviction that 
Aristotle thought of Aristotle in the way that MacIntyre himself presents him; 
and, second, that Aristotle is part of a classical tradition that actually existed 
until it was interrupted by the Enlightenment Project. My response to these 
two claims was that both MacIntyre and the tradition that he invokes have 
m isrepresented Aristotle. I have argued that the tradition  that MacIntyre 
invokes is fictitious and, therefore, should be rejected on historical grounds. 
Thus, w hat I have tried to demonstrate, by showing that MacIntyre—although 
being a neo-Aristotelian—has m isrepresented Aristotle, is that if he wants to 
prove his thesis, he would have to use rationalistic methodology, since all his 
historicist m ethodology is unhistorical. His argum ent cannot be defended 
w ithout support from a rationalistic methodology of some kind; but MacIntyre 
has unfortunately refused philosophical argum ent in After Virtue.
77 This is a point that Williams (1993) also acknowledges.
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In conclusion, I do not assert that I have given here a full account of all 
the historical circumstances related to what MacIntyre calls an Aristotelian or 
classical tradition. This would require a much larger and fuller elaboration of 
the particular historical circumstances that fall beyond the limits of this 
chapter. W hat I have really tried to do is to illustrate the illusions, the 
discontinuities and the historical inaccuracies involved in MacIntyre's concept 
of an Aristotelian tradition.
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2. COMMUNITY
You said: "I'll go to another country, go to another shore, 
find another city better than this one. 
Whatever I try to do is fated to turn out wrong 
and my heart-like something dead—lies buried. 
How long can I let my mind moulder in this place?
Wherever I turn, wherever I look, 
I see the black ruins of my life, here, 
where I've spent so many years, wasted them, destroyed them totally."
You won't find a new country, won't find another shore.
This city will always pursue you. 
You'll walk the same streets, grow old 
in the same neighbourhoods, turn grey in these same houses. 
You'll always end up in this city. Don't hope for things elsewhere: 
There's no ship for you, there's no road. 
Now that you've wasted your life here, in this small comer, 
you've destroyed it everywhere in the world.
C. P. Cavafy, 'The City'
2.1 Introduction
The concept of com m unity plays an im portan t role in contem porary  
discussions of political philosophy and especially in the com m unitarian 
criticisms of liberal theories of the good. Community is indeed w hat concerns 
the com m unitarians most, as their name suggests anyway. According to 
communitarianism, individuals are partly constituted by the communities of 
which they form part, and, therefore, a politics of the 'common good' should 
be advanced in preference to liberal neutrality. The common good of the 
community is thus the prim ary concern of comm unitarian theory. Liberalism 
presupposes an im plausible m etaphysics of the self, since—according to 
com m unitarianism —individuals can develop their ends, identity and talents 
only in the context of a community. Community should, therefore, be prior to 
the individual and not vice versa, since it is community that determines and 
shapes the natures of the individuals.
This com m unitarian  no tion  of com m unity  is p a rtly  based on 
Aristotelian principles (at least as far as MacIntyre is concerned, who explicitly 
refers to the Aristotelian notion of community throughout his work) and on
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the Aristotelian polis or city-state.78 MacIntyre, as I will show in the next 
section of this chapter, does indeed base his notion of com m unity on an 
Aristotelian account of the polis. The Aristotelian notion of community is also 
echoed by both Taylor and Sandel, in a more explicit way for the first and in a 
less explicit one for the latter. Taylor attacks the plausibility of the liberal 
'atomistic', as he calls it, conception of the self by saying that it sees a person as 
prim arily a 'w ill', w ithout taking into consideration the complexities of 
hum an personality, and that it ignores the fact that persons need to be situated 
in a society in order to develop.79 Sandel, although he very rarely mentions 
Aristotle in his work (as when he says for example, attributing to Aristotle, 
that "thus Aristotle said that the measure of a polis is the good at which it 
a im s"),80 he is, nevertheless, clearly influenced by the w ork of MacIntyre 
whose historical argum ent he takes for granted. But, it is not entirely clear how 
these com m unitarian pronouncem ents connect into the Aristotelian account 
of the polis.
The standard  response from the liberal side to this com m unitarian 
critique has been that liberalism never really viewed the individual as not 
belonging to a certain community, nor has argued that we should extract 
individuals from their natural communities in order to render them asocial 
and unencumbered. On the contrary, liberalism too insists on the social nature 
of hum an beings. The problem  is that we usually  view liberalism  in an 
extrem e H obbesian  v iew —not rep resen ta tive  of libera lism —that sees 
individuals as radically asocial, and we ignore other liberals like Locke, 
Rousseau, Kant, Rawls, Gauthier and Feinberg who have insisted on the social 
nature of hum an beings.81
78 See especially MacIntyre (1985), and MacIntyre (1994), pp. 283-304.
79 Taylor (1985), pp. 187-210.
80 Sandel (1992), p. 15.
81 Hampton (1997), p. 185.
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There have also been responses from the liberal side which have tried to 
reconstruct this Aristotelian notion of comm unity by interpreting it as not 
opposing the liberal ideas but indeed as supporting them. Yack, for example, 
has also argued that political community is for Aristotle a conflict-ridden 
reality rather than a speculative alternative, and that "the core of the Politics, 
Books III-VI, focuses instead on the kinds of conflict peculiar to political 
communities", and that "the existence of these conflicts bespeaks the presence, 
not the absence, of political community for him".82
Therefore, from what we can see, apart from the difficulties which arise 
from the implausibility of the revival of the Greek polis in our days if we take 
into account the form ation of the m odern nation-state—to take just one 
exam ple—several objections can arise as to w hether this com m unitarian 
interpretation of Aristotelian community is indeed the correct one in the sense 
that it really represents w hat Aristotle himself had in m ind when he laid out 
his theory, or whether it merely reflects the comm unitarian anticipations and 
impositions on his authority.
2.2 Conceptions of community
It will be necessary, though, to try, first, to define w hat a political community 
really consists of. A lthough the sim plest thing to say w ould  be that a 
community is an association of individuals, there is much dispute concerning 
the nature of this particular association. Really, there are two issues in dispute 
concerning the notion of political community. The first has to do w ith the 
relation between the individual and the community, and the bearing that the 
individual membership in a community has on his individual identity, while 
the second has to do w ith  the d ivers ity  of h u m an  associations
82 Yack (1985), pp. 92-112. See also Yack (1993).
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(neighbou rhoods, football clubs, un ivers ities, churches, ph ilo sophy  
departments etc.) that can be characterised as a community.83
Despite the diversity  of opinion concerning the notion  and the 
im portance of com m unity which exists betw een the different stands in 
political philosophy (left, traditional, or romantic right, com m unitarianism  
and liberalism), in general, it can be said that our notion of community has 
actually been shaped by three main models.84 I will present these models in 
w hat follows b u t not in great detail since m ost of the distinctions are 
reasonably clear and well known.
The first model derives from Tonnies's distinction between community 
(Gemeinschaft) and association (Gesellschaft) which are based respectively 
upon natu ra l and rational will. A com m unity is d istinguished  from an 
association in the sense that a true community is really organic and it involves 
ties of blood and kinship and shared attitudes and experiences. A shared 
locality is a necessary condition but not a sufficient one for the existence of a 
community, since community is something that one could only be born into 
and not a m atter of interest and contract. In Tonnies's community, individuals 
come to develop an idea of interests only because they have been born into a 
specific community.85
The second model of com m unity focuses on the im portance of the 
comm unality of interests, since a comm unity is a product of the will of its 
members and of the will for the good that its members have in common. This 
m odel (shaped by M aclver, 1917) has its roots in Rousseau's distinction 
between the general will and the will of all. In this model, historical ties are 
not as essential as they are in Tonnies model. W hat is im portant is the 
common concern for the good of the community. Community, according to 
Maclver, can be created by will, but this would only be the will of a particular
83 Kukathas (1996), pp. 82-83.
84 Categorised by Plant (1990), pp. 88-90.
85 Tonnies (1955).
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sort, for a common good or for a set of interests that a group shares. This sort of 
comm unity depends on the existence of a group which can be as large as a 
nation.
Lastly, the third model described by Plant86 regards com m unity as 
encompassing "partial relations" that is, groups related not by shared localities 
or a direct concern for some common good, bu t sim ply by specific private 
interests. This model stresses individual interests and views comm unity as a 
specific device for enhancing and extending these interests. According to this 
model, professional and occupational groups may be seen as embodying a 
sense of comm unity, since associations like these are based upon private 
interests. Similar to this model is that put forward by Kukathas which regards 
community as "an association of individuals who share an understanding of 
what is public and what is private within that association".87
It is interesting to bear in m ind though a further distinction m ade by 
Kymlicka betw een political and cultural com m unity. On the one hand, 
according to Kymlicka, a political community is one within which individuals 
exercise the rights and responsibilities entailed by the fram ework of liberal 
justice. People residing w ithin the same political com m unity are fellow 
citizens. On the other hand, a cultural com m unity is one w ithin  which 
individuals form and revise their aims and ambitions. People within the same 
cultural com m unity share a culture, a language and history which defines 
their cultural mem bership.88
In the following three sections of this chapter I will try to present the 
notion of liberal and com m unitarian com m unity respectively, having the 
above three models of community in mind, and to reconstruct the Aristotelian 
notion of com m unity as it is presented in his Politics .  Finally, in the
86 Plant (1990), p. 89.
87 Kukathas (1996), p. 85.
88 Kymlicka (1989), p. 135.
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conclusion, I will try to see what associations can be draw n between these four 
notions of community.
2. 3 The communitarian notion of a community
According to Kukathas, "the centrally im portant point of contention is the 
rela tionsh ip  betw een the ind iv idua l and  the com m unity  and, m ore 
specifically, the question of whether the individual is shaped or constituted by 
the community or whether the community is som ething to which individuals 
merely belong or are attached"89. The issue here is, according to him, one of 
identity. It is actually in this claim that the liberal-com m unitarian debate is 
focused concerning the notion of political community.
M ost com m unitarians argue tha t ind iv iduals are subject to the 
authority of the comm unity, pursuing a politics of the 'com m on good7 in 
preference to liberal comm unity. Such com m unitarian argum ents usually 
concentrate on the concept of the com m unity and on the concept of the 
hum an good which is the aim of the community. This doctrine, according to 
the com m unitarian critics of liberalism, can be traced back to Aristotle's 
political theory for the priority of the polis to the individual, since, as he 
m aintains, ind iv iduals can a ttain  perfection only if they are m orally 
habituated under the polis and its laws. The term  'com m unity7 can be traced 
back not only to Aristotle but also to Cicero and the Roman community of law 
and common interests, to St Augustine's com m unity of emotional ties, to 
Thomas Aquinas's idea of the community as a body politic, to Edmund Burke 
and to the works of Rousseau and Hegel. As Burke defined it, the community 
is a partnership "not only between the living, bu t those who are living, those 
who are dead, and those who are to be born".90
89 Kukathas (1996), p. 85.
90 Avineri and De-Shalit (1992), p. 1.
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I will start my presentation of the communitarian notion of community 
w ith that of Sandel who--despite not being a neo-Aristotelian--has the most 
clear-cut notion of all the three main communitarians, and still remains loyal 
to his critique of the liberal notion of comm unity.91 Sandel com plains that 
Rawls's theory of justice assum es the existence of a self as antecedently 
individuated which is unaltered by communal attachm ents, a self which is 
'unencum bered'. But, Sandel claims, our individual identities are not given 
independently of our m em bership in particular communities. In fact, what 
really is the case is that our identities are partly constituted by our social 
contexts and the commitments we have as parts of a community. There are 
three conceptions of a community according to Sandel.92 The first account of 
community conceives community in wholly instrum ental terms and invokes 
the image of a 'private society', where individuals regard social arrangements 
as a necessary burden and co-operate only for the sake of pursuing their private 
ends. The second account of comm unity, which corresponds according to 
Sandel to the Rawlsian one, offers a sentim ental account of comm unity in 
which the participants have certain 'shared final ends' and regard the scheme 
of co-operation as good in itself. But both these notions of comm unity are 
inadequate, since "one w ould have to imagine a conception of community 
that could penetrate the self more profoundly than even the sentimental view 
p e rm its" .93 As Sandel argues, one would need a theory of comm unity that 
would resemble Rawls's conception in that the sense of community would be 
manifest in the aims and the values of the participants but also in which
to say that the m embers of a society are bound by a sense of 
community is not simply to say that a great m any of them profess 
com m unitarian sentim ents and pursue com m unitarian aims, but 
rather that they conceive their identity—the subject and not just the
91 See Sandel (1996).
92 Sandel (1982), pp. 147-154.
93 Sandel (1982), p. 149.
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object of their feelings and aspirations--as defined to some extent by 
the com m unity of which they are part. For them , com m unity 
describes not just w hat they have as fellow citizens bu t also what 
they are, not a rela tionship  they choose (as in vo lun tary  
association) bu t an attachm ent they discover, not m erely an 
attribute but a constituent of their identity.94
MacIntyre is (as I have already mentioned) probably the communitarian 
who is the most neo-Aristotelian of all. According to M acIntyre of A fte r  
Virtue, in the Greek culture the chief means of moral education is the telling 
of stories. The im portant element of the Greek cultures is that these narratives 
provided the historical memory of the societies in which they were finally 
w ritten down. Moreover, stories, like the Homeric poems, provided a moral 
background to contemporary debate in classical societies, an account of a 'now- 
transcended' or 'partly-transcended' moral order whose beliefs and concepts 
were still partially  influential, bu t which provided at the same time an 
illum inating  contrast to the p resen t.95 It is on this historical fact t h a t  
MacIntyre's argum ent is based when he relates the Aristotelian theory with 
the virtues of the Homeric society.
In the Homeric world, every individual has a given role and status 
w ithin a well-defined and highly determinate system of roles and statuses. In 
the Heroic society a man is w hat he does and to judge a m an is to judge his 
actions. The Homeric individual had, therefore, a fixed role according to the 
position that he occupies in society and the knowledge of his role dictated to 
him his behaviour in society in order to redeem the duties incum bent upon 
him, since the concept of the virtues express the excellencies of character.96
In the Hom eric society, therefore, m orality and the requirem ents 
determ ined by social structure coincide: in fact, there exists no difference 
between them and the identity of a person is determined only by right action. It
94 Sandel (1982), p. 150.
95 MacIntyre (1985), p. 121.
96 MacIntyre (1985), pp. 122-123.
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follows that such a hum an life has a determinate form, the form of a certain 
kind of story.97 The Homeric poems narrate w hat happens to m en and, 
furthermore, in this narrative they capture a form that was already present in 
the lives which they relate, being able to portray a society which already 
embodies the form of epic.98 But, what does this mean? Is it not the place of 
the individual in society rather than his actions which determine his identity? 
According to MacIntyre, Aristotle is a part of this Homeric tradition, since the 
Athenians of the fifth century understood them selves as having emerged 
from the conflicts of this society and, consequently, defined their own 
s tandpo in t partia lly  in term s of th a t em ergence.99 But this is a very 
questionable step in MacIntyre's argument.
M acIntyre focuses on the Aristotelian account of hum an nature and 
links it w ith the metaphysical biology which the Ethics presupposes. According 
to MacIntyre's appropriation, for Aristotle, hum an beings, like the members of 
all other species, have a specific nature; and that nature is such that they have 
certain aims and goals, such that they move by nature towards a specific telos 
and the task that Aristotle faces is that of giving an account of the good which 
is at once local and particular, located in and partially  defined by the 
characteristics of the polis, while at the same time being cosmic and universal. 
The good for m an is identified with eudaimonia, the state of being well and 
doing well in being well, of a m an's being well-favoured himself and in 
relation to the divine. But, as MacIntyre rightly points out, the question of the 
content of eudaimonia is left, from the beginning, largely open.
M acIntyre's Aristotelianism  becomes clear w hen he talks about the 
Aristotelian virtues. In MacIntyre's view, Aristotle suggests that the final end 
of m an determines the virtues. The relation between the virtues and the end 
is an internal one and he calls a means internal to a given end, when the end
97 MacIntyre (1985), p. 124.
98 MacIntyre (1985), pp. 124-125.
99 MacIntyre (1985), p. 131.
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cannot be adequately characterised independently of a characterisation of the 
means. Of course, it should be noted that this distinction between internal and 
external virtues is not made by Aristotle but by Thomas Aquinas.
M acIntyre analyses three different conceptions of virtues. The first 
derives from Homer and is typical of the image of the Homeric society. It has 
to do w ith virtue as a quality that enables m an to fulfil his social role. The 
second conception is based on Aristotle, the New Testament and Aquinas and 
has to do with that quality that leads man to the fulfilment of a hum an end, 
natural or supernatural. The third expresses the beliefs of the Eighteenth 
century, and it has as an example Benjamin Franklin, and conceives virtue as 
a quality whose utility is made clear in the fulfilment of happiness.
M acIntyre's notion of the Aristotelian virtues can be sum m arised in 
what Mulhall and Swift point out:
the virtues as Aristotle understands them  cannot be exercised outside 
the political community; their developm ent and im plem entation in a 
complete hum an life requires that such a life be lived out in the polis, 
together w ith others all engaged in a common project of attem pting to 
live a good life. Only the material and cultural resources of the city state 
allow this project to be implem ented; and virtues such as courage, 
fidelity and friendship constitute both the framework conditions for any 
such community to m aintain itself and an essential part of the form of 
life at which those in the community are aiming. This is the sense in 
which Aristotelian man is necessarily a political animal.100
Nevertheless, as Mulhall and Swift remark, MacIntyre has (at least) two 
main reasons for thinking that his prescription for m odern morality must be a 
heavily reconstructed version of Aristotle. First, MacIntyre has to show that 
the teleological understanding of hum an nature is justified w ithout relying 
upon the Aristotelian metaphysical biology. Second, MacIntyre has to find a 
way of invoking the concept of a com m unity  in m orality  w ithou t 
presupposing entirely utopian social and political changes. In doing so he must
100 Mulhall and Swift (1996), p. 81.
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take into consideration the fact that the A ristotelian em phasis on the 
constitutive role of the polis for morality is grounded on the polis of Athens 
which was unique in its historical and cultural appearance.101 Also, another 
question to be asked is how dependent was Aristotle on Athens as opposed to 
Greek practice in general?
MacIntyre attem pts to meet these challenges by the development of the 
three central concepts that he introduces: of a practice, of the narrative unity of 
a hum an life, and of a tradition. These three concepts, being inherently social 
in nature, are intended to provide a rational framework for morality in which 
the concept of virtue retains a central place.
The most im portant element of MacIntyre's argum ent is based on the 
thesis that virtue always presupposes some elements of social and moral life 
according to which it is defined and explained. 'Virtue7 is:
an acquired hum an quality the possession and exercise of which tends to 
enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the 
lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.102
'Practice7 is first of all the social background where the exercise of the 
virtues is made possible. Practice, according to MacIntyre, is:
any coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative 
hum an activity through which goods internal to that form of activity 
are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of 
excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form 
of activity, with the result that hum an powers to achieve excellence, and 
hum an conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically 
extended.103
On the other hand, by the concept of the 'narrative unity  of a hum an 
life7 MacIntyre invokes the conception of a telos by following Aristotle that 
"man is by nature a political animal" and that the polis is a natural political
101 Mulhall and Swift (1996), p. 82.
I ° 2 MacIntyre (1985), p. 191.
103 MacIntyre (1985), p. 187.
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organisation by arguing that we cannot justify political arrangem ents without 
reference to common purposes and ends and that we cannot conceive our 
personhood w ithout reference to our roles as citizens and as participants in a 
common life. As MacIntyre puts it,
man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a 
story-telling animal... the key question for m en is not about their own 
authorship; I can only answer the question "What am I to do?7 if I can 
answer the prior question 7Of w hat story or stories do I find myself a 
part?7. We enter hum an society, that is, w ith  one or more im puted 
characters—roles into which we have been drafted—and we have to learn 
what they are in order to be able to understand how others respond to us 
and how responses to them are apt to be construed.104
And, lastly, by the concept of a tradition MacIntyre has in m ind the 
different historical and social circumstances that individuals live through, and 
by this he invokes a kind of moral relativism. As he says,
But it is not just that different individuals live in different social 
circumstances; it is also that we all approach our circumstances as 
bearers of a particular social identity... As much as I inherit from the past 
of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety  of debts, 
inheritances, rightful expectation and obligations. These constitute the 
given of life, my moral starting-point. This in part is w hat gives my life 
its moral particularity.105
It should though be no ted—as I have pointed out in the previous 
chapter—that MacIntyre does not quite accept the com m unitarian notion of 
community at least as it has been generally presented, in the sense that he does 
not believe in the re-introduction of a neo-Aristotelian conception of politics 
at the level of the contemporary Western nation-state. In fact, w hat MacIntyre 
really does, w hen advocating that when practice-based forms of Aristotelian 
community are generated in the m odern world they should always be small- 
scale and local, is to be more on the side of the third model of community,
104 MacIntyre (1985), p. 201.
105 MacIntyre (1985), pp. 204-205.
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which I have outlined previously, w ithout denying though the historical and 
social ties of the Tonnies model.
Charles Taylor's notion of community follows pretty much on the same 
track as M acIntyre's, although Taylor is more inclined not to reject all 
elements of liberal modernity. Taylor also connects the notion of the self with 
that of the community. In order to be able to ask the question w hat a person is, 
we need first to be able to connect it with his self-interpretations. As Mulhall 
and Swift point out, according to Taylor, this essential relation between selves 
and self-interpretation entails an equally essential relation between selves and 
other selves which is a relation to the community. This can be viewed in two 
ways. First, by gaining access to a vocabulary that em bodies these self­
representations. A language for Taylor exists only in a community. Second, by 
searching for my personal identity in relation to others, since one can be a self 
only amongst other selves.106 The only way through which I can learn about 
myself is engaging in conversation with others by using a language reflecting 
the community I am in. This does not deny the possibility of disassociating 
myself from others in the long run, from disputing and setting myself free to 
lead my own way. But, nevertheless, a self exists for Taylor only within what 
he calls 'w ebs of interlocution', and these can only be achieved inside a 
com m unity .107
In conclusion, we can see from the above presented com m unitarian 
accounts of community that, in general, communitarians think of individuals 
being socially em bedded in the com m unities they live in and that their 
appropriation of Aristotle seems to support their view. To w hat extent though 
this appropriation of Aristotelian community accurately represents Aristotle's 
actual notion of comm unity as presented in the Politics still remains to be 
seen.
106 Mulhall and Swift (1997), pp. 111-112.
107 Taylor (1989), p. 36.
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2.4 The liberal notion of a community
Liberalism is not really considered as having much to say about community in 
general. In fact, some might think that to talk about such a thing as a 'liberal 
community7 even existing on the first place, would be to talk about something 
totally alien to liberal philosophy. But is this really the case? It is true of course 
that the issue of comm unity has been pu t forward in the open in a direct 
m anner only by the communitarian critique of liberalism. It is communitarian 
philosophy w hich prim arily  takes the com m on good of the political 
com m unity as its first object of concern. According to com m unitarianism , 
liberalism undervalues comm unity, while in fact the existence of political 
com m unity and its value should  be our p rim ary  concern in political 
philosophy.
The liberal response to this com m unitarian critique varies. In fact, by 
following the line of argum ent that the communitarians themselves offer one 
could even sustain the idea that it is possible to have a communitarian society 
advancing liberal ideals, since, if community is to aim at its common good, 
one could easily imagine a community set to advance as its common good 
liberal ideals such as neutrality and self-determ ination. As Sandel himself 
points out, Rawls believes that he is allowing a fuller theory of community 
than is usually available on traditional liberal assumptions, in the sense that 
where the content of motivations is left open, as in the original position of the 
Theory of Justice, it is possible to suppose that "individuals may pursue social 
or comm unitarian aims as well as merely private ones, especially in a society 
governed by a scheme of reciprocity that works to affirm their sense of self- 
esteem 77.108
As Rawls points out, "there is no reason w hy a well-ordered society 
should encourage primarily individualist values if this means ways of life that
108 Sandel (1982), p. 148.
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lead individuals to pursue their own way and to have no concern for the 
interests of others (although respecting their rights and liberties). Normally 
one would expect most people to belong to one or more associations and to 
have at least some collective ends in this sense".109
One liberal response has been to argue that social pluralism  renders the 
existence of political com m unity im plausible.110 As Rawls says in Political 
Liberalism:
justice as fairness does indeed abandon the ideal of political 
comm unity if by that ideal is m eant a political society united on 
one (partially or fully) comprehensive religious, philosophical or 
moral doctrine. That conception of social unity is excluded by the 
fact of reasonable pluralism; it is no longer a political possibility for 
those who accept the constraints of liberty and to leration of 
democratic institutions.111
A second response has been to argue that there is a sense in which 
liberal society constitutes a community insofar as there is a distinctive set of 
liberal virtues, settled around a commitment to the idea of public justification. 
Macedo has argued for example that there is a shared public morality in liberal 
society, and  a d istinctive set of liberal virtues app ropria te  to such a 
c o m m u n ity .112 Also, a th ird  response has been to argue for a "political 
liberalism  which takes political com m unity itself as an aim, and not the 
rea lisa tion  of a p a rticu la r v ision  of hum an  flou rish ing  or hum an  
ex ce llen ce" .113 O thers though, like Kukathas for example, have tried to 
w eaken the notion of com m unity overall, and have argued  that both 
com m unitarianism  and contemporary liberalism have exaggerated the value
109 Rawls (1975), p. 550.
110 Kukathas (1996), p. 81.
111 Rawls (1993), p. 201.
112 Macedo (1990).
113 Moon (1993).
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of political com m unity, and have m istakenly assum ed its centrality as a 
starting point for philosophical reflection.114
In fact, it should be noted that all the talk about community from both 
sides, com m unitarian as well as liberal, evolves around the conception of 
liberal asocial individualism  and the liberal principle of self-determination. 
Surely, one cannot possibly sustain  that liberalism  in general has no 
conception of political community. That would be impossible, since it would 
suppose that liberal argum ent is blind to the ways people do organise and live 
their lives, and this is through one or another form of political community or 
association. And, surely, all liberal thinkers from Locke and Mill to Rawls and 
Dworkin when theorising on the principles that should govern our political 
life, have some conception of a political community that they have in mind.
Rawls is mistaken, according to Kukathas, to argue that he will not even 
consider the possibility of considering political society as a community since 
such a community will by its very nature require the oppressive use of state 
pow er.115 But this criticism of Rawls is wrong. It is precisely for this reason— 
the fear of the oppressive use of state pow er—that liberals have resisted all 
along the com m unitarian longings for community. It precisely for this that 
liberalism could never fully abandon the principle of self-determ ination and 
its m etaphysical conception of the self, no m atter how  plausible and 
historically acceptable are the com m unitarian argum ents in favour of a 
"situated7 self.
MacIntyre has acknowledged this and has credited liberalism —as we 
have seen in the previous chapter—for having it right from the very beginning 
in resisting all along the view of the m odern nation-state as an all-embracing 
community out of fear that such a view would generate totalitarian and other 
evils. A genuinely Aristotelian conception of the polis has to be a relatively
114 Kukathas (1996), pp. 98-103.
115 Kukathas (1996), p. 93.
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small-scale and local form of political association, totally distinct from any 
com m unitarian conception of a m odern nation-state. And, in this respect a 
point of convergence between liberals and communitarians can partly at least 
be achieved.116
2. 5 The polis as an association
Aristotle begins his analysis on political science in the Politics w ith the 
assertion that every city is a species of association (7r&aocv 7roXiv opcojuev 
Koivcoviav r iv a  ouaav). As he says in the opening passage of the Politics ,
Observation shows us, first, that every city (polis) is a species of 
association, and, secondly, that all associations come into being for 
the sake of some good—for all men do all their acts w ith a view to 
achieving som ething which is, in their view, a good. It is clear 
therefore that all associations aim at some good, and that the 
particular association which is the most sovereign of all, and 
includes the rest, will pursue this aim most, and will thus be 
directed to the most sovereign of all goods. This most sovereign 
and inclusive association is the city (or polis), as it is called, or the 
political association.117
The polis is described as a koinonia (Koivcov(a) ,  an association of some kind or
in m odern  term inology a 'com m unity '. Most translators of the Politics
translate K o iv c o v f a  as 'association'118 or 'partnership '.119 Some, on the other
hand, have been inclined to translate koinonia ( k o i v c o v i o O  as 'com m unity '120
since com m unity is the term  that describes best the particular m eaning of
political association. Translators favouring the 'com m unity ' option include
116 MacIntyre (1994), pp. 302-304.
117 I.l.i (1252a 1-7).
118 Saunders (1995), Barker (1958).
119 Rackham (1944).
120 Jowett, Barnes (1984) and Everson (1988) in the revisions of the Jowett translation. Also Yack 
(1993) and Miller (1995).
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some who are and some who are not involved in the m odern liberal- 
com m unitarian  debate. But the term  com m unity is m isleading, since 
com m unity is m uch more specific in a sense, while koinonia  ( k o i v g o v i g c )  
derives from the adjective koinos (Koivog) which refers to anything shared or 
held in common, and literally means a 'sharing' or 'partnership '. 'Association' 
fits m uch better the various m eanings of the Greek w ord koinonia , since 
Aristotle by using this particular w ord does not always refer only to the 
political association, or political com m unity, bu t also to other kinds of 
partnership such as family, household, management, marriage etc.
The problem  of the non existence in the English language of an 
adequate translation of the word K o i v o m a  becomes even more complicated if 
we call to m ind the m odern vocabulary of contemporary political philosophy 
which uses term s such as 'com m unity ', 'society' and 'association' in very 
different contexts. As Mulgan points out, both 'comm unity' and 'association' as 
possible candidates for the translation of the w ord koinonia may be very 
misleading if, for example, they suggest the common distinction which relies 
on T onnies's classification  betw een  com m unity  (G em einschaft) and 
association (Gesellschaft).121 A typical case of 'community' would be, according 
to this distinction, the family or the tribe, since communities meet a wider set 
of needs and are cemented by ties of sentiment and sym pathy and not only of 
self-interest. 'Associations' on the other hand, such as a joint stock company 
are usually formed deliberately and contractually in order to meet specific 
needs. Aristotle though when referring to koinonia "includes both the strictly 
utilitarian business partnership and the close-knit family under the heading of 
koinonia and ascribes both the sentiment of friendship or co-operation and the 
m ore rational principle of d istributive justice to every ko inon ia" .122 In
121 Mulgan (1977), p. 17.
122 Mulgan (1977), p. 18. Mulgan nevertheless thinks that 'community' is preferable as a 
translation to 'association' because of its etym ological connection w ith  'common' which  
corresponds to the derivation of K o i v o m a  from k o i v o q .
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addition to M ulgan's remark, it is also w orth pointing out that, on the one 
hand, 'Gesellschaft' is norm ally formed w ith some good in mind, while if 
'Gemeinschaft' aims at a good it may do so unconsciously. In addition, in the 
same context, it is w orth exploring the reference to friendship ((JnXia) made 
above; Aristotle's account also seems to blur 'Gesellschaft' and 'Gemeinschaft' 
and it is not clear whether there is such a distinction in the different kinds of 
friendship as presented by Aristotle.123 The A ristotelian pronouncem ents 
concerning friendship will become apparent in chapter six where I will discuss 
the Aristotelian notion of (JnXfa at length.
The implications that Tonnies's distinction betw een com m unity and 
association has in the contem porary liberal-com m unitarian debate are not 
only related to the Aristotelian concept of K o iv c o v ia  but also to the notion of 
com m unity  in general in bo th  com m unitarian  and liberal theories. 
Com m unitarian argum ents against liberalism mainly rest on the assum ption 
about the value of com m unity, w hich is, according to Yack, highly 
controversial in the sense that "communitarians generally assume that social 
and political health requires the strong sense of belonging to a community that 
they believe is characteristic of the specific form of social life that Tonnies and 
o thers call com m un ity " .124 The value of com m unity as described by 
com m unitarian thought m ight be very controversial in the sense that "it is 
not clear that comm unities, as conceptualised by Tonnies and those who 
follow him, actually do generate a strong sense of belonging to a community 
among its mem bers".125 The problem we are presented with in this case is that 
the sense of belonging to a community can only be plausible if we conflate 
community w ith communion. But in order for this to be the case, one should 
be able to prove that there is a plausible connection between community and
123 I suppose Tonnies's distinction could not have been made in a pre-capitalist society.
124 Yack (1995), p. 48.
125 Yack (1995), p. 49.
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communion in the sense that it should always be the case that communion 
would rise out of community.
According to Yack, both comm unitarians and liberals tend to blur the 
distinction between generic and specific uses of the term  'com m unity'. This 
frequent blurring of this distinction between generic and specific uses of terms 
such as 'comm unity', 'society' and 'association' is difficult to detect in general 
in arguments of both sides, since "we lack a generally recognised term for the 
genus of all social interactions", and, therefore, by "lacking a suitable term, we 
make term s such as c o m m u n ity , society, and association do double duty as 
generic and specific categories and suffer the consequences in conceptual 
confusion and repetitious intellectual controversies".126 But is this a valid 
distinction that Yack makes? A lthough it m ay be true  concerning the 
communitarian notion of a community, this charge could not really be made 
against Aristotle's use of koinonia as an association because that it embraces all 
forms of association, i.e. a distinction between a sense of 'com m unity' which 
can embrace many different kinds of societies and associations and a sense in 
which it refers to one specific form of association.
The im portance th a t com m unitarians ascribe to the value of 
com m unity certainly needs to be spelled out, since it is not clear why 
com m unity is a good thing as such in the first place or w hat sorts of 
community are desirable. Perhaps one could argue, for example, that not all 
communities are good. Indeed, it is clear that not all communities are good. 
Communities of thieves or terrorists, for example, could hardly be regarded as 
good, although they generate a sense of belonging to the individuals who 
participate in these sort of activities. At the same time, the com m unitarian 
would also be in a difficult position to successfully argue—w ithout lapsing into 
relativism—that communities which, for example, violate w om en's rights are
126 Yack (1995), pp. 49-50.
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valuable. A communitarian could not distinguish between a community and 
its mistaken values, as others might.
Another point to be considered related to the above is w hat evidence 
there is that Aristotle values com m unity and considers it as a good. Is 
com m unity a good for Aristotle? Com m unity generates a strong sense of 
belonging that is im portant for Aristotle as the Ethics chapters on friendship 
indicate. So, Aristotle would probably think community to be a good, although 
it should be stressed that not all communities or associations are good for 
Aristotle. As we shall see in chapter six on friendship, communities of thieves, 
for example, are not considered to be good for Aristotle. N ot all kinds of 
associations are good, according to Aristotle; only those which meet the right 
criteria to be characterised as such are good. So one should be able, according to 
A risto tle, to d istingu ish  betw een d ifferent kinds of com m unities or 
associations and not to think that all kinds of associations are necessarily good.
But, in addition, one should also distinguish between w hat is good for a 
community or an association and w hat is good for the individual. The good 
for an association is not necessarily the same as the good for the individual. 
For example, in the case of marriage, w hat is good for the m arriage is not 
necessarily the same as w hat is good for the individuals who are married to 
each other (e.g., divorcing, running off w ith som eone else, etc.). Some 
communitarians at least usually tend to identify the good of a community or 
an association w ith that of the individual. They tend to see community as a 
substantial entity inclusive of the good of the individual. Aristotle certainly 
does not think that all associations are substances; some people127 claim that 
the polis is a substance (or substance like) because it is natural. But, according 
to Aristotle, an association is not required to be seen as a substance, and, 
therefore, the A ristotelian notion of koinonia  is not a substantial entity. 
A lthough Aristotle considers collective activity to be an essential part of the
127 See, for example, Meikle (1991) and (1995).
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hum an good, he thinks that one could still experience his individual good 
w ithout experiencing merely a part in the collective common good.
The concept of koinonia plays an im portant role in Aristotle's political 
theory since the polis is perceived as a shared enterprise undertaken by the 
c itizens.128 The fundam ental goal of the polis is that of hum an good. The 
importance that the notion of good has for Aristotle's political theory is made 
clear in the opening sections of both the Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics. 
In the very beginning of book I of the Politics (1252a 1-7) Aristotle starts by 
arguing that "the polis has as its aim the pursuit of the most sovereign of all 
goods (KupicoTCXTOU dyotBou)". This conclusion is based on the following three 
premises: a) "The polis is a species of association or partnership (K oivom a)"  
(1252a 1), b) "All associations are instituted for the purpose of attaining some 
good" (1252a 2), and c) "The polis is the most sovereign (KupiGordrri) of all and 
includes all the rest" (1252a3-6). The polis has, therefore, an end, a telos (reXog). 
As Keyt puts it, the polis is telic.129 The end of the polis is the good of man, the 
good life, eudaimonia (eu5aijuov(a). This is argued by Aristotle throughout the 
Politics, but twice at length: first, in book I using a genetic or historical method 
and, second, in book III using a more analytical one. But I will not focus on 
Aristotle's notion of hum an good at this point, since I will discuss it in chapter 
four.
A community is, according to Aristotle, a group which co-operates for 
the sake of some common good. This common good can vary for example 
from meals or property to eudaimonia:
There m ust be some one thing w hich is comm on to all the 
members, and identical for them all, though their shares in it may 
be equal, or unequal. The thing itself may be various—food, for 
instance, or a stretch of territory, or anything else of the kind. 
(1328a26-bl)
128 Stalley (1995), p. 318.
129 Keyt (1991).
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This notion of the common good which holds the polis together and renders it 
into a koinonia can also be seen in 1252b29 where Aristotle says that the polis 
arises for the sake of survival but exists for the sake of well-being. Two 
questions arise from the above passage. First, do all koinonia seek a common 
good, as opposed to enabling individuals to pursue their own goods? Second, 
w hat is m eant by saying that they m ust have something in common?
Now, as far as this feature of the polis is concerned, MacIntyre maintains 
that the citizens of the Aristotelian polis take part in a project which is 
recognised as being good and that the goal of the life of the individual can be 
determined only according to his contribution to this good. This corresponds 
to his particular role set by the community. The role of the virtues is to 
maintain those traditions that enable the realisation of the particular common 
good. The individual contributes to the good of the community by realising in 
the best way possible his role and acquires happiness in the sense of the joy 
that accompanies every success.
MacIntyre makes here a similar point to Charles Taylor130 when he says 
that in liberal m odernity we are familiar w ith this Aristotelian notion of the 
common good only in respect to the grounding of hospitals, schools or charity:
An Aristotelian theory of the virtues does therefore presuppose a 
crucial distinction between what any particular individual at any 
particular time takes to be good for him and what is really good for 
him as a man. It is for the sake of achieving this latter good that we 
practice the virtues and we do so by making choices about means to 
achieve that end (...) It is worth remembering Aristotle's insistence 
that the virtues find their place not just in the life of the 
individual, but in the life of the city and that the individual is 
indeed intelligible only as a politikon zdon. This last rem ark 
suggests that one way to elucidate the relationship between virtues 
on the one hand and morality of laws on the other is to consider 
w hat w ould be involved in any age in founding a comm unity to
130 Sandel (1992, p. 15) also says, attributing to Aristotle, that "Thus Aristotle said that the 
measure of a polis is the good at which it aims".
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achieve a common project, to bring about some good recognised as 
their shared good by all those engaging in the project. As m odern 
examples of such a project we might consider the founding and 
carrying forward of a school, a hospital or an art gallery; in the 
ancient w orld the characteristic examples would have been those 
of a religious cult or of an expedition or of a city. Those who 
participated in such a project w ould need to develop two quite 
different types of evaluative practice. On the one hand they would 
need to value—to praise as excellencies—those qualities of m ind and 
character w hich w ould contribute to the realisation of their 
common good or goods. (...) They would also need however to 
identify certain types of action as the doing or the production of 
harm  of such an order that they destroy the bonds of community 
in such a way as to render the doing or achieving of good 
impossible in some respect at least for some time.131
But there is no evidence in Aristotle's text to suggest that "the virtues find
their place not just in the life of the individual, but in the life of the city and
that the individual is indeed intelligible only as a politikon zdon". Also,
associations like schools, hospitals or art galleries—valuable they may be—are
not necessarily good and could not in any way compare w ith the political
association that a polis is which aims at the highest good of all.
In Politics, Book III. 3 Aristotle argues that a polis cannot be identified by
reference to its place or the race of its inhabitants, since it is only the
constitution ( v o j l i o c )  of a polis which unites it. As he says,
If a city is a form of association, and if this form of association is an 
association of citizens in constitution, it w ould seem to follow 
inevitably that w hen the constitution undergoes a change in form, 
and becomes a different constitution, the city will likewise cease to 
be same city. We say that a chorus which appears at one time as a 
comic and at another as a tragic chorus is not the same—and this in 
spite of the fact that the members often remain the same. W hat is 
true of the chorus is also true of every kind of association, and of 
all other com pounds generally. If the form of its composition is
131 Taylor (1989), pp. 150-151.
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different, the com pound becomes a different com pound. A scale 
composed of the same notes will be a different scale depending on 
whether it is in the Dorian or the Phrygian mode. If this is the case, 
it is obvious that in determining the identity of the city we m ust 
look to the constitution. W hether the same group of people 
inhabits a city, or a total different group, we are free to call it the 
same city, or a different city. It is a different question whether it is 
right to pay debts or to repudiate them  w hen a city changes its 
constitution into another form (1276bl-10).
From w hat Aristotle says in this passage one may be inclined to argue 
that "if w hat it is for something to be a polis is for it to be a society unified by a 
single constitution, then there is no reason in principle w hy a m uch larger 
society than a city should not be a polis".132 If we see Aristotle's view, though, 
under this interpretation, then we should, first, accept the interpretation 
according to which it is the constitution that holds the polis together, and, 
second, the view that "Aristotle's subject in the Politics is neither the nature of 
the 'city-state ' nor of the 'city ' but of the society unified by constitutional 
g o v e rn m e n t" .133 According to this last view, a m odern nation state can 
function as a polis. But it is highly unlikely for this view to be plausible, if we 
take into account the definition of the m odern nation state and its past and 
curren t h istorical form ation. Some com m unitarians, like M acIntyre for 
example, were in the past inclined to indirectly suggest such a possibility, but 
not any more. But it should be pointed out that one could argue that a nation 
state could still have some essential characteristics of a polis (e.g. government 
by single assembly). Surely one could argue that different types of constitution 
create different types of society. For example, choirs are different from Rugby 
teams even though they are both types of social organisation.
It should also be pointed out that the above passage seems quite 
problematic. Aristotle's view, as presented here, seems not only to be opposed
132 Everson (1988), p. xv.
133 Everson (1988), ibid.
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to the comm unitarian argum ent but also to ordinary ways of speaking, since, 
on the one hand, it appears to treat the city as a substance w ith form and 
matter, while, on the other, it presents the city as an artefact. If the city becomes 
a new city at every revolution, then it m ust be more like an artefact than a 
natural substance. This is a strange position that A ristotle seems to be 
com m itted to—in distinguishing betw een different senses of natural and 
artificial—that will become apparent in the following chapter in the discussion 
of his political teleology.
Fred D. Miller argues, concerning both MacIntyre and Aristotle in their 
conception of state and community, that MacIntyre's description of liberalism 
shifts betw een two different concepts, that of com m unity and that of 
governm ent.134 According to MacIntyre, liberalism misconstrues the nature of 
community, since
For liberal individualism  a comm unity is simply an arena in which 
individuals each pursue their own self-chosen conception of the good 
life, and political institutions exist to provide that degree of order which 
makes such self-determined activity possible. Government and law are, 
or ought to be, neutral between rival conceptions of the good life for 
man, and hence, although it is the task of government to promote law- 
abidingness, it is on the liberal view no part of the legitimate function of 
government to inculcate any one moral outlook.135
In this description, as Miller points out,136 MacIntyre makes a switch 
between community and government, that is the state. The mistake made here 
is that these two conceptions—the first, the state, understood as the association 
which successfully asserts a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and the 
second, the community, understood in the broader sense of society comprised 
of many different forms of association—are quite different. To support a thesis 
according to which a lim ited state will be dedicated to the protection of
134 Miller (1995), pp. 363-366.
135 MacIntyre (1985), p. 181.
136 Miller (1995), pp. 363-364.
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individual rights does not suppose at the same time that society as a whole 
should resemble a liberal state in the sense that its components m ust be value- 
free and neutral. On the contrary, the advocate of the limited state can sustain 
that the com m unity in the broader sense should be a civil society,137 a 
community, consisting of many different associations which the government 
should protect.
From that, Miller is inclined to argue that the essential functions of the 
Aristotelian conception of best polis, that is moral education and the direct 
facilitation of the good life, could be sustained by a limited government. And 
he goes on to say that
Just as Aristotle makes the mistake of conflating two concepts of the 
polis, m odern com m unitarian theorists run  the risk of committing a 
similar error in connection with the community in so far as they treat it 
as a state or a quasi-state with an authoritative structure and a collective 
voice.
This is connected to a previous argument that Miller has offered on Aristotle's 
political theory according to which Aristotle's inference that the polis is the 
most inclusive of communities leads to the conclusion that it has the most 
authority. And this inference is plausible only because Aristotle fuses together 
the notions of the state and society.138
But is this true? As Ober argues,139 when we refer to the polis, either the 
one derived from the Aristotelian theory or the Athenian practice, neither the 
sta te /socie ty  distinction nor the com m unity /city  distinction can be fully
137 This idea of civil society, as Miller (1995, p. 364) points out, was clearly distinct, although it 
was advocated since the Enlightenment, by Hegel who treated it as a form of association distinct 
from both the family and the state. Furthermore, Oakeshott (1991, pp. 108-184 and 313-315) had 
distinguished a civil association from an enterprise association where the members pursue a 
substantive common purpose under a common authority. In a civil association the members do not 
have common substantive ends but co-operate and coexist under non-instrumental rules. M odem  
totalitarian regimes are an extreme example of the attempt to force societies into the mould of 
enterprise associations. Oakeshott proposed the civil association as a more defensible model for 
modem society.
138 Miller (1995), p. 358.
139 Ober (1993), p. 129.
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sustained, but on the contrary the conception of polis has to be viewed as a 
society and a state at once. According to Ober, w hen Aristotle uses the term 
polis he always assumes the existence of, and sometimes refers specifically to, 
the society at large, and also while the fourth-century Athenian social practice 
did make a distinction between state and civil society, that distinction was far 
from clear-cut and interchange between the public and private spheres was 
constant and meaningful.
2. 6 Conclusion
From the three above notions of community I have outlined, it can be seen 
that the differences among them are not always clear-cut. Some liberals will 
endorse some com m unitarian claims, and vice versa. As for Aristotle, his 
conception of com m unity cannot possibly be viewed independently  of his 
notion of good and his doctrine that man is by nature a political animal born 
fit for society. In o rder for one to decide w hether the com m unitarian 
interpretations of Aristotelian community are on the right side, and in order 
to settle in general the issue of w hether Aristotle is a com m unitarian or a 
liberal and in w hat sense, it is necessary to explain his conception of m an and 
in particular his doctrine that man is a political animal by nature, since it is—as 
we have seen—on Aristotelian teleology as opposed to the Rawlsian neo- 
Kantian metaphysical conception of the self that the communitarian theory on 
the community is mainly based upon.
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3. TELEOLOGY AND HUMAN NATURE
From these considerations it is evident that the city belongs to the class of things 
that exist by nature, and that man is by nature a political animal.
Politics, 1253a 1-3
3.1 Introduction
Much contemporary interest in Aristotle's political theory is due to w hat can 
be called the appeal of the natural. As Yack remarks, "in the textbook accounts, 
this claim makes Aristotle a defender of the naturalness of co-operation 
among hum an beings and an opponent of those, like Hobbes, who insist that 
hum an impulses drive hum an beings into conflict w ith each other".140 The 
above textbook interpretation involves a twofold issue. First, it has to do with 
Hobbes's own m isunderstanding of Aristotle's political theory in interpreting 
it as directly opposed to his own--a mistake originated by Hobbes that still 
dominates contemporary political philosophy. In the whole of Hobbes's work, 
his opposition to Aristotelianism (or better, his strong anti-Aristotelianism), 
and to the theory of the Politics in particular, is more than evident141; but what 
Hobbes did not see was that, despite his apparently objective opening in the 
beginning of the Politics, Aristotle's account is less factual than aspirational 
and that his ideal is strongly opposed to the vicious social and political strife
140 Yack (1993), p. 6.
141 Hobbes, although he was educated in Oxford, which at the time w as dom inated by 
Aristotelianism, and despite his admiration of Aristotle's Rhetoric, in the whole of his works 
regards Aristotelian thought with a critical eye and often with dislike. (For an account of the 
evolution of his thought see Skinner (1996, pp. 58-61). His anti-Aristotelianism is vividly  
expressed in Leviathan , Part IV, Ch. XLVI, 'Of Darkness from Vain Philosophy, and Fabulous 
Traditions', where he says: "The naturall Philosophy of those Schools, was rather a dream than 
Science, and set forth in senselesse and insignificant Language... Their Morall Philosophy is but 
a description of their own Passions... And I beleeve that scarce any thing can be more absurdly 
said in naturall Philosophy, than that which now is called A ris to t le 's  M e taph ys ic s; nor more 
repugnant to Government, than much of that hee hath said in his Politiques; nor more ignorantly, 
than a great part of his Ethiques .".
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w hich w as com m on in the Greek cities and w hich A ristotle describes 
elsew here.142
In one of the most characteristic passages of the De Cive where his 
opposition to the Aristotelian political theory is also dem onstrated, Hobbes 
advocates that:
The greatest part of those men who have w ritten aught concerning 
commonwealths, either suppose, or require us or beg us to believe, that 
m an is a creature born fit for society. The Greeks call him  Ccoov 
7t o X i t i k o v  and on this foundation they also build up the doctrine of 
civil society, as if for the preservation of peace and the governm ent of 
m ankind, there were nothing else necessary than that men should agree 
to make certain covenants and conditions together, which themselves 
should then call laws. Which axiom, though received by most, is yet 
certain ly  false; and an erro r p roceed ing  from  our too slight 
contem plation of hum an nature. For they who shall more narrow ly 
look into the causes for which men come together, and delight in each 
others company, shall easily find that this happen not because naturally . 
it could happen no otherwise, but by accident. For if by nature one man 
should love another, that is, as man, there could no reason be returned 
w hy every m an should not equally love every man, as being equally 
man; or why he should rather frequent those, whose society affords him 
honour or profit. We do not therefore by nature seek society for its own 
sake, bu t that we may receive some honour or profit from it; these we 
desire primarily, that secondarily.143
Hobbes's argum ent takes for granted that the Aristotelian position is 
opposed to his ow n.144 He clearly takes Aristotle to be one of his main 
intellectual opponents. Indeed, one way of viewing Hobbesian political theory 
could be as a reply to the Aristotelian one in the sense that Hobbes's project 
seems to set out to defeat Aristotelian political naturalism. The main contrast 
between Hobbesian and Aristotelian accounts of society, as Hobbes sees it, is
142 Politics, 1296a22-b2 and 1318bl-5.
143 Hobbes (1966), pp. 2-3.
144 This opposition is quite common in general. For a similar mistake in Arendt (1955), see 
Swanson (1992, pp. 1-2, 3n).
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that Aristotelian political philosophy defends the naturalness of co-operation 
am ong hum an beings w hile the Leviathan  account insists that hum an 
im pulses drive hum an beings into conflict w ith each other. The m ain 
disagreem ent in this context is between opposing accounts of hum an nature. 
Hobbes, as we know, puts forward a Thucydean account of hum an nature 
where 'man is wolf to man' and not 'a political animal by nature'. Aristotle's 
is one that supports the idea that hum an beings have the natural impulse to 
live together and to form political associations.
To some extend Hobbes is right to make this contrast. There is no doubt 
that Aristotle thinks that man is a political animal by nature born fit for society 
and that the creation of political associations comes naturally to him. But the 
political nature of man does not imply that the polis is natural in the sense 
that a living organism such as a plant is. Political associations, according to 
Aristotle, are still artifacts in the sense that they have been created by someone. 
Indeed, as we shall see later in this chapter, Aristotle speaks of the first man 
who created the polis to be the greatest of all benefactors. Aristotle is not 
advocating a strong organic view of the polis, and it is in this point that Hobbes 
is wrong to make the above contrast.
Therefore, from w hat we can see from the above passage,145 Hobbes's 
m isunderstanding of Aristotle's political philosophy is twofold.
First, Hobbes seems not to have understand the aspirational nature of 
the opening of the Politics and to realise that despite the historical language, 
Aristotle did not claim to have any special insight into the actual history of the 
hum an race. Aristotle's account in Politics Book I is not a historical one. 
Aristotle was not interested in presenting us with a historical account of how 
political association came into being, since—like m ost Greeks—he took the 
existence of the state for granted.
145 'j’he same is obvious in other various places of Leviathan  and De Cive.
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Second, as I have pointed out above, Aristotle did no t—as Hobbes 
thought—advocate a strong organic view of the state. It is true that Aristotle did 
not share the same view of hum an nature as Hobbes's. But, nevertheless, 
Aristotle's account of hum an nature as intrinsically political need not conflict 
in theory w ith a contractarian political theory. This is apparent for example in 
the case of Rousseau's social contract. But, what Hobbes did not see was that 
Aristotle in his account of the state did not rule out conflict; on the contrary he 
was more than aware of the hum an impulses that drive hum an beings into 
conflict w ith  each other. But A ristotle d id  not th ink  tha t conflict is 
incompatible with the hum an urge to be political.
The fact that Aristotle's theory can be read as a counter argum ent against 
Hobbes's theory and the contractarianism that his theory of the non-natural 
justification of the state often seems to imply, 146 and also at the same time as 
an anti-liberal theory, has often stim ulated philosophers to build  up an 
Aristotelian theory that could cure the flaws of liberal modernity. It should be 
pointed out though that the dispute between Hobbes and Aristotle does not 
merely concern whether m odern political life actually is like a Hobbesian state 
of nature or whether the m odern state resembles the Hobbesian state of nature, 
since all parties to any dispute in this area would argue that the state of nature 
is not and is not akin to any recognisable states or form of political life. 
Nevertheless, though, it should at the same time be pointed out that the 
account of hum an nature that political philosophers endorse shapes their 
views on the state. It is in this aspect that the core of the dispute lies.
Second, it is w orth noticing that, w hen the Politics is read within the 
context of the controversy about the nature of political community, especially 
w ithin the context of the liberal-com m unitarian debate, then  Aristotle's 
pronouncem ents about the p rio rity  of the political com m unity to the 
individual seem the m ost striking. And, very often, the in terpretation of
146 Wolff (1994), p. 271.
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Aristotle's argum ents is identified with the num erous objections that political 
philosophers have raised against liberal individualism .147 As Irwin points out,
In the Politics, Aristotle seeks to complete his ethical theory, by 
examining the implications of his account of the hum an good, of 
the virtues, and of friendship, for the proper understanding of the 
political com m unity (the polis), and of its role in prom oting the 
hum an  good; this is not im m ediately acceptable, or even 
recognisable, to those who are more familiar w ith the tendencies 
in m odern political theory that begin with Hobbes and Locke. This 
distance betw een Aristotle and those tendencies give us a good 
reason for studing Aristotle. (...) The fact that Aristotle excites such 
disapproval in Hobbes should dispose us to take him seriously.148
Of course, several questions arise from this description of m odernity 
and from this sharp contrast between the two opposing accounts of hum an 
nature, Aristotelianism and Hobbesianism. It is not quite clear, for example, 
whether m odern political life actually is really like a Hobbesian state of nature, 
as described by the com m unitarians, or rather that political life is merely 
presented as such by communitarian political thinkers. Is the question that the 
m odern state resembles the Hobbesian state of nature, or is it we who assume 
an Hobbesian view of m an em bedded in our everyday political and social 
practices?
Most im portant, is such a distinction betw een an Hobbesian and an 
Aristotelian perspective truly representative of the actual distinction between a 
liberal and communitarian view of man respectively? Although Hobbes's state 
of nature provides us w ith a very sharp and clear-cut account of liberty--in its 
negative form as presented by Berlin (which is indeed usually one of the main 
concepts of any liberal account) it is not, nevertheless, clear that liberal 
theories, w hen discussing liberty, have always in m ind negative liberty—and 
not both positive and negative liberty combined, as we shall discuss later in
147 Yack (1993), p. 13.
148 irwin (1996), p. 26.
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chapter seven. Hobbes's account of liberty is a useful device w hen trying to 
explain and to understand liberty in its extreme form, but it does not represent 
an accurate account of what actually liberals mean by liberty. It should also be 
noted that Hobbes, although being the father of social contract theory, is 
nevertheless no liberal thinker. It is not, therefore, clear w hether it is right to 
refer to Hobbes's when discussing contemporary liberalism on the one hand, 
and, on the other to contrast Aristotle's thought only w ith  a Hobbesian 
account of hum an nature, and not w ith other accounts representative of 
classical liberalism such as Locke's for example.
Furtherm ore, it has recently been argued that Aristotle's naturalistic 
approach to politics, which finds its concrete expression in the claim that the 
polis is natural and that m an is, therefore, by nature a political anim al ( e k  
t o u t c o v  ouv cjxxvspov o n  rcov (Jmaei r\ 7roXig ea ri, k o c i  o n  o dv0pco7rog 
4>uaei 7roXmKOV Ceoov, 1253a 2-4) is inconsistent w ith his general political 
theory. As Keyt has pointed out
One of the basic issues between Aristotle and Thomas Hobbes in 
po litical ph ilo sophy  concerns the n a tu re  of the po litica l 
community. Aristotle m aintains that the political comm unity, or 
the polis, is a natural entity like an animal or a man. For Hobbes, 
on the other hand, the political community is not an entity, it is a 
product of art. Now, I claim that Aristotle ought to agree w ith 
Hobbes, that according to Aristotle's own principles the political 
community is an artifact of the practical reason, not a product of 
nature, and that, consequently, there is a blunder at the very root of 
Aristotle's political philosophy.149
According to Aristotle, the polis is natural to m an who is himself 
naturally a polis-animal and is also prior to him in the sense that it is the 
presupposition of his true and full life. The question here is how the concept 
of nature is conceived by Aristotle and, mainly, what exactly he has in mind 
when he says that "man is a political animal by nature".
149 Keyt (1991), p. 118.
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Despite Keyt's argum ent on Aristotle's contradiction in this matter, 
there are commentators who argue that this contradiction is only apparent and 
not real. Traditionally, Bradley, Barker and Allan, for example, have in the 
past argued against this contradiction and have tried to save Aristotle's 
appearances by adopting a loose version of the notion of the 'natural'. In recent 
times Miller, Yack, M acIntyre and Taylor have tried to do the same. One 
interesting thing about this issue is that Miller and Yack follow the lines of an 
interpretation of Aristotle that makes him sympathise with a liberal or even a 
libertarian theory, while communitarian thinkers, like MacIntyre and Taylor, 
depict Aristotle as supporting a communitarian standpoint.
In fact, the dispute between these two positions comes down to the 
question of w hat exactly the notion of natural or naturalness means. On the 
one hand, Keyt adopts a strict version of the notion of the natural according to 
which the polis is natural in the sense of natural objects such as plants and 
bees. On the other hand though, Bradley, Barker and Allan, all adopt a loose 
version of the natural according to which the polis is natural in the sense that 
it is natural to man.
As Bradley points out, "And so, as a master, a husband, a father, a 
member of a village, his possibilities are still in various degrees latent, only 
partially brought into life. It is only in the state that they come in a full play, 
and therefore the state is 'natural' to him ".150 Allan also argues that, "One 
should not be mislead by the historical language used by theorists, whether 
ancient or modern, who describe the origin of the state; they do not claim to 
have special insight into the actual history of the hum an race. Most likely both 
Plato and Aristotle believed that civilisation has arisen and been destroyed 
many times in the past, and they sometimes speculated about regular law of 
occurrence; the world, for them, has existed from the beginning of time; it does 
not occur to them  that m an may have been slowly evolved from a lower
150 Bradley (1991), p. 198.
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species. W hat is intended in political philosophy is to make clear the function 
of political society, as distinct from simpler forms of association, by a quasi- 
historical account of its origin; this was as clear to the authors of the Republic 
and the Politics as to Rousseau and other m odern thinkers".151
Barker goes even further in claiming that "what makes the state natural 
is the fact that, however it came into existence, it is as it stands the satisfaction 
of an imm anent impulse in hum an nature towards moral perfection".152 One 
could of course argue that possibly this loose interpretation of the natural goes 
too far in the sense that it could be compatible with any account of how the 
polis comes into existence. The polis according to this interpretation could, for 
example, be either merely a creation designed by a small group of highly 
intelligent people, or a result of an intervention of a supernatural being, or 
even merely a pure accident.153 Despite the fact that I am more sympathetic to 
this loose view of the natural, since--if true—it somehow seems to soften the 
gap betw een A ntiqu ity  and the E nlightenm ent, A risto telian ism  and 
M odernity, a detailed exam ination of Aristotelian argum ents is required 
nevertheless before favouring either view.
3. 2 Aristotle and the naturalness claim
One of the basic ideas of the Politics (I. 2) is that the polis is a natural entity like 
an animal or a man. Two additional ideas are that man is by nature a political 
animal and that the polis is prior to the individual. In fact the whole of 
Politics, Book I, 2 is dedicated to arguing for the naturalness of the polis.
Aristotle begins in Politics 1252a 1-23 by criticising the political theories 
of his predecessors and making an immediate reference to Plato's Statesman. 
He disagrees w ith Plato's view that the roles of a statesm an, a king, a
151 Allan (1970), p. 143.
152 Barker (1958), p. xlix.
153 Chan (1992), p. 190.
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household-manager and a master of slaves are the same since, as he says, this 
Platonic view is based on three false assumptions that: (a) "each of these differs 
in point of large or small numbers, but not in kind" (1252a 9-10), (b) "there is 
no difference between a large household and a small state" (1252a 13-14), and 
(c) on the notion of the respective roles of the statesm an and the king, by 
believing that when a man is in personal control he has a role of king, whereas 
when he takes his turn at ruling and at being ruled according to the principles 
of that sort of knowledge, he is a statesman (1252a 14-16).
A ris to tle 's  p o in t—th a t each sm allest p a rt (i.e. m an /w o m a n , 
m aster/slave, fa ther/son , the smallest parts of a household and hence of a 
polis) is different and requires a ruler different in kind—as he explains in 1252a 
17-23—will become clear when it is examined according to his normal mode of 
inquiry, that is to analyse a com pound into its irreducible elements, the 
smallest parts of a whole. In this way, by examining the component parts of the 
state, we will be in the position, according to Aristotle, to "see better both how 
these two differ from each other and w hether we can acquire some skilled 
understanding of each of the roles m entioned". This mode of inquiry is the 
same as that described in the Physics and em ployed variously throughout 
Aristotle's work.
It should be noted that Aristotle here seems to be appealing to two 
m ethods which on the surface look distinct: analytic (dividing into subject 
parts) and genetic (seeing how it comes into being). As he says, "as in other 
sciences, so in politics compounds should always be resolved into the simple 
elements or smallest parts of the whole; and if you consider things in their first 
growth and origin, whether they are cities or anything else, you will get the 
clearest view of them" (1252a 19-25). Aristotle's mode of enquiry is to analyse a 
compound into its elements; in order to do that one has to look at its origin 
and to see how it grows. Aristotle supposes that the cities are open to the same 
sort of scientific investigation as animals and plants. He does not suppose
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though that the polis is simply a product of nature. W hat he does suppose is 
that it is sufficiently like a natural product to respond to the same sort of 
inquiry.
His analysis starts with the examination of the natural growth of things 
from their beginnings in order to distinguish the different forms of association 
and successively to trace the association of the household, of the village and, 
finally, that of the polis which is the crown of all, since it completes and fulfils 
the nature of man. This genetic method of considering things in the process of 
their growth is the same as the analytic suggested previously, since the genetic 
m ethod consists of beginning w ith the sim ple elem ents, som ething that 
implies anyway the use of analysis. It is through this analytic-genetic method 
(1252a 24-1253a 1) that Aristotle w ill finally come to the conclusion of 
providing a proof of the natural character of the polis. One should point out 
that the analytic and genetic methods are the same only if one supposes that 
wholes came into existence by the com bination of parts w hich rem ain 
unchanged in themselves; an example of such a case would be to compare the 
parts of a tower built from children's blocks with the ingredients of a cake.
Aristotle's analysis in 1252a 26-27 starts, first, by examining the relation 
between "those which are incapable of existing w ithout each other and must 
unite as a pair". These associations are two that of the male and the female (the 
first and simplest association that existed) and that of master and slave. The 
first exists for breeding and is not one that is being made by choice but rather 
from the urge that exists in man, as in other animals as well and in plants, to 
leave behind another such as one is oneself. The second exists for preservation 
between that which naturally rules and that which is ruled. This association is 
natural for Aristotle since for him that which can use its intellect to look ahead 
is by nature master, while that which has the bodily strength to labour is ruled 
and is by nature a slave, and they both benefit from the same thing.
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After making the distinction between these two associations, he goes on 
clarifying that the distinction between female and slave is also made by nature, 
since nature produces nothing in a niggardly way for m any purposes, as for 
example the Delphic knife that smiths were supposed to make, and therefore it 
is wrong to assign to female and slave the same status, as the barbarians (the 
non-Greeks) do. This assum ption is m ade by them  according to Aristotle 
because they do not have that which naturally rules and thus their association 
comes to be that of a male slave and a female slave. From this he asserts that, 
as the poet says, "it is proper that Greeks should rule barbarians", since 
according to his line of thought a barbarian and a slave are by nature identical 
(1252a 34-b9).
In 1252b 10-15 Aristotle concludes that it was from these two associations 
of m an—wom an and m aster—slave that the association of the household arose. 
As Hesiod, the poet says in his Theogonia: "first of all a house and a wife and 
an ox to draw the plough"; for oxen serve the poor in lieu of household slaves. 
The first form of association is therefore naturally instituted for the satisfaction 
of the purposes of every day life. The members of this household are named by 
Charondas "bread-fellows" and by Epimenides "stable-companions".
In the next paragraph (1252b 15-27) Aristotle continues his genetic 
analysis to explain the formation of the village. A village is the first association 
from several households for the satisfaction of other than daily purposes, and 
seems to be by nature in the highest degree. This is the reason that the polis, 
and the colonies, were first ruled by kings; because they were formed from 
persons that were under kingly rule. This is explained if we see that every 
household is under the kingly rule of its most of senior member, something 
which is m entioned in Homer when he says—speaking of the Cyclopes—that 
"each lays dow n the law to children and wives" and proves that men in 
ancient times lived in scattered groups. Further proof to the fact that men in 
ancient times were governed by kings is the reason that leads us all to assert
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that the gods are also governed by a king, since we make the lives of the gods 
in the likeness of our own, in the same w ay that we make their shapes. 
Aristotle is here arguing from history; the historical basis of what Aristotle says 
is dubious, but this does not necessarily affect the value of his argument.
Finally, in 1252b 27-1253a 1 Aristotle's discussion is focused on the polis 
which is "the complete association, from several villages, which at once 
reaches the limit of total self-sufficiency". The polis—i.e. the association that is 
finally composed of several villages and has at last attained the limit of 
virtually complete self-sufficiency; "whereas it comes into existence for the 
sake of life, it exists for the sake of good life", and therefore "every polis exists 
by nature, since the first associations did too". "For this association is their end, 
and nature is an end; for whatever each thing is in character when its coming 
into existence has been completed, that is w hat we call the nature of each 
thing—for a man, for instance, or a horse or a house. Moreover the aim, i.e. the 
end, is best; and self-sufficiency is both end and best". Aristotle's argum ent is of 
course quite puzzling here, since he has not really proven the claim that the 
polis exists for the good life. In 1253a 1-7, he concludes that
These considerations make it clear, then, that the state is one of 
those things which exist by nature, and that m an is by nature an 
animal fit for a polis. Anyone who by his nature (5icx tjnSaiv) and 
not by ill-luck (ou 5ia  ruxqv) is cityless ((X7roXtg) is either a wretch 
((JxxuXog) or superhum an (Kpeirrwv rf dv0pco7rog); he is also like 
the m an condemned by Homer as having 'no brotherhood, no law, 
no hearth'; for he is at once such by nature and keen to go to war, 
being isolated like a piece in game of pettoi.
The above argum ents depend on the claim that the polis exists for the good
life; som ething which is hardly dem onstrated by A ristotle's semi-historical
argum ent.
In 1253a 7-18 he develops his thesis further by putting  forward the 
argum ent that "it is obvious that m an is an animal fit for a state to a fuller
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extent than any bee or any herding animal". This thesis is peculiarly argued 
and the argum ent goes as follows: (a) nature does nothing in vain, (b) man 
alone of the animals is furnished with the faculty of language, (c) the mere 
making of sounds serves to indicate pleasure and pain, and it is therefore a 
faculty that belongs to animals in general (their nature enables them to attain 
the point which they have perceptions of pleasure and pain and can signify 
those perceptions to one another), (d) but, language serves to declare what is 
just and w hat is unjust, (e) it is the peculiarity of m an in comparison w ith the 
rest of the animal world to possess a perception of good and evil, of the just 
and the unjust, and of other similar qualities, and, finally, (f) it is association in 
a common perception of these things which makes a family and a polis.
Furtherm ore, in 1253a 18-29 A ristotle argues that, a lthough  the 
individual and the household is prior to the polis in time, the polis is prior by 
nature to the individual and to the household. This thesis is based on the 
following argument: (a) the whole is necessarily prior to the part, (b) if the 
whole body will be destroyed, then there will not be a foot or a hand, except in 
that ambiguous sense in which one uses the same w ord to indicate a different 
thing (ojLicovijjucog)154 (as when one speaks of a hand made of stone, since when 
a hand is destroyed—when the whole body is destroyed—it will be no better 
than a hand made of stone), (c) all things derive their essential character from 
their function and their capacity, (d) therefore, if things are no longer fit to 
discharge their function, they are no longer considered to be the same things 
(rot a u ra ) , but that they only have the same name by ambiguity (oiucovujua). So, 
finally, "it is clear that the polis exists by nature and is prior to the individual". 
Because, "if an individual is not self-sufficient after separation, he will stand in 
the same relationship to the whole as the parts in the other cases do, while a 
man who is incapable of associating, or has no need of it because of self­
154 a s a term "homonymous7 is analysed in the Categories, I, la l .
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sufficiency, is no part of a polis, so he must be either a beast or a god" (ware rf 
0r|plov f) 0eog).
But, although the impulse towards this kind of associations exists by 
nature in all men, "the first person who first constructed such an association 
was none the less the greatest of all benefactors". Aristotle makes this point 
more clear by pointing out that "man is the best of all animals when he has 
reached his full development, and he is worst of all when divorced from law 
and justice. Injustice arm ed is at its harshest; m an is born w ith weapons to 
support practical w isdom  and virtue, which all are too easy to use for the 
opposite purposes. Hence w ithout virtue he is the m ost savage, the most 
unrighteous, and the worst in respect of sex and food. The virtue of justice is a 
characteristic of a state, since justice is the arrangement of the association that 
takes the form of a state and the virtue of justice is a judgem ent about what is 
just" (1253a29-39).
One reason why Aristotle thinks that the polis exists by nature, even 
though it does not satisfy his main criterion of the natural—i.e. that which 
exists always or for the most part—is because it aims to produce eudaimonia, 
the true end of hum an life. It is clear that for Aristotle the polis is not natural 
because it is grown. The polis is made natural because however it came into 
existence, it is as it stands the satisfaction of an immanent impulse in hum an 
nature tow ards m oral perfection—an im m anent im pulse which drives men 
upw ards, through various forms of society, into the final political form. As we 
can understand from the text, Aristotle did indeed believe in the conscious 
construction of the polis. This is supported from w hat we have already seen 
that he says in Politics, Book I, 2: "There is an imm anent impulse in all men 
towards an association of this order; but the m an who first constructed such an 
association was the greatest of all benefactors". There is a real question as to 
whether Aristotle's discussion of "the man who first constructed the city" is 
consistent with his overall accounts of the polis. If his account could be proven
79
to be consistent, a good question would be whether Aristotle's account of the 
polis as natural could be compatible with a contractarian view.
3.3 Teleology and communitarianism
The application of natural teleology by Aristotle to the science of the Politics 
and whether it is successful, or even more intended, has often troubled the 
Aristotelian scholars, since~as it has often been argued~if the politics and the 
ethics of Aristotle are im plausible w ithout the connection to physics and 
metaphysics, then it w ould be very difficult to successfully sustain such a 
political position which is based on a metaphysical position that we can no 
longer share. If, as M acIntyre argues, A ristotle's ethics presupposes his 
'm etaphysical biology',155 then how far is the Aristotelian enterprise of linking 
politics to an account of hum an nature and the hum an good draw n from that 
biology vitiated by the failure of that biology? But, regardless of w hether 
Aristotle's teleological application is successful or not, w hat I w ould like to 
examine in this section is w hether the teleological explanation of Aristotle's 
ethics tha t M acIntyre adopts is consistent w ith  A risto telian  teleology. 
MacIntyre points out that Aristotle, by seeing everywhere the growth of an 
initial potentiality into a final form or end, and distinguishing in its form or 
end the essential nature of everything, applied his general philosophy to man 
and man's long development, as he struggled upw ard from the potentiality of 
prim ary instincts to the form, or end, or nature of a political being--a being 
intended by his potentialities for existence in a polis and a being who achieved 
his nature in and through such existence. The polis is therefore entirely and 
perfectly natural, since it was the natural home of the fully grown and natural 
man. Thus, we arrive by the application of teleology to Aristotle's Politics and
155 MacIntyre (1999) has tried to provide us with a solution to this problem; not a very successful 
one, according to my opinion, but I will not expand on his argument here.
80
Ethics to M acIntyre's distinction of man-as-he-happens-to-be and man-as-he- 
should-be-if-he-realised-his-essential-nature.
However, it should be noted that MacIntyre conceives the notion of 
good as being the excellent performance of a function for the achievement of a 
common end. But, this functionalistic interpretation of the good m ade by 
M acIntyre is likely taken in by a w idespread m isunderstand ing  of the 
Aristotelian sense of telos.
Aristotle tries to develop an approach to the study of living things that 
is both explanatory and evaluative. As he says in Metaphysics Z, 1040b 26-27, 
every natural thing can be understood in terms of the potentiality (S u v a p ig )  
and the function or actuality (e v e p y e u x )  that define it. The form ( e i5 o g )  or end 
(r e A o g )  or actuality (e v e p y e io c )  of a thing is the prim ary means of explaining 
w hat each natu ra l thing is,156 and this explanation is at the same time 
evaluative or critical, since in giving an account of any given hum an being or 
hum an culture we m ust characterise its goals or practices in terms of and 
relative to the goals that define hum an being as a certain kind of entity. The 
Politics, as well as the Ethics and the Rhetoric, are filled w ith explanations and 
evaluations of such kind. Hum an nature is understood in all these examples 
as a hierarchy of ends, and serves as the perspective from which to judge the 
extent to which various characteristic ways of life and cultural institutions are 
just or right ( b i K o t i o g )  by nature. H um an nature provides a ground for 
judgments that are at once causal and evaluative, even though w hat is just or 
right by nature does not take the form of universal laws, bu t varies, within 
limits, from place to place and person to person.157
MacIntyre raises the possibility of recovering this tradition of evaluative 
exp lanation  in A fter  Virtue, w here he m ain tains th a t the classical 
philosophical tradition is fundam entally a continuation or expression of the
156 Physics, 2, 193b6-18.
157 Salkever (1990), pp. 19-20.
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prevailing views of Greek political culture. He further asserts that all forms of 
ethical functionalism —w hether Aristotle's view  or the one em bedded in 
traditional Greek politics—are essentially the same because of their common 
orig in  in an opposition  to m oral and m ethodological indiv idualism . 
According to his argum ent in After Virtue,
Aristotle takes it as a starting-point for ethical enquiry that the 
relationship of 'm an ' to 'living w ell' is analogous to that of 
'harp ist' to 'playing the harp well' (NE,  1095a 16). But the use of 
man as a functional concept is far older than Aristotle and it does 
not initially derive from Aristotle's m etaphysical biology. It is 
rooted in the forms of social life to which the theorists of the 
classical tradition give expression. For according to that tradition to 
be a m an is to fill a set of roles each of which has its own point and 
purpose: member of a family, citizen, soldier, philosopher, servant 
of God. It is only when man is thought of as an individual prior to 
and apart from all roles that 'm an ' ceases to be a functional 
concept.158
But M acIntyre's argum ent is not all that convincing. As Rapp has 
pointed out, a state which can be brought about by technical knowledge is only 
a special instance of telos. In general, telos expresses the fully unfolded essence 
of a thing—connected to this with regard to the polis is a norm ative criterion 
for the comparison of various institutions. A constitution is better to the 
extent that it comes closer to the telos of the polis, to the distributively 
common advantage of everyone, to their good life. This sense of end does not 
necessarily include the notion that the citizen of a polis seeks to achieve the 
end of the polis as the players of a football team  seek victory, and the 
Aristotelian notions of praxis and eudaimonia even exclude this view. Rather, 
the concrete polis comes nearest to the essence of a polis, which is inferred 
from the bilevel reconstruction of political life—and thus attains its telos—if it 
provides favourable conditions for the individual quest for happiness by its
158 MacIntyre (1995), pp. 58-59.
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citizens and supports to the best of its ability these possibilities through 
education and good laws. The talk of a common project and the functionalistic 
view of the good implied in MacIntyre's argum ent is at the end of the day 
missing the point entirely.159
In conclusion, one could argue that MacIntyre's functionalistic view of 
the good and his insistence that the polis should aim to a common project 
(and that it is only through the realisation of this common project that the 
citizen w ould reach his full potential and become good) commits him to a 
kind of organicism, in the sense that the polis is viewed as a natural organism 
such as a hum an being for example. On this view each citizen has a specific 
function which contributes to the overall welfare of the city. The citizen's role 
is thus similar to that of a part of an organism or a machine. The value of his 
life is determined by the contribution he makes to the whole. This view leaves 
no room for expressing any kind of individuality on the part of the citizen 
body and is not supported by Aristotle's pronouncements and his criticism of 
Plato's Republic in Politics, Book II, as we shall see in the following chapters of 
this thesis.
3.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, our examination of the argum ents in Politics, I, 1-2 shows that 
there is of good deal of ambiguity in Aristotle's claims that the polis is natural 
and that man is a political animal by nature. It appears that there are three 
plausible ways of interpreting Aristotle's pronouncements.
159 Rapp (1994), pp. 340-341.
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First, there are passages which suggest that the polis may be compared to 
a natural organism such as a hum an being and the citizens may be compared 
to the parts of its body. If these passages are to be taken literally, then they 
imply a strongly organic view of the state. However, a view of this kind would 
seem incompatible w ith Aristotle's conception of hum an good and w ith his 
complaints in Politics, Book II that Plato has an over-unified view of the state, 
an criticism of Aristotle's that I will expand on in later chapters. Such a view of 
the polis as an organism  w ould be unlikely to com m end itself to m any 
m odern political theorists because it implies that the citizen has no value 
except in so far as he or she contribute to the overall functioning of the state.
A second more plausible interpretation w ould be to take Aristotle as 
meaning that the city is natural in the sense that hum an beings have a natural 
tendency to live in cities and can only achieve their good within the polis. But 
again this claim can still be interpreted in different ways. The most obvious 
interpretation is suggested by the claim pu t forward in Politics, Book I, Ch. 1 
that the city is an association for the sake of the most sovereign good. Also, by 
the one pu t forward in Politics, Book I, Ch. 2 that the city comes into being for 
the sake of life but exists for the sake of the good life. One would naturally take 
these passages to imply that the citizens m ust share a common conception of 
the good. The polis is natural in the sense that only w ithin the polis can 
hum an beings achieve their true good. This view would be compatible with 
the fact that most hum an beings do not live in a polis. The point made here is 
that only those fortunate enough to live in a polis have a chance of a truly 
good life.
Third, an alternative interpretation—suggested by the argum ent from 
language and the comparison w ith other social anim als—is that Aristotle's 
claim is simply that it is natural for man to live in society. This is of course a 
very plausible claim to make. Man has characteristics such as the ability to use
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language which make him fit for society, most men do indeed live in societies, 
and it is difficult for man to survive outside society.
In general, looking at Aristotle's philosophy as a whole it seems as 
though the second in terpretation  offered above is the correct one, but, 
nevertheless, in arguing for this view Aristotle has used argum ents which 
would have better suited the first or the third interpretation.
But, of course, from the point of view of this chapter, the im portant 
thing is to see w hat bearing all this has on the liberal-communitarian debate. 
On the one hand, it is essential to the second interpretation that a polis has a 
shared conception of the good. In this sense it agrees w ith the communitarian 
position. But this view is linked with the idea that there is one kind of life that 
is the good life for man. That in turn is based on Aristotle's teleological view of 
man. Therefore, w ithout com m itting him self to A risto tle 's m etaphysical 
biology, it is difficult to see how  the com m unitarian could accept this 
interpretation. On the other hand, the th ird  in terpretation  avoids these 
metaphysical difficulties, but there does not seem to be anything specifically 
communitarian about it. A liberal individualist could agree that it is natural to 
live in society in the sense that hum an beings tend to live in societies and 
have difficulty living outside a society. The comm unitarian w ould really have 
to suggest that a successful society needs a shared conception of the good, even 
though there is no one good life for which man is fitted by nature. But, there 
appears to be no Aristotelian support for this position.
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4. THE CITY AND THE GOOD LIFE
7raaa K o iv a m a v  dyocOou n v o c  eveicev aoveaT nK oiav
P olitics, 1252a 2
4.1 Introduction
A central principle of Aristotle's Politics is that the city exists for the sake of a 
good life. In this chapter we shall investigate how that principle bears on the 
liberal-communitarian debate. There are two questions to consider here. First, 
does the idea that the city exists for the good life have in itself any implications 
which a liberal individualist would have to reject? Second, does the idea that 
the city exists for the good life when taken in conjunction with an Aristotelian 
account of the good have any implications which a liberal individualist would 
have to reject? But, first, we have to consider the part that this idea plays in 
Aristotle's own political philosophy.
The problems and the various interpretations surrounding Aristotle's 
notion of eudaimonia are well-known and m uch discussed. Therefore, I will 
not attem pt here to solve the questions surrounding A ristotle's account of 
eudaimonia as presented in the Nicomachean Ethics. I will merely outline the 
m ain theses in Aristotle's position and stress the issues relevant to my 
discussion on the appropriation of Aristotle's political theory in the liberal- 
communitarian debate. In the first section, I will examine Aristotle's notion of 
eudaimonia  and the bearing it has in his political philosophy. Also, I will 
distinguish between three different Aristotelian accounts of the best city in the 
Politics, and I will discuss the role that Aristotle's account of the good life plays 
in the city. In the next sections I will discuss the liberal and comm unitarian 
conceptions of the good and their appropriations of Aristotle's conception of 
the good life in the city.
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Ancient ethical theory largely revolved around the notions of the 
hum an good, or, in Aristotelian terms, of the "good for m an' (dyaSov) and of 
'happiness' (si35aijuov{a). Indeed, two of the questions most often asked by 
Greek philosophers were 'W hat is the hum an good?' and 'W hat is the good 
life?'. This has always been central for Greek philosophy, since Socrates who 
argued that an unexamined life is not worth living, and that philosophy is not 
a trivial m atter, since it involves a quest about how one should live. To 
inquire about the good life is to ask about the proper course of an entire life 
and not just about proper conduct in a particular situation. Aristotle's main 
concern was to inquire about the good and the nature of hum an happiness and 
not just about right action. Consequentialist and deontological ethical theories 
discuss 'right action', while ancient Greek writers—although interested in right 
action as well--were preoccupied in discussing 'lives as a whole'.
In one way or another questions about the good continue to occupy a 
central place in contem porary moral and political discussion. Indeed, when 
discussing the good for m an and the notion of eudaimonia or 'happiness' in 
relation to applications of both to political theory and practice, different sorts of 
questions arise.
Clearly, first, there are questions concerning the notion of the good and 
the good life per se: whether one is justified in talking about the good life in 
the first place or whether there can be different conceptions of the good and 
many ways of leading the good life, since theories of the good divide into two 
kinds: monistic and pluralistic. These questions play an im portant part in 
liberal and com m unitarian theories of the good but are clearly of interest to 
Aristotelian thought as well.
Second, there are issues of interpretation as far as Aristotelian thought is 
concerned, since one is presented w ith two different accounts of political 
community and of hum an good that Aristotle advances in the Politics. First, 
with the form of constitution which would be best under ideal conditions and
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is therefore best absolutely that he advances in Book VII, and second, with the 
form of constitution that is best under the conditions that actually prevail that 
he advances in Book IV.
Third, there are questions concerning the limits of authority of the state 
over the individual which are closely related to the concept of the good. 
W hether one will adopt an inclusivist or a dom inant in terpretation  of 
eudaimonia would determine the conception of state in the sense of allowing 
or not allowing pluralism to take place in it.
I will start my analysis of Aristotle's position by presenting an exegesis 
of the two above mentioned Aristotelian accounts as they can be found in the 
Politics, offering at the same time an interpretation of the Aristotelian text and 
discussing the several issues as they emerge during the discussion. But, first, I 
would like to consider briefly Aristotle's account of hum an good in his ethical 
writings and its bearing on political matters.
4.2 The good life in Aristotle's Ethics
The fundam ental goal of the polis is that of hum an good. The importance that 
the notion of good has for Aristotle's political theory is m ade clear in the 
opening sections of both the Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics.
In Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that the good and 
the highest good (ravaSov k o u  t o  ap iarov ) is the end of the polis and is 
studied by political science, which is the most authoritative of the sciences or a 
kind of master art or science. As he points out, the subject m atter of political 
science is hum an action. Political science is the 'architectonic ' or m aster 
discipline, which exercises general control over all other practical disciplines. 
The authority of political science is suprem e and it directs the activities of 
other disciplines, each of which is concerned w ith  one particular area of
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hum an activity, therefore, its aim or purpose m ust be all-embracing. The 
science of politics lays down which of the sciences there should be in cities and 
which each class of person should learn and up to w hat level; so even the 
most honourable of faculties—such as military science, domestic economy, and 
rhetoric—come under it. Since political science uses the rest of the sciences, and 
since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and we are to abstain from, the 
end of this science m ust include those of the other sciences, so that its end 
m ust be the good for man:
For even if the good is the same for an individual as for a city, that 
of the city is obviously a greater and more complete thing to obtain 
and preserve. For while the good of an individual is a desirable 
thing, w hat is good for a people or for cities is a nobler and more 
godlike thing. (EN I. 2 ,1094b 4-11)
Ethical and political theory are, therefore, inseparably linked together in one
discipline, that is, political science.160
Aristotle examines the notion of hum an good and of eudaimonia in the
Nicomachean Ethics in Books I and X. When Aristotle uses the concept of the
suprem e good, or suprem e end in the Nicomachean Ethics, he understands it
as the idea of a goal of action which is desired for itself and not as a means to
secure further ends. As he says in the opening sentence of the Nicomachean
160 This relation, though, between the Ethics and the Politics is not unproblematic. One common 
mistake usually made in regard to Aristotle's political philosophy is its subordination to his 
ethical theory, something that MacIntyre does for example. What most philosophers fail to see 
is not just the unity of Aristotelian ethical and political philosophy, but m ainly the fact that 
the ethical writings of Aristotle do not constitute an autonomous moral science and do not merely 
include the politics, but rather that the ethics form part of his comprehensive political science. 
According to Yack (1993, p. 4) for example this has further implications since the result of this 
interpretation is that some writers, unlike Aristotle, see social structures and contingencies as 
factors that constrain the application of ethical concepts rather than as partly constitutive of 
these concepts. The issue in question here is whether political factors affect ethical concepts or 
merely constrain their application in practice. This subordination of politics to ethics leads to 
the underestimation of the extent to which political contingencies constrain ethical choices and 
development. According to Yack (1993, pp. 4-5), Irwin (1988, pp. 447, 409)—despite his own  
arguments against separating the two fields—m inim ises the political constraints on the 
achievement of the good life, and suggests, therefore, that the Aristotelian virtues pursue the 
common good in a rational way and secure it in moderately favourable conditions. These 
moderately favourable conditions refer to the conditions expressed in Aristotle's polity, since, as 
he thinks, without the ideal city there will be no good men.
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Ethics: "Every skill and every inquiry, and similarly every action and rational 
choice, is thought to aim at some good; and so the good has been aptly 
described as that at which everything aims." (N E , I. 1094a 1-3) The most 
com plete (and m ost final, or m ost perfect) good is that w hich is not 
instrum ental to any other good, and is good in itself. Happiness (eudaimonia) 
is the end for the sake of which we all do everything else. The chief good 
(KupiGOTOtro dyaOov) is evidently som ething 'final w ithout qualification' 
(reXeiov a7rXcoc), it is 'self-sufficient' (aurdpKEc) and 'something of one's own 
and not easily taken from one' (NE, I, 7).
EuSaipovCa, usually translated as 'happiness' in English, is an activity 
desirable for its own sake, and not a disposition or a state of feeling or 
enjoym ent or content, the usual m eaning of the English term. To be 
eudaimon, is to flourish, and while happiness refers mostly to a psychological 
state, a state of feeling, eudaimonia, being a kind of a more objective condition 
of a person, is closer to connotations of w ell-being and flourishing. 
Eudaimonia is defined as an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. It 
should be noted that, since eudaimonia is an activity exercised in accordance 
with virtue, then, presumably, this implies that the city m ust equip its citizens 
with the virtues and with opportunities for their exercise.
Eudaimonia  involves the exercise of two types of virtue, ethical and 
intellectual. The man of ethical virtue possesses courage, justice, magnificence, 
liberality, magnanimity, good temper, friendliness, truthfulness, ready wit and 
tem perance .161 To be happy, in addition, he m ust possesses a certain amount 
of 'external goods', since "there are some things the lack of which takes the 
lustre from happiness, such as good birth, goodly children, beauty".162 In order 
of course to acquire eudaimonia  one should only need a m odest level of 
hum an goods, since "we can be happy w ithout ruling earth or sea".163 And,
161 E N  I. 8 ,1099a 31-b 8 and X. 8 (1178 b 33-5.
162 E N  X. 8 ,1099b 2-3.
163 E N  X. 8 ,1179a 4.
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lastly, the happy man needs to possess the intellectual virtues which are art or 
technical skill, scientific knowledge, prudence or practical wisdom , wisdom 
and intelligence. Among them, practical w isdom  (4>pdvr|ai<;) is involved in 
ethically virtuous behaviour while wisdom  (ao4>ia) concentrates on eternal 
and unchanging objects and is identified w ith philosophical contemplation 
which is the highest and best hum an activity.
But, w hat does the good for man, eudaimonia, consists in? Aristotle 
explicitly introduces the so-called 'function' (epyov) argum ent (NE, I, 7; EE, II, 1) 
in order to best describe w hat the nature of euda im onia  is. A ristotle 's 
'function ' argum ent relies heavily on his conception of nature. There is a 
general relation between the function of an x, a good x, and the good for an x. 
A hum an being's ergon is "an active life of the element that has a rational 
principle". Since the characteristic capacity of a hum an being is the exercise of 
reason, then the good of a hum an being will be exercising this capacity well. 
The good is acting well and acting well is acting in accordance with the virtues. 
So, exercising rationality well will consist in exercising rationality in acting 
virtuously. As he argues in Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a 7-17,
For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general, 
for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the 
'well' is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be 
for man, if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and the 
tanner certain functions or activities, and has m an none? Is he 
born w ithout a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each 
of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man 
similarly has a function apart from all these? W hat then can this 
be?
The m an's function is, thus, to be found in the active life of the rational part of 
the soul:
There rem ains, then, an active life of the elem ent that has a 
rational principle; of this, one part has such a principle in the sense 
of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one
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and exercising thought. And, as "life of the rational element' also 
has two meanings, we m ust state that life in the sense of activity is 
w hat we mean; for this seems to be the more proper sense of the 
term. Now if the function of m an is an activity of soul which 
follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say 'so-and-so' and 
'a good so-and-so' have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a 
lyre, and a good lyre-player, and so w ithout qualification in all 
cases, eminence in respect of goodness being added to the name of 
the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and 
that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case, and we 
state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be 
an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and 
the function of a good m an to be the good and noble performance 
of these, and if any action is well performed w hen it is performed 
in accordance w ith the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, 
hum an good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with 
virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with 
the best and most complete.
The suprem acy of contem plation is argued for in Book X of the 
Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle claims that reason is the best part of man, 
that contemplation is the most continuous and the most pleasant activity, that 
the philosopher has the least need for external goods and that contemplation is 
the only thing loved for its own sake and is the only truly divine activity .164 In 
fact, as he argues in the Metaphysics, the actual object of contemplation is pure 
thought, something that only God could fully achieve, since, as he admits, it is 
too high for man.
As we have seen, ethics and politics are closely connected in Aristotle's 
view. This is m ade plain by the references to politics in his ethical works and 
to ethics in his work on politics. The Nicomachean Ethics is concerned from its 
early chapters w ith politics (I, 2, 1094a 27-8, blO-11; 3.1095a2; 4.1095al4-17; EE 
VII, 1, 1234b 22) and ends with a transition to a study of politics and the science
164 EN  X. 7-8.
92
of legislation (X, 9, 1180b 28-end). Its final paragraph, or epilogue outlines the 
contents of a "life of politics':
Now our predecessors have left the subject of legislation to us 
unexamined; it is perhaps best, therefore, that we should ourselves 
study it, and in general study the question of the constitution, in 
order to complete to the best of our ability the philosophy of 
hum an nature. First, then, if anything has been said well in detail 
by earlier thinkers, let us try to review it; then in the light of the 
constitutions we have collected let us study w hat sorts of influence 
preserve and destroy states, and what sorts preserve or destroy the 
particular kinds of constitution, and to w hat causes it is due that 
some are well and others ill administered. W hen these m atters 
have been studied we shall perhaps be more likely to see with a 
com prehensive view which constitution is best, and how  each 
m ust be ordered, and what laws and customs it m ust use, if it is to 
be at its best. Let us make a beginning of our discussion.
One could say that in NE  X. 8 Aristotle tries to compromise between the
two different ways of life and to defend the theoretical or contemplative way of
life by arguing that theoretical life need not be inactive since it is primarily in
thinking that we are active. So, in fact, one could say that, if it is primarily in
thinking that we are active, then there is no actual dispute between the two
different ways of life, since there is only one way of life which really exists, that
of the active life which includes both contemplative and political. One could
go even further in supposing that anyway contem plative life w ould be
im possible w ithout having some knowledge of the political sphere and
w ithout participating in it. For one thing, one should have som ething to
contem plate about, and the objects of contem plation exist in the external
world, in the sphere of the political. Aristotle would not nevertheless see these
as objects of contemplation. As Aristotle has stressed himself in the beginning
of the Politics, m an is a political animal by nature and someone outside
political association w ould either be god or w ild animal, and—unless the
philosopher is prepared to play god—the wild animal lacks the capacities for
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contem plation since it has no association w ith  others. Also, another 
interesting thing that one could actually derive from this passage is that 
despite the need for active civic participation in the city, the private sphere is 
not totally excluded and someone could act as a free indiv idual while 
participating in the common affairs.
One interpretation which tries to solve the inconsistency w ould be to 
argue that contemplation should occupy only part of a philosopher's life since 
in so far as he is a hum an being who lives among other people, he has to 
choose to do acts of ethical virtue. This also applies to the ordinary citizen who 
in o rder to achieve e u d a im o n ia  shou ld  accom plish  a m ix tu re  of 
contemplation and ethical virtue, combining these two with a full social and 
political life. Such a model of a citizen though, fully accomplished, could 
probably be only ideal, and would be more likely to exist only among the 'few ' 
and not among the 'm any'. Aristotle believes that it is only through a well 
organised educational system that a political com m unity could consist of 
inform ed citizens. And it is exactly at this point, in the last book of the 
Nicomachean Ethics that the connection between his ethical ideas and his 
political science is most explicitly shown. Having completed his account of the 
good life, he raises the question of how it is to be im plemented. Everyday 
people are unlikely to become good unless the governm ent and the laws are 
directed tow ards the achievement of hum an good. Therefore, the complete 
philosophy of hum an nature should also include the study of laws and 
constitutions and how best to frame them .165
But, this view is difficult to reconcile with Aristotle's general views on 
morality and politics and, in general, the problems of interpretation involved 
in the Aristotelian accounts of the active and the contem plative life have
165 M ulgan (1977), p. 6. In a similar line of thought, Tessitore (1996) argues—rather 
unsuccessfully—that Aristotle aims to effect a reconciliation by leading statesmen to appreciate 
philosophy. Despite that Aristotle in fact believes that true happiness consists in a life devoted  
to philosophical speculation, his intended audience was non-philosophers in the hope to lure 
them into it.
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puzzled philosophers over the centuries. The major dispute has been about 
the interpretation of Books I and X of the Nicomachean Ethics concerning 
A risto tle 's question on 'w hat it is that we all u ltim ately  aim at'. In 
Nicomachean Ethics Book I, 2, 1094a 18-26 Aristotle seems to suggest that there 
is one ultimate end towards which all our actions are directed:
So if what is done has some end that we want for its own sake, and 
everything else we want is for the sake of this end; and if we do not 
choose everything for the sake of som ething else (because this 
would lead to an infinite progression, making our desire fruitless 
and vain), then clearly this will be the good, indeed the chief good. 
Surely, then, knowledge of the good m ust be very im portant for 
our lives? And if, like archers, we have a target, are we not more 
likely to hit the right mark? If so, we m ust try at least roughly to 
comprehend w hat it is and which science or faculty is concerned 
with it.
Views among the commentators differ significantly as to w hat exactly 
Aristotle had in m ind and even as to w hether his view is w orthy of any 
interest whatsoever in the first place. Kenny, for example, has argued that 
A risto tle 's conception of euda im onia  is not only inconsistent bu t also 
implausible, since it rests on the mistaken thesis of NE  Book I where he claims 
that the good life for m an would have as its pursuit a single dom inant end 
around which the agent should centre his life and activities. According to 
Kenny—who thinks that Aristotle considers eudaimonia only in the dom inant 
sense—"Aristotle's belief that the pursuit of happiness m ust be the pursuit of a 
single dom inant aim, and his account of the nature of philosophy, seem to be 
both so seriously m istaken as to make unprofitable a discussion of his 
arguments that happiness consists in theoria".166 Hintikka has also argued that 
Aristotle falls victim to his "conceptual teleology" in the sense that, since he 
could not accommodate within his conceptual system an activity that did not 
have a telos, he had to provide one even for activities that he w anted to
166 Kenny (1965-6), p. 58. See also Kenny (1992).
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distinguish from productive ones, hence falling into the absurdity of speaking 
of an activity of the former kind as its own telos167
The central problem  has traditionally been w hether Aristotle takes a 
'dom inant' or an 'inclusive' view about eudaimonia.168 On the one hand, 
according to the 'dom inant' (or 'exclusive') view, happiness is the prim ary or 
dom inant good among several others; in NE, X.7, 1177a Aristotle appears to 
claim  that happiness is to be identified  w ith just one good, that of 
philosophical contemplation. To conceive one's end in life as a dom inant (or 
exclusive) end is to identify it as lying in something rather highly specific, for 
example as power over others or service to others or contemplation. On the 
other hand, according to the 'inclusive' view, any conception of happiness 
m ust include all goods. In this sense, to conceive our end in life as an 
inclusive end is to conceive it as possibly consisting in an array of goods or 
satisfactions, for example victory and wealth and honour and friendship and 
pleasure and intellectual satisfaction {X + Y + Z + ...}.
But how are the terms 'inclusive' and 'dom inant' to be understood? As 
Ackrill points out, "the term 'inclusive' suggests the contrast between a single 
aim or 'good ' and a plurality, while the term 'dom inant' suggests the contrast 
between a group whose members are roughly equal and a group one of whose 
m embers is m uch superior to the rest". These two terms, w hen used as a 
contrasting pair of terms, are to be understood as follows: (a) "by an 'inclusive 
end ' m ight be meant any end combining or including two or more values or 
activities or goods; or there m ight be m eant an end in w hich different 
com ponents have roughly equal value (or at least are such that no one 
com ponent is incom m ensurably m ore valuable than another)", (b) "by a 
'dom inant end ' m ight be m eant a monolithic end, an end consisting of just
167 Hintikka (1973), pp. 53-62.
168 Hardie was the first to label the two views as 'dominant' and 'inclusive'; Hardie also argued 
that Aristotle confuses the idea of an 'inclusive' end and the idea of a 'dominant' end because he 
fails in NE  Book I to distinguish clearly between means and ends. See, Hardie (1968a), pp. 297- 
322. See also, Hardie (1968b), Ch. 2.
96
one valued activity or good, or there might be m eant that element in an end 
combining two or more independently valued goods which has a dominant or 
p reponderating  or param ount im portance".169 Ackrill points out that it is 
clearly in the strong sense of 'dom inant' and the contrasting weak sense of 
'inclusive' that both Hardie and Kenny base their view that Aristotle advances 
in NE  Book I eudaimonia as a 'dom inant' end.
Ackrill defends Aristotle against the charge that in N E ,  Book I the 
confusion about means and ends leads him to hold that action has value only 
as a means to theoria by arguing that when Aristotle says that A  is for the sake 
of B, he need not mean that A is a means to subsequent B but may mean that 
A  contributes as a constituent to B. When Aristotle says that good actions are 
for the sake of euda im on ia ,  he m eans that good actions contribute as 
constituents to eudaimonia and not that eudaimonia consists in a single type 
of activity, that is theoria.170
W hat is, though, the bearing that Aristotle's conception of the good for 
man and the good life in the Nicomachean Ethics has on political matters? 
And, indeed, why should it have any bearing at all in his political philosophy?
In the Politics, Aristotle discusses the good for m an and eudaimonia on 
more than one occasion and, as he says, the city has as its aim the pursuit of 
the most sovereign of all goods. The problem of the inconsistency between the 
two different ways of life—the practical and the contemplative one—also comes 
forward in book VII of the Politics. It should be pointed out that whether one 
adopts an 'inclusive' or a 'dom inant' interpretation of the good is not a trivial 
matter, since it has a bearing on whether one would be allowed to choose a 'life 
of politics' in the first place. It is only if one adopts an 'inclusive' view of 
eudaimonia  that political activity is m ade possible. If political activity is a 
dom inant end, no value can be attached to contemplation. The 'dom inant'
169 Ackrill (1980), p. 17.
170 Ackrill (1980), pp. 18-29.
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in terp reta tion  of eudaim onia  has to be rejected as far as political life is 
concerned. One could hardly be in a position to play an active role in the 
political life of a city~let alone to participate in any way in politics—if his 
dom inant end in life is that of philosophical contemplation.
Therefore, if one is to make any sense of Aristotle's moral and political 
philosophy, it seems that he w ould have to adopt an 'inclusivist' view of 
eudaimonia. A lthough philosophical contem plation (theoria) m ight be a 
necessary constituent of a good life, it is true that nobody could survive 
without devoting some time to other activities since they are also necessary in 
order to live a good life. One could not possibly spent his life philosophising 
alone with no family, friends and community.
In conclusion, I would like to point out that I do not go into a detailed 
examination of the different argum ents offered by various interpretators in 
support of the one or the other view, since my aim in this section was merely 
to identify the different interpretations of the hum an good in order to 
demonstrate their bearing on Aristotle's political theory. As has been pointed 
out p rev iously , w hether one adop ts an 'in c lu s ive ' or a 'd o m in an t' 
interpretation of the good life is of great significance to political theory, since a 
'life of politics' could only be pursued if one has an 'inclusive' view of 
eudaimonia. Philosophical contem plation, on the one hand, pursued as a 
dom inant end in one's life w ould leave no room for political activity, and 
would mean the end of political life as Aristotle at least envisaged it. On the 
other hand, one can pursue political activity as a dom inant end; but this would 
again be unacceptable to Aristotle because it w ould leave no room for 
philosophical contemplation.
In addition, the conception of eudaimonia in the Nicomachean Ethics is 
of im portance for A ristotle's political theory and its appropriation in the 
liberal-communitarian debate for two main reasons. First, because most of the 
com m unitarian appropriations of A ristotelian political theory rely on an
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account of hum an good and eudaimonia derived from the Ethics and not from 
the Politics. Second, because, depending on whether one adopts the 'inclusive' 
or the 'dom inant' view of eudaimonia, Aristotle can either be appropriated as 
an individualist or a communitarian.
4.3 The good life in Aristotle's Politics
We may distinguish two different Aristotelian accounts of the best polis in the 
Politics: first, in the form of constitution which w ould be best under ideal 
conditions—and is, therefore, best absolutely—that he advances in Books VII 
and VIII; and, second, in the form of constitution that is best under the 
conditions that actually prevail that he advances in Books IV. It should be 
noted, though, that the account of the good life plays a central role in the city of 
books VII and VIII, some role in Book II but very little in Books III and IV. I 
will argue that the Book VII account includes a good deal that liberals m ust 
reject; this stems not so much from the idea that the city exists for the sake of 
the good life as from Aristotle's particular conception of the good life.
It is rather im portant to have in m ind that in the Politics  A ristotle 
brings forward two kinds of questions concerning the best constitution. He 
tries to examine which form of constitution would be the best absolutely under 
ideal conditions and which form of constitution w ould be best under the 
conditions that actually prevail.171 He deals with the first question in books VII 
and VIII and with the second in books IV to VI.
This is im portant in the sense that m uch depends on w hether one 
would take Aristotle to be strongly committed to the first or the second form of 
constitution that he discusses in the Politics, the one that is best absolutely or 
the one which is best under the conditions that actually prevail. Some think
171 Stalley (1995), p. 331.
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that Aristotle is aware that his best constitution is just an ideal that cannot in 
fact have any application in practice, and that in fact Aristotle would only be in 
favour of imperfect political associations. Presumably, though, Aristotle must 
be in favour of his ideal constitution; but he could, nevertheless, see the ideal 
constitution as lacking in practical relevance. One could go further and argue 
that Aristotle could even hold that it is positively harm ful for the practical 
politician to connect himself with such ideals.
Yack has argued, for example, that the way we should interpret Aristotle 
is as actually having in mind imperfect and conflict-ridden communities and 
not his analysis on the ideal state, as we usually do, since such an ideal s ta te - 
even to Aristotle's knowledge—has no chance of ever existing .172 Furthermore, 
Yack contends that man is in Aristotle an argum entative animal, since man 
has the capacity for argument, and also that Aristotle's citizens argue about 
general standards of justice and goodness.173 Therefore, one could argue that 
in fact the Politics  entails two different theories on the best form of 
constitution which could be seen independently from one another and also 
that one could actually be in a position to choose to adopt the one and drop the 
other.
Two questions though arise from an interpretation of this kind. On the 
one hand, if the two conceptions presuppose radically different views of the 
same condition, what are they doing in the same author? On the other hand, if 
they do not presuppose a totally different view of the same condition, they 
must be related in some way.
The first of the two above questions would not seem too difficult to 
answer if we think in terms of the theory of the 'second-best'. The term is 
borrowed from Plato's Statesman  where Plato argues that governm ent in 
accordance with written law is only the second-best.174 According to this line of
172 See Yack (1993).
173 See also Yack (1985), pp. 92-112.
174 Plato, Statesm an , 297e 1-5. See also Laws 739a-e.
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thought, it is plausible that Aristotle advances his theory on the good life in 
the ideal state which would be best absolutely under ideal conditions, but at the 
same time he realises that this is a theory that could not be applied in practice 
under the circumstances which are actually prevailing. He needs, therefore, to 
come up w ith  another theory, a 'second best' theory, w hich could be 
im plem ented under the circumstances which are actually prevailing. There 
are two ways to do that: (a) either to present a view very similar to that which 
is best absolutely, or (b) to propose instead a different one all together. There is 
no reason w hy one should not go for the second option: if my first option is to 
spend my sum m er holidays on a beach in the M editerranean but I cannot 
afford it, there is no reason why I should go on a British beach instead; my 
second best option could well be to do something very different all together 
and to spend my holidays in the Scottish Highlands.
In the very beginning of Book I of the Politics (1252a 1-8) Aristotle starts 
by arguing that "the polis has as its aim the pursuit of the most sovereign of all 
goods (KUpicoTticTOU dyotOou)". This conclusion is based on the following three 
premises: (a) Every polis is a species of association, (b) All associations come 
into being for the sake of some good (for all men do all their acts with a view 
to achieving something which is, in their view, good), and (c) the particular 
association which is the most sovereign of all, and includes all the rest, will 
pursue this aim most, and will thus be directed to the most sovereign of all 
goods. This most sovereign and inclusive association is the polis (1252a3-7). 
This is related to Aristotle's general view that all our deliberate acts are 
directed to some good, a view that is found in the Nicomachean Ethics.175
The polis is, therefore, an association that is distinctive in aiming at the 
most sovereign good. Of course all forms of association have their own good 
that they aim at. If one cannot define the good of the state more precisely than 
by saying that it is the sovereign good, one might question w hether there is
175 Stalley (1995), p. 318. N E  1094al-bll.
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any good that is common to all cities. But, is the most sovereign good the same 
as the highest good?
The question that arises from that is whether the most sovereign good 
( K u p i c o T c c r o v  c x y a B o v )  is the same as the highest good ( a p i a r o v  a y a B o v ) .  It is 
indeed difficult to know exactly w hat is m eant by K u p i a S r a r o v ,  since a city 
might have a misplaced conception of the good in such a way as the good that 
is sovereign in a particular city need not also be the highest. One could argue 
that the sovereign good is not the same w ith the highest good, since all 
associations aim at some good but there could be cities that do not manage to 
reach the highest good or are mistaken in their conception of the good, and 
pursue, therefore, a conception of the good different to that of the highest.
Thus, it is not clear w hether the most sovereign good means 'm ost 
sovereign for that particular city' or 'm ost sovereign overall'. There is a scope 
am biguity here sim ilar to Nicomachean Ethics Book I. It should also be 
pointed out that this also has a bearing on many other parts of the Politics; for 
example, on the genetic account of the state, on the account of justice in Book 
III and on the account of the ideal state.
The above problem may point to the difficulty of assimilating politics to 
the teleology of nature. Hum an beings could choose to create cities for a variety 
of different ends bu t (on A ristotle 's view at least) natural things have a 
predeterm ined end. This could further support the argum ent about the 
conscious creation of the polis discussed in the previous chapter on teleology, 
since, as Aristotle points out in the beginning of Politics Book I (1252a 2-3), "all 
men do all their acts w ith a view to achieving som ething which is, in their 
view, good" ( t o o  yap elvai S o k o u v t o c  ayaBoo x < * P l v  Travra 7rpdrrouai 
7ravT£C). This implies that, since men act to achieve something which is good, 
and since the polis aims at the pursuit of the most sovereign of all goods, then 
the polis need not be a natural creation. As we shall see, Aristotle discusses the 
account of the highest good (apiarov ayaBov) in Politics Books VII and VIII.
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In Book III, 3, 1276bl Aristotle argues that, since the polis is an 
association ( k o i v c o v I a ) —and, in particular, an association of citizens in a 
constitution (e a n  5e K o i v c o v i a  7toX i tgov  7 r o X i T e i a g ) - - w h e n  t h e  form of t h e  
government changes and becomes different, then it may be supposed that the 
polis is no longer the same, just as, for example, a tragic chorus differs from a 
comic chorus, although the members of both may be identical.
In chapter 6 of the same Book, when he speaks about the constitutions 
(7ro Aitei oti) and their classification, he makes clear that m an is by nature a 
political animal that comes together in the cities for the sake of the good life, 
and, since the constitution of a polis is the ordering of its offices and 
particularly of the sovereign one, it is, therefore, correct if it aims at the 
common good, since the polis is a society of the free. But, as he says, if the 
constitution aims at the good of the rulers only, it is despotic and perverted.
In Book III, 9, w hen he examines the principle of a constitution176 
which is its conception of justice, he presents an argum ent in support of his 
definition of the polis which comes dow n to a search for the feature that 
distinguishes a city from the other kinds within its genus. This feature of the 
polis which distinguishes it from the other kinds of associations is its end 
(teAoq). This argum ent is a totally different one from the others presented in 
Book I in support of the same thesis. He starts his argum ent by examining all 
the possible candidates for the end of the polis and he rejects them in turn all 
as inadequate except for one. The six candidates for the differentia of a polis, its 
telos, are: 1) property, 2) self-preservation, 3) m utual defence against outsiders, 
4) trade and m utual intercourse, 5) prevention of injustice to one another, and 
finally 6) good life. All these first five candidates, even if they are taken 
severally or jointly, establish at most an alliance (aujajuaxioc) and not a political 
association.
176 It should be noted though that 7roXiTela is, of course, ambiguous because it sometimes means 
'constitution' but also refers to a particular kind of constitution, the 'middle' constitution. 'Polity' 
is often used of the latter. But that meaning is not in play here.
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First, property is an unsuccessful candidate because, "if men formed the 
political association (eKoivtovr|aav) and came together (auvrjXOov) for the sake 
of wealth, their share in the polis is proportionate to their share in the 
property". If property was the end of the state, the oligarchic view would be 
right (namely that in a partnership with a capital of 100 minae it would not be 
just for the m an who contributed one mina to have a share w hether of the 
principal or of the profits accruing equal to the share of the m an who supplied 
the whole of the remainder). But, wealth can not be a suprem e good since it is 
only instrumental and not intrinsic to the good life of the state (1280a25-31).
Self-preservation is also rejected in his famous phrase that the polis was 
formed not for the sake of life only but rather for the sake of the good life (jurjre 
tou  Cqv juovov eveKev aXXa juaXXov rou su trjv), for otherwise a collection 
of slaves or of lower animals would be a state, bu t as it is, it is not a polis, 
because slaves and animals have no share in well-being or in purposive life 
(1280a31-35).
'M utual defence against outsiders', 'trade ', 'm utual intercourse', and 
'prevention of injustice to one another' are also rejected as candidates for the 
goal of the polis. If the polis was formed for the sake of trade and of business 
relations, then, all the people that have comm ercial relations w ith one 
another, like for example Etruscans and Carthaginians, w ould be virtually 
citizens of a single city. It is true that such people have agreem ents about 
im ports, treaties to ensure just conduct and w ritten term s of alliance for 
m utual defence. But they do not have common offices appointed to enforce 
these matters, but different officials with either party take any concern as to the 
proper moral character of the other, nor attem pt to secure that nobody in the 
cities shall be dishonest or in any way immoral, but only that they shall not 
commit any wrong against each other (1280a35-b5).
Aristotle concludes that it is only the good life which is the successful 
candidate as the end of the polis. W hat justifies the polis, w hat gives the
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content to the formulation of the polis is the good life. This is why he thinks 
that the good life is the end of the existence of the polis, because the good life 
provides an adequate explanation of the justification of the polis.177 A  polis is 
an association of households and clans in living well (q rou eu £ q v  
k oi vg o v i oc ) ,  for the sake of a perfect (reX elag) and self-sufficient (a u r a p K o u g )  life 
(1280b33-35). Finally, after combining this definition w ith the criterion that 
satisfies the goal of the polis, Aristotle concludes that "those who contribute 
most to such an association have a larger share in the city than those who are 
equal or superior in freedom and birth but unequal in political virtue, or those 
who exceed in wealth but are exceeded in virtue" (1281a4-8). It should be noted 
though that it is interesting that these argum ents suggest various criteria for 
the existence of a polis--as for example that there be common officials—which 
are not obviously related to the goal of the good life.
Aristotle has repeated this claim in Book I, 1252b 29, w hen he said that 
"although the polis comes into being at first for the sake of living, it exists for 
the sake of living well" (yivoiuevq juev ouv rod tq v  evexev, ouaot 5s rou eu 
Cqv). Later, though, in 1281a 3 he reformulates this by replacing the 'good life' 
(su Cqv) w ith the 'for the sake of noble actions' (to Cqv euSoujLidvcog Kai 
KaXcog). This distinction of 'living as survival' and 'living as well-being' is, 
therefore, fundam ental for the understand ing  of A risto tle 's notion of 
eudaim onia.
The polis thus arises for the sake of survival but exists for the sake of 
well-being. He distinguishes thus between living as survival and living as 
well-being. This first notion of living as survival on w hich part of the 
existence of the polis depends is linked to the satisfaction of elementary needs 
which strongly necessitate co-operation with others, since as he says in the 
Nicomachean Ethics (1133al6) the com m unity does not consist of two
177  It should be noted that here Aristotle's arguments on the justification of the polis  are 
empirical, since he argues from everyday experiences that exist in real life, and not 
h yp oth etica lly .
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physicians, bu t of a physician and a farmer and in general of people who are 
unequal, and it is need which holds every hum an being together.
Furtherm ore, the participants of this pre-associational com m unity, 
according to Aristotle, form a basic form of community where everything that 
is common endures by way of the just and where the change that is mutually 
advantageous should be guided by the just as such (cforAcog Sikouov).178 This 
mutual advantage presupposes that the participants are able to have a genuine 
self-interest. The just as such is distinguished from the politically just and is to 
a certain extent pre-political and already bound up w ith m an's faculty of 
speech, since—as Aristotle says in Politics 1253a 14—speech is designed "to 
explain w hat is useful and w hat is harmful and as a consequence what is just 
and what unjust". The participants of this pre-political need-exchange model 
of life as survival are able to direct their decision to w hat is just or unjust 
without having to appeal to the common project of the polis. In fact this kind 
of association and this kind of justice, as Aristotle says in the Eudemian Ethics 
1242b 6-1243b 39, could exist even if there were no polis. Nevertheless, it 
should be pointed out that, although Aristotle does think of justice as pre­
political, he mainly sees it as presupposing a koinonia. Indeed, justice and 
Koivcovia are inseparable.
But of course this does not mean that living as survival and living as 
well-being are two separate activities. Despite the fact that one can survive but 
not live well, one cannot live well w ithout surviving. This first level of living 
as survival has in fact to be presupposed in the polis so that the notions of the 
fullness or excellence of life can be developed. Aristotle challenges precisely 
the view that people want to live solely in order to survive: everyone strives 
naturally for a good life, eudaimonia.
In what follows, I will discuss, first, Aristotle's account of the good life in 
the ideal city, second, his criticism of Plato's political theory and how this
178 EE, 1241bl4.
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criticism help us understand better Aristotle's conception of the good life in 
Politics, Books VII and VIII, and, third, his account of the city which is best 
under the circumstances actually prevailing.
4. 3.1 The good life in the ideal city
Aristotle's account of the good life in the Politics is mainly set out in books VII 
and VIII which contain the portrait of a best or aristocratic state (dpiatog). His 
account of the ideal state is supported by his account of how the polis promotes 
the hum an good. For, in order to be able to depict the ideal constitution, we 
m ust first determine which is the most appropriate candidate for the good life. 
In Aristotle's ideal state the city only exists for the good life, since this account 
of the ideal state presupposed the best possible conditions and is the best 
ab so lu te ly .179 But one should point out that the fact that there is only an 
account of the good life in his discussion of the ideal city raises the question 
w hether Aristotle's conception of the good life has any relevance to practical 
affairs.
It is the account of the highest good (dpiOTOv dyocBdv) that Aristotle 
embarks on discussing in Politics, Books VII and VIII. These Books set out 
Aristotle's political ideal on the constitution that should be best absolutely 
under the best possible conditions. In the first three chapters of Book VII 
Aristotle sets forth the norm ative principles for his ideal constitution by 
discussing the nature of the highest good and of the best and happiest life, 
while in the rest of Book VII and in the whole of Book VIII he sets out the 
sketch of a best constitution and the educational principles that should govern 
that ideal state.
179 Stalley (1995), p. 395.
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In order to be able to decide on the ideal constitution though, one 
should first be able to give an account of how the political association 
promotes the hum an good. Many of the problems that surround problematic 
ideals of constitu tions, or actual ones, depend on the conceptions of 
eudaimonia which enables the cities to promote the hum an good. As Aristotle 
points out in 1323al4-20, "Anyone who is going to make a proper inquiry 
about the best form of constitution (7roXiTe(a ap ia rri) m ust first determine 
what mode of life is most to be desired". Otherwise, it would be very difficult 
to be able to define w hat is the best constitution, since as can be expected- 
provided that nothing extraordinary happens—"those who live under the 
constitution that is best for those in their circumstances will have the best way 
of live". Therefore, Aristotle concludes, "we must, first of all, find some agreed 
conception of the way of life which is most desirable for all men in all cases; 
and we m ust then discover whether or not the same way of life is desirable in 
the case of the community as in that of the individual".
So, in fact, the discussion in the first three chapters of Book VII aims at 
presenting an accurate conception of the highest hum an good and of the best 
and happiest life that would be the most appropriate for his ideal constitution. 
Having agreed on an accurate conception of the highest hum an good, the polis 
would be able to promote that hum an good, to provide for its citizens and to 
persuade them that they have reason to promote it for its own sake. As he says 
in 1324a, his argum ent would be that "the best way of life, for individuals 
separately as well as for cities collectively, is the life of goodness (virtue) duly 
equipped w ith such a store of requisites as makes it possible to share in the 
activities of goodness". We shall see in what follows by examining Aristotle's 
argument how he makes this im portant transition from the first claim that the 
city seeks the good to the last one that the good consists in a life of virtue.
Aristotle starts his enquiry into the nature of the best way of life 
desirable for all men (o 7raaiv aipsrcoraTog (3iog) by making a classification of
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goods that no one—according to his opinion—could challenge and which the 
eudaimon m an should possess. The classification of these elements falls into 
three groups: (a) external goods (roov eiordg), (b) goods of the body (rcov ev tgo 
Quipcm), and (c) goods of the soul (rcov ev T13 From these three, the
goods of the soul come first, since as he says,
The facts themselves make it easy for you to assure yourselves on 
these issues. You can see for yourselves that the goods of the soul 
are not gained or maintained by external goods. It is the other way 
round. You can see for yourselves that the happy life—no m atter 
whether it consists in pleasure, or goodness, or both—belongs more 
to those w ho have cultivated their character and m ind to the 
uttermost, and kept acquisition of external goods w ithin moderate 
limits, than it does to those who have m anaged to acquire more 
external goods than they can use, and are lacking in the goods of 
the soul (1323a 35-b7).
This can also be proven theoretically. The claim that happiness is 
proportionate to goodness and wisdom  is derived from his argum ent that 
goods of the soul are more valuable than those of the body (1323a 35-b). While 
external goods have a necessary limit of size, with goods of the soul the greater 
the amount of each, the greater is its usefulness or its value. The goods of the 
soul are not gained or maintained by external goods. On the contrary it is the 
other way round: "the happy life—no matter whether it consists in pleasure, or 
goodness, or both—belongs more to those who have cultivated their character 
and m ind to the utterm ost, and kept acquisition of external goods within 
m oderate limits, than it does to those who have m anaged to acquire more 
external goods than they can use, and are lacking in the goods of the soul" 
(1323ba 35-5). According to Aristotle, it should be agreed that
the am ount of happiness which falls to each individual m an is 
equal to the am ount of his goodness and his wisdom, and of the 
good and wise acts that he does. God Himself bears witness to this 
conclusion. He is happy and blessed; bu t He is so in and by 
Himself, by reason of the nature of His being, and not by virtue of
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any external good. This will explain why there m ust always be a 
difference between being happy and being fortunate. Accident and 
chance are causes of the goods external to the soul ; but no man 
can be just and tem perate merely from chance or by chance 
(1323b21-29).
Finally, he concludes the first chapter by making the last point that
the best city is the one which is happy and "does well'. To do well 
is impossible unless you also do fine deeds; and there can be no 
doing fine deeds for a city, any more than there can be for an 
individual, in the absence of goodness and wisdom. The courage 
of a city, and the justice and wisdom of a city, have the same force, 
and the same character, as the qualities which cause individuals 
who have them to be called just, wise, and temperate.
In the following chapter (VII. 2), Aristotle goes on to discuss whether the
life of goodness—which is the best way of life for both the city and the
individual—consists more in external action or more in internal development.
In the opening of chapter 2, in 1324a5, he examines the question of whether
the happiness of the city is the same as that of the individual, or whether it is
different. The answer is clear, as he says, since "all agree that they are the
same":
Those who believe that the well-being of the individual consists 
in his wealth, will also believe that the city as a whole is happy 
when it is wealthy. Those who rank the life of a tyrant higher than 
any other, will also rank the city which possesses the largest 
empire as being the happiest city. Anyone who grades individuals 
by their goodness, will also regard the happiness of cities as 
proportionate to their goodness (1324a9-13).
The happiness of the city is the same as that of the individual in the sense that
in the same way that it is important for the individual to be wealthy, good etc.,
it is also important for the city too to be wealthy, good, etc.
In the following paragraph of the same chapter, Aristotle puts forward
two questions. First, which way of life is the most desirable: to join with other
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citizens and share in the city's activity, or to live in it like an alien, released 
from the ties of political association? Second, which is the best constitution 
and the best way of organising the city—no matter whether we assume that it is 
desirable for all to have to share in the city, or regard it as desirable for the 
majority only? The first question raises the issue of w hat is good for the 
individual, while the second one is a matter for political thought and political 
speculation.
One thing is clear about the best constitution: "It m ust be a political 
organisation which will enable anyone to be at his best and live happily" 
(1324a23-25). But views are divided around which way of life is the most 
desirable, the practical and political life (o 7roXiTiKog Koti 7rpaKTiKog (3ioq) or 
the theoretical one (0ecopr|TiK()<; |3iog), the one which is appropriate for a 
philosopher? We are faced w ith a sim ilar question as far as cities are 
concerned; which kind of life is the most desirable for the city, (a) the life of 
politics and action, which issues in the assumption of authority over others, or 
(b) the life of the self-contained city which engages in developing its own 
resources and culture?
Many cities, like Sparta for example, choose to pursue the first ideal and 
they make w ar part of their everyday life, in their legislation and their 
educational system  and also in their customs and traditions. But m ilitary 
pursuits, and war in general, should not be the chief end of man, transcending 
all other ends. Problems of war do occur of course because of the neighbouring 
countries, and there is the need to defend oneself against the others. On the 
other hand though, one could imagine an ideal city isolated w ith no enemies 
and no neighbouring countries that would have no need for w ar or warlike 
legislation. It should be clear that war is only a means to a chief end. So, "the 
task of a good lawgiver is to see how any city or race of men or society with 
which he is concerned, may share in a good life and in w hatever form of 
happiness is available to them" (1325a6-ll).
I l l
In the next chapter Aristotle deals with the same question concerning 
the two options between the two different life-styles, but as far as the life of the 
individual is concerned. This dilemma brings forw ard the same problem  
discussed in the Nicomachean Ethics concerning the life of active virtue and 
the life of theoretical virtue. It should be clear that the dispute here is about 
how the individual should live the life of goodness ( t o v  j u s t ’ dperrjg (3(ov). 
As Aristotle says, there are two schools of thought divided over this issue.
The first school advocates that one should refrain oneself from taking 
part in political office and should consider the life of the free individual ( t o v  
t o o  eXeuOspoo (3(ov) to be better and more preferable than that of the 
politician. The second school, on the other hand, thinks that the active life of 
the politician is the best, since it is impossible-according to their opinion—for 
someone who does nothing to do well and they identify eudaim onia w ith 
active well-doing (rfjv 5 ’ e u T r p a y i o c v  k o u  Trjv eu S a i ju ov iav  e l v a i  r a o r o v )  
(1325al8-24).
Both schools argue well in some points and wrongly in others according 
to Aristotle. The first view is right in advocating that the life of a free 
individual is much better than that of a despot, someone who is a master over 
people inferior to him (o t o o  sXsuOepou |3iog t o o  5ea7roriKoi5 apeivcov), 
since nobody finds anything pleasant or fulfilling in m astering slaves. The 
second view is wrong in considering every form of authority as mastery, since 
governing free men is different from ruling over slaves in the same way as 
that which is by nature free differs from that which is by nature servile (<|)i5 aei 
sXeu0£pov— cj)uaei SouXov). In general, it is wrong to prefer inaction over action, 
since eudaimonia is action (f| yap eu S a ip ov ia  7rpa£ic, e a n v )  and the actions 
of the just and wise men accomplish many and good things (1325a24-34).
Having argued that "sovereign power is the highest of all goods, because 
it is also the power of practising the greatest num ber of the highest and best 
activities" (1325a34-35) and that everyone should act on the principle 'the best
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is the most desirable' and 'to do well is the best', he concludes by saying that 
eudaimonia should be held to consist in 'well-doing' (suSaipoviav eu7rpayiav 
0£T6ov) and from that it follows that "the life of action is best (dpiarog (3iog o 
7rpaKTiKog), alike for every city as a whole and for each individual in his own 
conduct" (1325M4-17).
But, the life of action need not always be a life which involves relations 
to others and the 'in ternal' life of contem plation need not be completely 
excluded from the polis:
But the life of action need not be, as is sometimes thought, a life 
which involves relations to others. Nor should our thoughts be 
held to be active only when they are directed to objects which 
have to be achieved by action. Thoughts w ith no object beyond 
themselves, and speculations and trains of reflection followed 
purely for their own sake, are far more deserving of the name of 
active. 'W ell-doing' is the end we seek: action of some sort or 
other is therefore our end and aim; but, even in the sphere of 
outward acts, action can also be predicated—and that in the fullest 
m easure and the true sense of the w ord—of those who, by their 
thoughts, are the prim e authors of such acts. Cities situated by 
them selves, and resolved to live in isolation, need not be 
therefore inactive. They can achieve activity by sections: the 
d ifferent sections of such a city w ill have m any m utual 
connections.This is also, and equally, true of the indiv idual 
hum an being. If it were not so, there would be something wrong 
w ith God himself and the whole of the universe, who have no 
activities other than those of their own internal life (1325b20-30).
In summarising, according to Aristotle, eudaimonia in the polis consists of the
life of goodness duly equipped w ith such a store of requisites as makes it
possible to share in the activities of goodness and that the same way of life
which is best for the individual must also be best for the city as a whole and for
all its members.
This is a sum m ary of Aristotle's m ain argum ents in the first three 
chapters of Politics, Book VII w here Aristotle sets forth the norm ative
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principles that should govern his ideal constitution. But, from w hat we have 
seen so far, does Aristotle have a clear view of the ends of the state? If there are 
ambiguities w hat are they? Is w hat he says sufficient to give a content to the 
idea that the city aims at the good life?
Aristotle's search was for the feature of the city which distinguishes it 
from the other kinds within its genus in order to justify the state. W hat the 
end of the city is, justifies the existence of the state. The end of the ideal city is 
not property, self-preservation, m utual defence against outsiders, trade and 
m utual intercourse or prevention of injustice bu t the good life. The good life 
provides, therefore, the justification of the state. W hat justifies the state, what 
gives the content to the state is good life. This is w hy Aristotle thinks that the 
good life is the end of the existence of the polis; because he thinks that the good 
life provides an adequate explanation of the justification of the city. He 
envisages a community of persons who associate w ith each other not because 
of their need to make a living, but who have as their goal the good life, a life of 
fulfilment of exemplifying the characteristically hum an virtues. In the rest of 
Book VII and Book VIII, Aristotle is concerned w ith  the w ay laws and 
institutions are to be structured in order to ensure that citizens are educated 
into virtue.
Aristotle's notion of the good life in Politics VII, 1-3 is an inclusive one. 
As Depew points out, the argum ent of Politics VII, 1-3 is centred on the fact 
that there two ways of life, the political and the intellectual, which seem to be 
plausible candidates for the way of life of a happy state (VII, 2, 1324a25-34).180 
Which of these two w ould be the best to be chosen for the ideal state? The 
political and practical life of the statesman (|3{oc 7toAitik6c) or the free life of 
speculations and thoughts (pioc BecopriTiKoc)? We are faced, therefore, in the 
Politics in the discussion of the good life for the ideal city w ith the same 
question as we were in the Ethics. Indeed, the Nicomachean Ethics 'sconceptual
180 Depew (1991), pp. 348-349.
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analysis of the components of eudaimonia  is present in this account of the 
ideal city and the tension between the two different ways of life is the same. 
Aristotle's solution to the problem here is to try to compromise the two ways 
of life and to put forward an inclusive account of the good life in the best city.
As Depew advocates, according to Aristotle's argum ent in Book VII, 1-3, 
a person will count as genuinely political only if he regards intellectual and 
political virtues as connected to eudaimonia through noble activity done for 
its own sake.181 The conventionally political m an has an inadequate and 
incomplete conception of virtue, since those who pu rsue  an exclusively 
political life typically m istake m eans for ends by treating  v irtue as an 
instrumental good in order to acquire external goods which they regard as 
ends, such as power, money etc. As Aristotle points out in Eudemian Ethics 
1216a 23-7, the majority of those engaged in politics are not correctly designated 
politicians, since they are not truly political in the sense that the political man 
is someone who purposely chooses noble actions for their own sake and not 
for the sake of money or excess as it is usually the case. The politician should, 
thus, love learning for its own sake and have at the same time an appreciation 
of genuine political life.182 This is an inclusive ends in terpretation  of 
A ristotelian eudaimonia  for the state. According to the inclusive view, 
"Aristotelian happiness countenances a lifetime of excellent activity in both 
the political-moral and contemplative spheres".183 In this sense, 'inclusivism ' 
contrasts with 'strict intellectualism ', both in a radical form, where the true 
happy, contemplative person regards himself as altogether free from social 
obligations, and in a weaker, more plausible version, according to which moral 
duties are necessary conditions for, but not proper parts of, happiness".184
181 Depew (1991), p. 358.
182 Depew (1991), ib id .
183 Depew (1991), p. 360.
184 Depew (1991), ibid.
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Inclusivism itself also has of course weaker and stronger versions. On 
the first hand, according to the weaker version of inclusivism, eudaimonia is 
considered to be merely the additive sum of goods commonly regarded as 
constituents of the good life with no strong ordering principle among them. 
This interpretation, as Depew points out, has been called the 'trade-off view, 
since "this countenances the unconstrained trading off of one good to realise 
another".185 On the other hand, according to a stronger version of inclusivism, 
the contemplative virtues serve as an ordering principle according to which 
contemplation is to be pursued as vigorously as possible w ithin the bounds of 
social obligations that m ust be met first.186 In this account, moral virtue comes 
first, but once it is secured then the other intellectual goods are allowed to 
come forward. According to Depew, in Aristotle's ideal state good politics and 
contemplative activity are m utually entailing: "W hat undergirds Aristotle's 
solution is his deep confidence in the practical w isdom  (phronesis) of 
autonomous political agents, which, for Aristotle, does not repress, deflect or 
manage desire, but completes the education of desire for intrinsically good 
things, and prizes contemplation not because it is politically useful, but because 
it is inherently noble and divine".187
4. 3. 2 Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic ideal state
Before going on to discuss Aristotle's 'second best theory ', I w ould like to 
discuss briefly his criticisms of Platonic politics w ith the view of deriving from 
it conclusions about the good and its role in his political theory. Aristotle's 
criticisms of the Republic at least may help to fill a picture of Aristotle's ideal
185 Depew (1991), pp. 360-361. Ackrill (1973) and Nussbaum (1986, p. 375) also put toward this 
interpretation.
186 Depew (1991), p. 361.
187 Depew (1991), p. 380.
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as one of individual activity, as opposed to a life in which the individual is 
merely a member of a collective.
In Politics Book II, Aristotle reviews theoretical and practical ideals of 
constitu tions, theoretical constitu tions and actual constitu tions w hich 
approach the ideal. From the first group, he examines Plato's Republic, Plato's 
Laws and the theories of Phaleas of Chalcedon and H ippodam us of Miletus. 
From the second group, he examines the Spartan, the Cretan, the Carthaginian 
constitutions, and some other legislators like Solon, Draco and Pittacus.
Aristotle's criticism of Plato's ideal constitution mainly brings forward 
questions concerning the political unity of the state. W hether the state or the 
polis should be view ed as one and w hether there should be only one 
conception of the good. Rawls apparently seems to think that Aristotle is 
committed to a rather strong conception of the unity of the state. Rawls holds 
this view rather in passim really when he mentions Aristotle among others as 
advocating that there should be only one conception of the good to be 
recognised by all persons. As Rawls argues,
One of the deepest distinctions between conceptions of justice is 
between those that allow for a plurality  of reasonable though 
opposing comprehensive doctrines each w ith its own conception 
of the good, and those that hold that there is bu t one such 
conception to be recognised by all citizens who are fully reasonable 
and rational. Conceptions of justice that fall on opposite sides of 
this divide are distinct in m any fundam ental ways. Plato and 
Aristotle, and the Christian tradition as represented by Augustine 
and Aquinas, fall on the side of the one reasonable and rational 
good. Such views hold that institutions are justifiable to the extent 
that they effectively prom ote that good. Indeed, beginning w ith 
Greek thought the dom inant tradition seems to have been that 
there is but one reasonable and rational conception of the good.
The aim of political philosophy—always viewed as part of moral 
philosophy, together w ith theology and m etaphysics—is then to 
determine its nature and content. The classical utilitarianism  of
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Bentham, Edgeworth, and Sidgwick belongs to this dom inant 
trad ition .188
But, as Aristotle's criticism of Plato's Republic shows us, Aristotle does 
not envisage for his account of the state the absolute unity of the state that the 
Republic advocates. Aristotle's view is not one of organicism, the view that 
the individual is a means to the community as end, that there is a good of 
society as a whole to the prom otion of which the indiv idual is purely 
instrum ental and subordinate. A lthough there are traces of organicism in 
Plato, as for example in the subordination of the guardian 's happiness to the 
welfare of the city as a whole, there is no such view  present in Aristotle's 
account.
As Stalley points out, in fact Aristotle in Politics Book II does not offer so 
much "a critique of the Republic or its ideal constitution as a discussion of 
political com m unity".189 Aristotle starts his discussion in Book II (1260b 36- 
1261a 9) by asking whether it is necessary either that the citizens have all things 
in common, or that they have nothing in common, or that they have some 
things in common, and others not. He thinks that it is clearly impossible that 
they should have nothing in common since the constitution of a city involves 
in itself some sort of association and its members m ust in the first place share a 
common locality. A city though which is to be well conducted does not have to 
share in all the things in which it is possible for it to share but it should share 
in some things and not in others.
Aristotle does not agree with the Platonic view that the gardians should 
have wom en and children in common. His criticisms are unfair to Plato's 
views but his intentions were not to make a scholarly criticism of Plato but to
188 Rawls (1996), pp. 134-135. Also in Rawls (1982, p. 160) where he says the same thing. Rawls 
contrasts in the first paper his political liberalism with forms of moral liberalism like that of 
Raz and Dworkin which are, according to him, similar to Aristotle's perfectionist account of the 
good. But, of course, it is not clear why liberal theory in general should be affiliated to the kind 
of liberalism that Rawls advocates and not to some sort of liberal perfectionism.
189 Stalley (1991), p. 184.
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put forward his own views.190 In 1261a 20-22, Aristotle advocates that the main 
mistake in Plato's theory is to assume that the whole polis should ideally be as 
much of unity as possible, denying thus its plurality:
A city, by its nature, is some sort of plurality. If it becomes more of 
a unit, it will first become a household instead of a city, and then 
an individual instead of a household; for we should all call the 
household more of a unit than the city, and the individual more of 
a unit than the household. It follows that, even if we could, we 
ought not to achieve this object: it would be the destruction of the 
city. Not only is the city composed of a num ber of people: it is also 
composed of different kinds of people, for a city cannot be 
composed of those who are like one another.
As Stalley argues, one should also note the passages from the Metaphysics
(XIV. 4. 1091b 16ff.) and the Eudemian Ethics (I. 8. 1218a 6ff.) where Aristotle
criticises those Platonists who identify the good with the one and see plurality
as the source of evil: "Aristotle's view is that, far from being an imperfection,
the plurality of a city is part of what makes it valuable".191
4. 3. 3 The good life in the city
In conclusion, what are we to make out of the above Aristotelian accounts of 
the good life? Does Aristotle's account of the best city actually provide the ideal 
of the good life and could that ideal be achievable w ithout the state as he 
actually describes it? Also, does Aristotle think it is possible to live a good life 
outside the ideal state?
As far as the good life in the ideal state is concerned, Aristotle is 
committed to two main claims; first, that one can live a good life in the ideal 
state, and, second, that there is no other state which provides an equal or better
190 Stalley (1991), pp. 183-186.
191 Stalley (1991), p. 187.
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chance of living a good life. He describes the best form of political community 
for human beings to be able to follow their ideal form of life. His account of the 
good life in the ideal state is an inclusive one which combines the active life of 
the citizen w ith that of the life of contem plation of the philosopher. It 
provides the opportunity for small num bers to live a good life in the small 
boundaries of a polis. Nevertheless, as we have seen, Aristotle also thinks that 
other states, than the ideal one, could also provide opportunities for people to 
live a good life. In that sense, it might be possible for one to envisage a liberal 
state which could provide the good life.
Of course, Aristotle's conception of the good life in the ideal state is not 
a liberal one. In fact, Aristotle's ideal state is a very illiberal one. On the other 
hand, as we have seen, in Politics Book IV we are presented w ith a less illiberal 
conception of the good life. It is clear that there exists a difference between the 
two Books. Nevertheless, one could still argue that one could have within a 
liberal state individual groups (for example, people who educate their children 
in private schools) who would actually pursue an Aristotelian conception of 
the human good without the state imposing it on them.
It is true that there are com m unitarian elements in Aristotle's ideal 
account but these are not intrinsic to the Aristotelian conception of the hum an 
good. In Book IV, Aristotle's account could not be seen as being so close to 
communitarianism and does not seem to imply that the state should promote 
the hum an good in such a way as that everybody should adopt it. The 
Aristotelian conception of the state is, therefore, in a w ay com m unitarian 
(definitely in Books VII and VIII); but it is not intrinsic to Aristotle's account of 
the hum an good to be such, since it would allow citizens living in a liberal 
state to pursue the Aristotelian good life, and still remain Aristotelian, in the 
sense that he might be Aristotelian in his account of the good bu t not see it as 
the state's duty to promote this specific account of the good. A liberal would of 
course reject Aristotle's conception of the good in Books VII and VIII as
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rational activity necessarily involving participation in common activity and 
education in virtue being necessary in order to engage in rational activity; 
nevertheless, even someone w ith a broadly Aristotelian view in m ind might 
not want to live in an Aristotelian liberal state.
4.4 The good life and the liberal-communitarian debate
In considering liberal views on the good and the good life one should be well 
aware that liberal thinkers vary considerably in this matter. A standard liberal 
viewpoint is that the state should be neutral between different conceptions of 
the good. One should clearly distinguish though betw een those forms of 
liberalism which do make explicit a conception of the good and those forms 
which deny that they rest on such a conception. Incidentally, it should be 
pointed out that one could have a conception of com m unal good w ithout 
having a conception of individual good. For example, one could argue that a 
society full of variety is good in itself, w ithout supporting any particular 
conception of individual good and w ithout defending any view of communal 
good by reference to individual good.
It should be pointed out that the notion of the p lurality  and the 
diversity of different conceptions of the good is not typical of all forms of 
liberalism but that it is mostly a figure of Rawls's form of political liberalism. 
Actually, the idea endorsed by Rawls, according to which the state should be 
neutral between the different conceptions of the good, is in fact alien to almost 
all forms of classical liberalism and to most forms of nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries liberalism. One of the m ain points of Rawlsian liberalism  that 
com m unitarians often criticise is that its theory of justice is prior to and 
independent of a theory of the good—the priority of right over the good thesis 
as it is often called. As Rawls says,
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The principles of right, and so of justice, pu t lim its on which 
satisfactions have value; they impose restrictions on w hat are 
reasonable conceptions of one's good. In drawing up plans and in 
deciding on aspirations men are to take those constraints into 
account. Hence, in justice as fairness one does not take the 
propensity and inclinations as given, whatever they are, and then 
seek the best way to fill them. Rather, their desires and aspirations 
are restricted from the outset by the principles of justice which 
specify the boundaries that men's systems of ends m ust respect.
We can express this by saying that in justice as fairness the concept 
of right is prior to that of the good.192
But, w hat is the priority of the right over the good really about? If it is 
only about the issue of distribution and is pu t forward only as a critique of 
utilitarianism  and in order to ensure that the innocent will not be sacrificed 
for the sake of the overall good—as Kymlicka thinks—then Rawls's opposition 
to teleological theories may not be so real after all. Rawls calls all theories 
w hich give p rio rity  to the right over the good, includ ing  his own, 
deontological. His theory has an account of people's rightful claims that is not 
entirely derivative from the maximisation of the good. Right is prior to, and 
constrains the pursuit of the good. Each person's good matters equally in a way 
that constrains the pursuit of the good; each person's good should have a 
standing that puts limits on the sacrifices that can rightfully be asked in the 
nam e of the overall good. If Kymlicka (1989) is right in that Rawls 
m isunderstands utilitarianism  in the sense that he w rongly criticises its 
teleological assumptions, then it m ight not be necessary after all to rule out 
teleological theories, if indeed there is a way to m ake them  secure 
individuality.
Despite Rawls's 'Aristotelian Principle'193 , where it seems that he relies 
on the Aristotelian notion of reason and rationality, as for example when he 
speaks of 'the rational plan ' from which a person's good is determ ined (N E
192 Rawls (1971), p. 31.
193 Rawls (1971), pp. 424-433.
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1178a 5), Rawls naturally also thinks that Aristotle is committed to a rather 
strong conception of the unity of the state. In a similar line of thought, John 
Stuart Mill in his essay On Liberty placed liberty as the central principle of 
political philosophy. Mill did not think that this would be such an easy task, 
since--as he said—despite the "air of truism " that his position m ight seem to 
have, "there is no doctrine which stands more directly opposed to the general 
tendency of existing opinion and practice" and "society has expended fully as 
much effort in the attem pt (according to its lights) to compel people to 
conform to its notions of personal, as of social excellence".194 Mill in this 
passage draws attention to the difference between the ancient commonwealths 
and the m odern world and points out that in the ancient commonwealths the 
state had a deep interest in the whole bodily and mental disciple of every one 
of its citizens, while "in the m odern w orld the greater size of political 
communities, and above all, the separation betw een spiritual and temporal 
authority (which placed the direction of m en's consciences in other hands 
than those which controlled their w orldly affairs), prevented so great an 
interference by law in the details of private life".195 As Mill says concerning the 
ancient commonwealths:
The ancient com m onw ealths thought them selves en titled  to 
p ractise , and  the ancient ph ilo sophers coun tenanced , the 
regulation of every part of private conduct by public authority, on 
the ground that the State had a deep interest in the whole bodily 
and m ental discipline of every one of its citizens; a m ode of 
thinking w hich m ay have been adm issible in small republics 
surrounded  by pow erful enemies, in constant peril of being 
subverted by foreign attack or internal commotion, and to which 
even a short interval of relaxed energy and self-command might so 
easily be fatal, that they could not afford to wait for the salutary 
perm anent effects of freedom.196
194 Mill (1989), p. 16.
195 Mill (1989), ibid.
196 Mill (1989), ibid.
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C om m unitarians challenge liberal conceptions of the good and in 
particular Rawls's theory of the thin conception of the good by advocating that, 
on the contrary, it is essential for a community to have a shared conception of 
the good, since individuals are to be seen in the social context of constitutive 
attachments, and not as 'asocial7 and "unencumbered7 selves. Their view is 
roughly that individuals are to be seen in the social context of constitutive 
attachments. It is a denial of the idea, typical of one form of liberalism, that 
there is a hum an essence which can be defined universally  and trans- 
historically irrespective of social context. Liberalism, even in its m inimalist 
classical formulation, entails a substantive moral position, and is committed to 
resisting  the v io la tion  of rights that lead to the crises w ith  w hich 
communitarians are concerned.
Despite the fact that communitarians hold the claim that 77a community 
m ust have a shared conception of the good77 (as for example in the case of a 
shared conception of the good among the community of Eskimos: "the good of 
the community of Eskimos77), it does not easily follow that they also adopt the 
claim that "there is indeed an objective good that everyone should adopt". It 
rather seems that MacIntyre, and the like, look more like relativists than 
objectivists, since M acIntyre holds that the state should prom ote valuable 
conceptions of the good but he does not hold, or would wish to hold, that the 
state should  prom ote an objective conception of the good. Indeed, 
comm unitarians notoriously deny the idea, which is traditionally associated 
with one form or another of Kantian liberalism, that there is a hum an essence 
which can be defined universally and trans-historically irrespectively of social 
context.
It seems more plausible that an objectivist comm unitarian would really 
be someone like Aristotle, since despite the fact that he argues for three 
different theories throughout the Politics—either the one of the ideal state or 
the one of the "second-best7 or of conflict-ridden constitutions—in his m ind
124
there always is an objective notion of hum an good, even if it is implausible for 
the citizens of actual states to accomplish it fully. Communitarians endorse the 
notion of the 'common good' which is quite different from that of Aristotelian 
'hum an good'.
But, first, let's examine some of the com m unitarian appropriations of 
Aristotle. As we have seen, the end of the polis is for Aristotle the good life, 
eudaimonia. M acIntyre advocates that the citizens of the Aristotelian polis 
take part in a project which is recognised as being good and that the goal of the 
life of the individual can be determined only according to his contribution to 
this good w hich corresponds to his particu lar role w hich is set by the 
com m unity.
How does this notion of the common good accord with the Aristotelian 
one of agathon? In Politics 1252b29, Aristotle says that the polis arises for the 
sake of survival but exists for the sake of well-being. He distinguishes thus 
between living as survival and living as well-being. This first notion of living 
as survival on which part of the existence of the polis depends is linked to the 
satisfaction of elementary needs which strongly necessitates co-operation with 
others, since, as he says in Nicomachean Ethics 1133a 16, the community does 
not consist of two physicians, but of a physician and a farmer and in general of 
people who are unequal, and it is need which holds every hum an being 
together. This exchange between unequals applies to survival needs, but in a 
sense also to higher level needs in order for the political association to be able 
to function.
Furthermore, the participants of this community, according to Aristotle, 
form ulate a basic form of com m unity w here everything that is common 
endures by w ay of the just and w here the change tha t is m utually  
advantageous should be guided by the (X7rXcog S I k o c i o v ,  the just as such.197 This 
mutual advantage presupposes that the participants are able to have a genuine
197 EE, 1241b 14.
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self-interest w hich also presupposes freedom  in the w eak sense of the 
Metaphysics whereby the participants live for their own sake. The just as such 
is distinguished from the politically just and is to a certain extent pre-political 
and already bound up with man's faculty of speech, since—as Aristotle says in 
Politics 1253al4—speech is designed "to explain w hat is useful and w hat is 
harmful and as a consequence what is just and w hat unjust". The participants 
of this pre-political need-exchange model of life as survival are able to direct 
their decision to w hat is just or unjust w ithout having to appeal to the 
common project of the polis. In fact this kind of association and this kind of 
justice, as Aristotle says in the Eudemian Ethics 1242b6-1243b39, could exist 
even if there were no polis.
But of course this does not mean that this distinction between living as 
survival and living as well-being is an actual one. It is rather a conceptual one. 
This exchange model is definitely not a historical one but rather one that 
continues to exist in the polis. This first level of living as survival has in fact 
to be presupposed in the polis so that notions of the fullness or excellence of 
life can be developed. Aristotle challenges precisely the view that men want to 
live solely in order to survive: everyone strives naturally  for a good life, 
eudaim onia.
The end of the polis is, therefore, for A risto tle  the good life, 
eudaimonia. But, although MacIntyre's notion of the common good sets out 
from the second element of the existence of the polis, of the living as well­
being, he seems to hold that it is the common project which is the end of a 
community, and not Aristotelian eudaimonia. For MacIntyre, the community 
draws its right to exist from the common project. But this notion is totally 
alien to Aristotle, since w ith respect to the good life, w hat is of concern is the 
good life of each individual in a distributive sense and thus also the advantage
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of each individual.198 As Aristotle most characteristically says in 1278b22-31 of 
the Politics:
Now it has been said in our first discourses, in which we determined the 
principles concerning household m anagement and the control of slaves, 
that m an is by nature a political animal; and so even w hen men have 
no need of assistance from each other they none the less desire to live 
together. At the same time they are also brought together by common 
interest, so far as each achieves a share of good life. The good life then is 
the chief aim of society, both collectively for all its members and 
individually;199 bu t they also come together and m aintain the political 
partnership for the sake of life merely, for doubtless there is some 
elem ent of value contained even in the m ere state of being alive, 
provided that there is not too great an excess on the side of the 
hardships of life, and it is clear that the mass of mankind cling to life at 
the cost of enduring m uch suffering, which shows that life contains 
some measure of well-being and of sweetness in its essential nature.
This is an im portant point since it shows us that MacIntyre's account would
submerge the individual in the common good. The idea of a common project
seems to leave no room for notions of individual good.
Furthermore, the fact that the legitimation of the political community is 
individually affected can also be show n in Aristotle's critique of Plato's 
authoritarian republic where it is clearly show n that Aristotle rejects every 
non-distributive reading:
It is not possible for the whole to be happy unless most or all of its 
parts, or some of them, possess eudaimonia. For eudaimonia is not 
a thing of the same sort as being an even number: that may belong 
to a whole but not to either of its parts, bu t happiness cannot 
belong to the whole and not to its parts.200
Therefore, as we can see from the two previous accounts of MacIntyre 
and Aristotle, MacIntyre is wrong in attributing to Aristotle that the polis
198 Rapp (1994), pp. 338-340.
199 xhe italics are mine.
200 Politics,  Book II, 1264b 17-24.
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should be solely aiming at the collective hum an good. Although for Aristotle 
the polis exists for the good life, according to M acIntyre's interpretation the 
polis exists for the implementation of a common project. In addition while for 
Aristotle it is m uch m ore plausible for the ind iv idual to understand  
autonomously the notions of the good life-even when the polis supports the 
individual or even if a realisation w ithout the polis w ould be entirely out of 
the question—the individual in MacIntyre's account can only, on the contrary, 
understand the concept of good as the good realisation of his particular 
contribution to this project. On M acIntyre's account, that is, individual 
happiness would be a by-product of the communal effort rather than its end.
According to Aristotle, every individual chooses the good or w hat 
seems good in all his conscious and voluntary activities. Good for Aristotle is 
what is chosen, in the sense that good in itself or by nature is that which 
everyone w ould under norm al circumstances prefer to its contrary, as for 
example honour, money, health, self-preservation etc. As he says in Politics 
1324a 4:
It remains to say whether the good life is the same for the private 
individual as for the polis, or not the same. This too is evident; for 
everyone w ould agree that they are the same. If riches make men 
happy, they will also make a political society happy. If the 
individual finds happiness in dom inating others, the political 
society will be happy by conquering other states. If a m an finds that 
virtue is his greatest joy, so will the political society.
It should be noted though that Aristotle's position seems a bit peculiar here.
For example, if individual good consists in contemplation, could the good of
the polis consist in contemplation? There are two ways of classifying the
various goods required for the individual’s choice of a form of life according to
Aristotle. First, in reference to the choice situation which can be described as
wherever one has to choose, he would prefer good A to good B. And, second,
the concept of an unparalleled good which is chosen always only in itself and
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never for the sake of a higher good, and which could not be augmented by any 
further addition. This good is found in the notion of eudaimonia.
It could, however, be argued that M acIntyre's em phasis upon the 
narrative un ity  of the self adequately  acknow ledges the role of each 
individual's specific conception of the good, by allowing each individual to 
answer the overarching question of how best to live through combining a 
variety of practice-based goods in different ways. Indeed, "this narrative form 
provides the fram ework w ithin which we can attem pt to make rational 
choices concerning the conflicting demands of different practices" by giving to 
the individual the opportunity to ask the question: 'H ow  best may I live out 
the narrative unity of my life?'.201 MacIntyre argues at this point that "the 
asking of the question is at least as im portant to an individual's success in 
living the good life for hum an beings as the specific answers which m ay or 
may not emerge".202
I do not aim to refute this claim in the argum ent that I have provided 
concerning Aristotle's and M acIntyre's conceptions of eudaimonia. W hat I 
wanted to stress in the above argum ent was their difference in the conceptions 
of the good. From w hat I have analysed, MacIntyre's notion of the hum an 
good derives in practice solely from the first half of the existence of the polis; 
while Aristotle derives hum an good from both halves and identifies it with 
eudaimonia. If this is true, then MacIntyre has a very different notion of 
eudaimonia than Aristotle does.
4. 5 Conclusion
From the account of the good life already depicted in Aristotle's ideal state, it is 
obvious that it would be very difficult for any liberal individualist to accept it.
201 Mulhall and Swift (1996), p. 88.
202 Mulhall and Swift (1996), ibid.
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It looks as though a Rawlsian liberal would have to reject the idea that the city 
exists for the sake of the good life, unless one takes that to mean simply that it 
exists to enable each individual to pursue his or her own conception of the 
good life. A liberal perfectionist could accept that the city exists for the sake of 
the good life but would define the good life in such a way that freedom is an 
essential part of it. The liberal perfectionist's conception of the good life might 
not be very far from Aristotle's. Both would value a life which enables us to 
live a life of practical reason. But Aristotle would lay the emphasis on reason 
while the liberal would emphasise choice and spontaneity.
Even so, Aristotle's is not the standard com m unitarian account of the 
good life. Aristotle clearly thinks that there is an ideal account of the good and 
a conception of the good life that ideally we should all follow. Although 
Aristotle sees individuals in the context of the polis in which alone can 
distinctively hum an goodness and happiness be achieved, he, nevertheless, 
does not think that the good is relevant to the particular historical and cultural 
circumstances of the polis. Aristotle recognises the fact that different kinds of 
constitutions exist, since there are d ifferent conceptions of the good. 
Nevertheless, not all conceptions of the good are acceptable according to his 
view. There is one conception of the good that is best absolutely and which 
ideally should be pursued in the best city of our dreams. If the ideal is not 
achievable, then we should try to be as close to it as possible by adopting a 
second best one.
i
It is true that Aristotle has a 'formal' account of the good life in the sense 
that there is a pattern that its city follows depending on the conception of the 
good that it adopts. But this does not make all the conceptions of the good 
equally acceptable. It should also be stressed that his account of the good life is 
not historically based. The conception of the good is not based on the historical 
circumstances of the city; the ideal city is best absolutely, it does not depend on 
a particu la r social context of a h istorically  specific com m unity , as
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com m unitarianism  advocates. The com m unitarian m isappropriation  is to 
take the formal account of the Aristotelian good life and the function of a man 
and to argue that this should be the model for a city. The communitarian sets 
out an Aristotelian teleological account of how a city should be like and w hat 
goals it should pursue. But the end of the city for the communitarian depends 
on the particular historical and cultural circum stances of that particular 
community. For Aristotle, the conception of the good could be universally 
pursued if the conditions that he sets out are met. Aristotle has a substantive 
conception of the good and he wants the state to promote it.
131
5. JUSTICE
The good in the sphere of politics is justice.
P olitics, 1282b 16-17
5.1 Introduction
As I have previously pointed out, Aristotle's Politics has a certain ambiguity 
which is picked up by the communitarians on the one side and by the liberals 
on the other side, and they both think that Aristotle echoes their views. This is 
also dem onstrated in the case of justice. My aim in this chapter is to try to 
clarify Aristotle's conception of justice in relation to its appropriations by both 
the liberal and the com m unitarians cam ps in either case w here these 
appropriations are Aristotelian (as in the case of MacIntyre) or explanatory of 
Aristotle's position (as in the case of Miller and Yack). But, first, I will pu t 
forward Aristotle's account of justice as presented in the Nicomachean Ethics, 
the Politics and the Eudemian Ethics.
It should be em phasised here that Aristotle makes justice the chief 
virtue of the polis. As he says in Politics III, 1282b 14-18, "The good in the 
sphere of politics is justice". As M iller points out, justice is central to 
Aristotle's political theory right from the start of the Politics w here—w hen he 
defends political naturalism  in Book I, 2—he makes two im portant references 
to justice. First, Aristotle claims that hum an beings—being political animals by 
nature—are uniquely endowed by nature with the ability to form the concept of 
justice and with the capacity for political co-operation (Pol., 1253a7-18 and EE, 
1241b 14-15). Second, Aristotle's argum ent about the lawgiver being a great 
benefactor also contains the claim that hum an beings need law and justice in 
order to form a political association.203
203 Miller (1995), p. 67.
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According to Aristotle, justice is im portant since it aims at the common 
interest of the polis. For Aristotle there are universal and particular forms of 
justice as w ell as na tu ra l and conventional form s. The question  in 
contemporary political philosophy concerns the role of justice as an institution 
settled to fix the limits of hum an conduct. According to Rawls, Aristotle could 
never be a liberal because he gives priority to one rational conception of the 
good rather than to justice. Rawls argues that justice is not prior for Aristotle, 
since in the definition of the polis we can find the good bu t not the concept of 
justice.204 A similar point is made by MacIntyre when he argues that Aristotle 
offers an instrum entalist conception of the polis, namely that of covering the 
primary needs of the people (the living as survival), in the sense that the polis 
exists primarily for its members to survive.
But one should note that Aristotle does not p u t forw ard the same 
account of justice in both the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, so one 
should be careful to first examine these two accounts separately and then try to 
understand Aristotle's conception of justice as a whole. At the same time, it is 
worth looking into the connection of justice to friendship that Aristotle makes 
in both the Nicomachean and the Eudemian Ethics and try  to further enhance 
from it Aristotle's conception of justice. Since, in general, Aristotle's notion of 
'political friendship' has not been discussed in great detail, I will devote in the 
next chapter a considerable analysis of this notion and its relation to Aristotle's 
account of justice, since I take it to be of great importance in order to throw 
new light into Aristotle's account of justice, but, also, into his political theory 
in general.
In this chapter, I will, first, present Aristotle's conception of justice as 
presented in the N icom achean Ethics  and in the Politics. Second, I will 
examine the A ristotelian conception of political justice in relation to 
com m unitarian theory, especially in connection to M acIntyre's theory of
204 Rawls (1999), p. 360.
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justice and his appropriation of Aristotle's conception of justice. Finally, I will 
discuss Aristotle's view on justice and moderation, i.e. his idea that, in the 
world as we find it, where the ideal is not possible, we may have to choose the 
kind of constitution which is least prone to stasis. On this account, Aristotle's 
considerations do not rest on a concept of desert and do not presuppose a thick 
theory of the good, therefore, they could be recognised by a m odern liberal.
5.2 Aristotle's account of justice 
5. 2.1 Nicomachean Ethics
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle puts forward his well known account of 
distributive justice, but it should be noted that distributive justice is not the 
only kind of justice that Aristotle recognises, as will be m ade clear in the 
discussion that follows. A ristotle 's theory on d istributive justice in the 
Nicomachean Ethics (V. 3) can be outlined as follows: (a) Distributive justice is 
a kind of geometric proportion205 involving at least two persons, A  and B, and 
two things, C and D206. In a just distribution, according to this view, the ratio 
of C to D is the same as that of A  to B: (i) A /B = C /D .207 W hen the ratios are 
equal, the distribution is just if C is allocated to A,  and D to B208. (b) The ratio 
of the things is then replaced by the equal ratio of sums that reflects 'the yoking 
together' of A  and C and of B and D: (ii) A/B=A+C/B+D209. (c) If we replace C 
and D in the original formula by definite descriptions, then we have: (iii) 
A /B=the thing allotted to A /th e  thing allotted to B. (d) Since persons, or 
things, do not stand in ratios to each other -per se but only in certain respects
205 NE,  V. 3 ,1131bl2-13.
206 NE,  V. 3 ,1131bl8-20.
202 A : B = C : D, then, A : C = B : D, and, therefore, A + C : B  + D = A : B  [A /B =C /D , 
A /C =B/D=R , A+C/B+D=CR+C/AR+D= C (R+1)/D(R+1)=C/D=A/B].
208 NE,  V. 3 ,1131b 20-24.
209 NE,  V. 3 ,1131b 3-12.
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such as age, height, wealth, etc., what in fact these ratios imply is some basis of 
comparison of the persons and the things, which in this special comparison is 
their positive or negative value210, that of the persons is their w orth211 (d^ ia , 
axia): (iv) the worth of person A /the  worth of person B=the value of the thing 
allotted to A /th e  value of the thing allotted to B. This Aristotelian concept of 
distributive justice asserts that a distribution is just if it follows this formula, if 
the value of the thing it allots to one person stands to the value of the thing it 
allots to another as the worth of one person stands to the worth of the other.212
But this needs further illum ination in order to be clear as to w hat 
exactly Aristotle means. According to Aristotle, the just is equal as a mean of 
the inequalities of greed and inferiority, of profit and loss. The just involves 
persons and objects and is meaningful only in connection with four terms, and 
is a mean and an equal only in relation to these four terms. The relation of the 
objects m ust be analogous to the relation of the persons; if the persons are 
equal, then they deserve equal shares; if they are not equal, then they will not 
have equal gain. So, Aristotle says, in the same way that everybody believes 
that the just is equal, everybody admits that also in distributive justice the just 
has to be distributed according to w orth ( k o h ’ d c £ i a v ) ,  from the principle of 
'assignment by desert'. The dispute lies in the determination of the identity of 
desert as a criterion of distribution of the parties because "all agree that justice 
in distributions m ust be based on desert of some sort, although they do not all 
mean the same sort of desert; democrats make the criterion freedom; those of 
oligarchic sympathies wealth; upholders of aristocracy make it virtue".213 In 
this way the criterion of distribution is 'proportion ', the equality of logical
210 NE,  V. 3 ,1131b 19-23.
211 NE,  V. 3 ,1131ba 24, 26.
212 This outline is derived from Keyt (1995), pp. 127-128. See also Keyt (1991), pp. 238-278.
213 NE 1131a 28-31. This is related to MacIntyre's discussion of the notion of desert. In this case, 
people disagree "because they are bad judges in their own affairs" and also "because both the 
parties to the argument are speaking of a limited and partial justice, but imagine themselves to 
be speaking of absolute justice" (Politics, 1280a 20-22).
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relation, or geometrical equality—as Aristotle calls it—which is qualitative 
relation as opposed to the arithmetical, or num eral equality that applies to 
corrective law and to friendship. In other dom ains of law  other criteria 
apply.214
What is interesting in this point is that, as Aristotle says, disputes about 
distributive justice start not over the principle of distributive justice itself, nor 
over the value of the things being distributed, bu t over the w orth of the 
persons claiming a share of the distribution. According to Keyt, "it is useful 
here to borrow the distinction from Rawls between the concept of distributive 
justice, which is expressed by the formal and abstract principle of distribution 
to which everyone assents [formula (d) above] and the various conceptions of 
distributive justice, which evaluate a person's w orth according to various 
standards such as freedom, wealth, good birth, and virtue. Thus, a democratic 
conception of justice is expressed when w orth is evaluated according to the 
standard of freedom, and the oligarchic conception is expressed when it is 
evaluated according to the standard of wealth. Everyone shares the same 
concept of distributive justice, but not the same conception".215 From this it 
follows that if Aristotle's account of justice in the Nicomachean Ethics is read 
formally (that is, 'treat equals equally and unequals unequally'), then, in that 
sense, almost any philosopher could read his view in it. From that point of 
view, Aristotle's doctrine on distributive justice is really neutral between any 
political position.
One could, therefore, say that Aristotle acknowledges the possibility of 
the application of different distributive criteria in the different areas of social 
and political relations and in the different spheres of justice, while as far as the 
economic and social goods are concerned, he puts forward the criterion of
214 NE1131a 2 ,1155a 2 7 ,1157b 3 6 ,1158b 29-34,1132b 21-33,1134b 8-18,1161a 20-1161b 1.
215 Keyt (1995), p. 129.
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'proportion' which he leaves open, and according to which among equals there 
exists absolute equality, while among unequals a relative one.
5. 2. 2 Politics
Aristotle in Politics, III, 9-13 discusses the relation of justice to constitutions, 
and wealth. He approaches the classification of the constitutions from the 
point of view of justice.216 It should be pointed out that this account of justice 
that Aristotle puts forward in Politics III gives content to the account of justice 
by explaining w hat sorts of equality and inequality are relevant. This—as 
dem onstrated in the previous section—was not obvious from the account 
presented in the Nicomachean Ethics.
According to Aristotle, the principle of a constitution is its conception of 
justice. As he says in Politics 1280a 7-9 w hen he discusses oligarchy and 
democracy, "We m ust next ascertain w hat are said to be the distinctive 
principles of oligarchy and democracy, and w hat are the oligarchic and the 
democratic conceptions of justice. All parties have a hold on a conception of 
justice; but they both fail to carry it far enough, and do not express the true 
conception of justice in the whole of its range." Both oligarchy and democracy- 
-which are of course perversions of right constitutions—rest on a particular 
social class. They have their own distinctive conception of justice concerning 
the way that offices and honours are distributed which enables them to justify 
the predominance of the class they favour.217
Democrats think that the conception of justice is based on the principle 
of equality (equality in free birth), while oligarchs base justice on inequality 
(inequality in wealth). Aristotle's principle of political justice, on the other 
hand, is that political offices and honours should be distributed according to
216 Stalley (1995), pp. 356-57.
217 Stalley (1995), p. 357.
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virtue. His ow n view is elaborated through the critique of the respective 
principles of the oligarchic and democratic constitutions.
Aristotle argues that justice is the political good. As he says, "Justice is 
concerned w ith  people; and a just d istribution is one in which there is 
proportion betw een the things d istributed and those to w hom  they are 
distributed, a point which has already been made in the Ethics. There is general 
agreem ent about w hat constitutes equality in the thing, bu t disagreem ent 
about w hat constitutes it in people" (1280a 17-23). But, according to Aristotle, 
both sides—being m islead by the fact that they are professing a sort of 
conception of justice, and professing it up to a point, into thinking that they 
profess one which is absolute and complete—fail to m ention the 'real cardinal 
factor', as he calls it. The cardinal factor in this case is that the end of the city is 
the common promotion of a good quality of life and not only mere life.
Justice consists, therefore, in w hat tends to prom ote the common 
interest. There are, however, different views of w hat constitutes the common 
interest and these give rise to forms of constitution. As Aristotle points out,
Thus, as general opinion makes justice consist in some sort of 
equality. This agrees up to a point with the philosophical inquiries 
which contain our conclusions on ethics. In other words, it holds 
that justice involves two factors—things, and those to whom  things 
are assigned—and it considers that those who are equal should 
have assigned to them equal things. (1280a 17-20)
The question which m ust not be overlooked and which arises from the above
presentation of justice is, according to Aristotle, 'equals and unequals in
what?'. This is a question that involves us in philosophical speculation on
politics.
As far as economic and social goods are concerned, Aristotle places 
desert, that is the relative proportional equality, as the distributive criterion for 
the m an who lives 'in  the world as we know it'.218 This applies only to this
218 Polit ics , 1280a 33.
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kind of man, since in a society of exceptional m en there is no place for 
anything but absolute equality. It has to be noted that Aristotle does not define 
the precise content of this proportional equality, bu t he simply attem pts a 
form al analysis by leaving the criterion open. In the economic area, 
proportional equality is determ ined according to the contribution of each 
citizen.219 Furthermore, superiority of political rights is not allowed unless in 
the case of som ething that contributes to the excellence of perform ance.220 
When laws are said to be 'right', the w ord m ust be taken to mean 'equally 
right', and this means 'right' in regard to the interest of the whole polis and in 
regard to the common welfare of the citizens.221 In conclusion, seen in the 
context of the application of his principle of 'm ean' and his theory on the best 
life, Aristotle argues that there should exist for everybody a minimum of social 
goods, and also a maximum of goods should not be exceeded 222
The democratic conception of justice that Aristotle presents here sounds 
similar to the liberal definition of freedom. This m ay suggest that the state 
should be maximising freedom, since the democrats see freedom as the good. 
But the democratic conception is not a liberal conception. If one takes this view 
to be the ancient conception of freedom that Aristotle is arguing about, then— 
as we shall see in the chapter on freedom—it is a democratic conception but not 
a liberal one in the sense that part of its definition at least consists not in 
exercising freedom of choice but of having a share in rule. So, the democratic 
view is not an individualist conception of freedom or justice. This is further 
enhanced by Aristotle's criticism of Lycophron's 'libertarian ' view and of 
H ippodam us's view (as we shall see). Of course, Aristotle is critical of both the 
oligarchic and the democratic conception of the state. But his argum ents are
219 Politics, 1280a 25-30.
220 Politics, 1282b 23-1283a 1.
221 Politics,  1283b 40.
222 It should be noted that the concept of 'mean' in the case of justice is different from that in the 
other virtues, because the mean in this case does not refer to the middle between two equally bad 
habits, but to a mean in relation to the things.
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not undemocratic as such; he is more keen to dem onstrate the dangers of 
democracy—in the same way that Plato was aware of democracy's dangers—than 
criticise democracy as such.
Aristotle seems to envisage a possible role of the state to promote the 
good life but not to guarantee just claims. The state's job is not to arbitrate 
disputes. As Aristotle points out at 1280b 6-12, if the city does not devote itself 
to the end of encouraging goodness, a political association sinks into a mere 
alliance, which only differs in space (in the contiguity of its members) from 
other forms of alliance w here the m em bers live at a distance from one 
another. The law becomes a mere covenant—or, in the phrase of the sophist 
Lycophron, 'a  guarantor of just claim s'—but lacks the capacity, according to 
Aristotle, to make the citizens good and just.
In order to illustrate this point, Aristotle imagines an hypothetical case 
where two cities unite into one: if, for example, two different sites could be 
united in one, so that the polis of Megara and that of Corinth were embraced 
by a single wall. But, this union, according to Aristotle, w ould not make a 
single city, since a polis is not an association of site {r\ 7roXic o u k  e o n  
Koivcovia T07rou) 223 As he says at 1280b 29-1281a 1,
It is clear, therefore, that a city is not an association for residence in 
a common site, or for the sake of preventing m utual injustice and 
easing exchange. These are indeed conditions w hich m ust be 
present before a city can exist; bu t the presence of all these 
conditions is not enough, in itself, to constitute a city. W hat 
constitutes a city is an association of households and clans in a 
good life, for the sake of attaining a perfect and self-sufficing 
existence. This, however, will not come about unless the members 
inhabit one and the self-same place and practice intermarriage. It 
was for this reason that the various institutions of a common 
social life—marriage-connections, kin-groups, religious gatherings, 
and social pastimes generally—arose in cities. This sort of thing is
223 Politics,  1280b 30.
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the business of friendship, for the pursuit of a common social life 
is friendship. Thus the purpose of a city is the good life, and these 
institutions are means to that end. A city is constituted by the 
association of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing 
existence; and such an existence, on our definition, consists in 
living a happy and truly valuable life.
The pu rsu it of a common social life is, therefore, friendship, but, 
nevertheless, the purpose of a city is the good life and these institutions are 
means to an end. Therefore, Aristotle concludes at 1281a 2-10 that it is for the 
sake of actions valuable in themselves, and not for the sake of social life, that 
political associations m ust be considered to exist. Those who contribute most 
to this association have a greater share in the city than those who are equal to 
them  (or even greater) in free b irth  and descent, bu t unequal in civic 
excellence, or than those who surpass them in wealth but are surpassed by 
them in excellence. This, according to Aristotle, shows that the disputants 
about constitution profess only a partial conception of justice.
Aristotle gives great importance to criticising Lycophron's alternative 
view because his aim  is to em phasise th a t—w hen discussing different 
conceptions of justice, and the equality and inequality  relevant to the 
distribution of honours—it is im portant that we have first agreed on the end 
for which the city exists. The distribution of honours depends ultim ately on 
the purpose for which the association exists. In that sense, Aristotle is able to 
discriminate between different conceptions of justice, and, also, to demonstrate 
that each conception of justice contains an element of truth. This is based on 
the assum ption that we have agreed on the end for which the city exists.224 
This criticism of Lycophron is similar to the argum ent against H ippodam us's 
theory m ade by Aristotle at Politics 1267b 37. A ristotle's first criticism of 
H ippodam us's theory concerns the division of the citizen body; all share in the
224 Stalley (1995), p. 358.
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constitution but not all of them bear arms and become, therefore, the slaves of 
the class in possession of arms.
5. 3 Communitarian accounts of Aristotelian justice
5. 3.1 MacIntyre's account of justice
According to M acIntyre's argum ent in After Virtue and in Whose Justice 
Which Rationality the concept of justice cannot provide the basis for practical 
and philosophical agreem ent. M acIntyre claims that Rawls and Nozick 
advance incom m ensurable conceptions of justice w hich are logically 
incom patible (Rawls's needs-based theo ry /N ozick 's  entitlem ent theory). 
Neither Rawls's account nor Nozick's allow a central place for desert in claims 
about justice and injustice. Desert is, for MacIntyre, at home only in the context 
of a community and not in the individualism of Rawls and Nozick. MacIntyre 
has five aims in After Virtue: (i) to prove practical disagreem ent on the 
conception of justice, (ii) to prove philosophical d isagreem ent on the 
conception of justice, (iii) to show that moral philosophy reflects the debates 
and disagreements of the culture so faithfully that its controversies turn out to 
be unsellab le  in just the way that the political and moral debates themselves 
are, (iv) to point out the flaws of liberal individualism, and, (v) to stress the 
need for the revival of the so-called Aristotelian tradition. My aim in this 
section, and in the one that follows, is to show the inconsistencies involved in 
MacIntyre's argum ent, to illustrate the special character of the Aristotelian 
concept of justice and its connection w ith MacIntyre's argum ent and to show 
M acIntyre's m isin terpretation  of the A ristotelian concept of justice. In 
addition, I would like to point out the importance of political disagreement, 
and to show its relevance to the notion of justice and its connection w ith 
Aristotelian political philosophy.
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Contemporary political disagreement is apparent at both theoretical and 
practical levels. As we know, at the practical level it is expressed in the debates 
over w hat kind of policies the state should pursue, as for example on the 
enforcement of taxation. The issue of taxation also provokes disagreement at 
the theoretical level in the debate over whether social justice requires priority 
to be given to the w orst off through re-distributive taxation. According to 
M ason, tw o d ifferen t conceptions of po litical d isag reem en t can be 
distinguished: the 'im perfection ' and the 'con testab ility ' conception.225 
According to the model of the 'im perfection' conception, it is assum ed that 
when political disagreement arises at least one party to the dispute is mistaken 
and that given time, patience, impartiality and logical skills, political disputes 
could be settled to the satisfaction of any reasonable person who is sincerely 
engaged w ith  them . In this m odel there is, first, the im plicit idea that 
disagreement can be explained by a theory of 'error' of why some have made 
m istakes and also, second, by the com m itm ent to a form of cognitivism 
according to which the notion of correctness is in place in relation to moral 
and political thinking because when it is properly conducted it is governed by a 
rational m ethod. According to the model of the 'contestability ' conception, 
political disagreement is intractable because rational constraints on the proper 
use of political term s allow for a variety of different applications of them. 
From this point of view, disagreem ent over the use of political terms will 
always arise, provided that there exists freedom of expression.
In relation to the concept of justice, political disagreem ent finds its 
expression in the different theories of justice developed by the political 
theorists or in the arguments of the 'ordinary non philosophical citizens' who 
argue about the conception of justice and choose to vote for different political 
parties according to their views of w hat is 'just'. MacIntyre has argued in After 
Virtue that contemporary moral and political disagreement is largely due to a
225 Mason (1993), pp. 2-4.
143
clash between incommensurable ways of thinking about moral issues, some of 
which have been prised from the historical and social contexts that gave them 
their meaning. Our current moral discourse consists of m odern terms such as 
'rights' and 'u tility ', which are moral fictions because they have no proper 
reference and they coexist alongside older concepts, such as the notion of 
d ese rt.226 In the conceptual melange of m oral thought and practice today, 
fragm ents from the trad ition  are still found alongside characteristically 
m odern and individualist concepts such as those of rights and utilities. The 
A ristotelian trad ition  survives, according to M acIntyre, in a m uch less 
fragm ented form in the lives of certain comm unities whose historical ties 
with their past remain strong, like some Catholic Irish, some Orthodox Greeks 
and some Jews of an Orthodox persuasion. The allegiance of such marginal 
communities to the tradition is constantly in danger of being eroded and our 
society cannot hope to achieve moral consensus. The nature of any society is 
not therefore to be deciphered from its laws alone, but from those understood 
as an index of its conflicts. From which it seems, therefore, MacIntyre follows 
the 'contestability' model.
MacIntyre, in chapter 17 of After Virtue, entitled 'Justice as a Virtue: 
Changing Conceptions',227 deals with the question of political disagreement on 
the conception of justice, and argues that moral and political philosophy 
reflects the debates and disagreem ents of the culture so faithfully that its 
controversies turn out to be unsettlable in just the way that the political and 
moral debates them selves are. M acIntyre starts his discussion on political 
disagreement about justice by saying that "when Aristotle praised justice as the 
first virtue of political life, he did so in such a way as to suggest that a 
community which lacks practical agreement on a conception of justice m ust 
also lack the necessary basis for political com m unity".228 According to his
226 Mason (1993), p. 7.
227 MacIntyre (1985), pp. 244-255.
228 MacIntyre (1985), p. 244.
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opinion, "the lack of such a basis must therefore threaten our own society. For 
the outcome of that history (...) has not only been an inability to agree upon a 
catalogue of the virtues and an even more fundam ental inability to agree 
upon the relative importance of the virtue concepts w ithin a moral scheme in 
which notions of rights and of utility also have a key place. It has also been an 
inability to agree upon the content and character of particular virtues. For since 
a virtue is now generally understood as a disposition or sentiment which will 
produce in us obedience to certain rules, agreement on w hat the relevant rules 
are to be is always a prerequisite for agreement upon the nature and content of 
a particular virtue. But this prior agreement on rules is (...) something which 
our individualistic culture is unable to secure. Nowhere is more m arked and 
nowhere are the consequences more threatening than in the case of justice".229
According to MacIntyre, everyday life is pervaded by these consequences 
of individualism , and basic controversies cannot be rationally resolved. To 
illustrate his point, he brings in the discussion an example from American 
politics in the form of a debate between two ideal, but typical, characters named 
A and B on the question of whether it is just or unjust to raise taxes. A in the 
example represents the property owners and B represents the have-nots or the 
social workers. Since these two characters have different conceptions of justice 
respectively based on the principle of legitimate entitlement and the principle 
of basic needs, it is impossible for them to settle their dispute rationally. What 
is unjust for A is just for B. They will have to enrol in different political parties 
with hope that the 'right' party will win the next elections so that just laws will 
be passed w hich will advance or protect the interests of each of them  
respectively. It should be pointed out though that, for Rawls and Nozick, it is a 
question of advancing a conception of justice, rather than  of protecting 
interests. According to MacIntyre, A and B can also expect that in the course of 
time capable philosophers will appear to take up their respective claims and
229 MacIntyre (1985), ibid.
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defend them as they think they deserve. MacIntyre suggests that Nozick and 
Rawls have done exactly that for A and B respectively.
MacIntyre, then, proceeds to quote and compare the basic principles of 
Rawls's and Nozick's theories of justice in order to prove their incompatibility 
which m irrors the incompatibility of A's position w ith B's, and that to this 
extent Rawls and Nozick successfully articulate at the level of m oral 
philosophy the disagreem ent betw een such o rd inary  non-philosophical 
citizens as A and B. It appears so far that w hat M acIntyre says about the 
incom patibility of A's and B's position--the incom patibility of Rawls's and 
Nozick's theories of justice—is very similar to the old quarrel betw een 
democrats and oligarchs that Aristotle describes in 1280a 8-18 of the Politics.230
According to MacIntyre, even though the positions of Nozick and Rawls 
articulate the views of A and B, both these views fail to fully account for the 
positions of A and B respectively, because they leave out—as he says—any 
appeal to desert w hich is a relic of an older, m ore trad itional, m ore 
Aristotelian and Christian view of justice. But his m entioning of Aristotle's 
conception of justice goes no further than that, and he does not really give an 
extensive account of it.
For MacIntyre, desert is at home only in the context of a community. In 
both Rawls's and Nozick's account, individuals are prim ary and society 
secondary, and the identification of individual interests is p rior to, and
230 "We must next ascertain what are the distinctive principles attributed by their advocates to 
oligarchy and democracy, and are the oligarchic and the democratic conceptions of justice. Both 
oligarchs and democrats have a hold on a sort of conception of justice; but they both fail to carry 
it far enough, and neither of them expresses the true conception of justice in the whole of its 
range. In democracies, for example, justice is considered to mean equality [in the distribution of 
office]. It does mean equality—but equality for those w ho are equal, and not for all. In 
oligarchies, again, inequality in the distribution of office is considered to be just; and indeed it 
is—but only for those who are unequal, and not for all. The advocates of oligarchy and democracy 
both refuse to consider this factor—w ho are the persons to whom  their principles properly 
apply—and they both make erroneous judgements. The reason is that they are judging in their 
own case; and most men, as a rule, are bad judges where their own interests are involved. Justice is 
relative to persons; and a just distribution is one in which the relative values of the things given  
correspond to those of the persons receiving—a point which has already been made in the 
Ethics
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independent of, the construction of any moral or social bonds between them. 
Rawls explicitly makes it a presupposition of his view that we m ust expect to 
disagree with others about w hat the good life for m an is and m ust therefore 
exclude any understanding of it that we may have from our formulation of the 
principles of justice. Only those goods in which everyone, w hatever their 
views of the good life, takes an interest, are to be admitted to consideration. In 
Nozick's argum ent too, the concept of community, required for the notion of 
desert to have any kind of application, is sim ply absent. According to 
MacIntyre, desert is ruled out in Rawls and Nozick accounts in two ways 
because, first, the shared social presuppositions of Rawls' and Nozick's are 
based in the social contract tradition, and, because, second, Nozick's account is 
based on a Lockean mythology according to which all legitimate entitlements 
can be traced to legitimate acts of original acquisition.
In the first case, Rawls and Nozick articulate with great power a shared 
view which envisages entry into social life as the voluntary act of at least 
potentially rational individuals w ith prior interests w ho have to ask the 
question "What kind of social contract w ith others is it reasonable for me to 
enter into?'. A consequence of this is that their views exclude any account of 
hum an community in which the notion of desert in relation to contributions 
to the common tasks of that com m unity in pursuing  shared goods could 
provide the basis for judgements about virtue and injustice. In the second case, 
the Lockean thesis ignores, according to MacIntyre, the fact that the property- 
owners of the m odern  w orld are not the legitim ate heirs of Lockean 
individuals who performed quasi-Lockean acts of original acquisition; they are 
the inheritors of those who, for example, stole, and used violence to steal the 
common lands of England from the common people, vast tracts of N orth 
America from the American Indian, m uch of Ireland from the Irish, and 
Prussia from the original non-German Prussians.
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MacIntyre contrasts the liberal conception of 'justice as impartiality' with 
that of the Aristotelian conception of 'justice as virtue'. Liberal individualism 
does roughly adopt the m odel of justice as im partiality  and allows for 
disagreement on the conception of justice, since it maintains that the task of 
political philosophy is to devise principles of justice that will be abstract and 
general, assigning rights, duties, and responsibilities to individuals. Political 
philosophers in dem ocratic regim es should accept that the existence of 
conflicting conceptions of the good is a perm anent feature of the social 
landscape.
In particular, according to Rawls, political philosophy in democratic 
regimes should have as its m ost im portant aim the achievem ent of an 
overlapping consensus in which those who hold different com prehensive 
views of the good life converge on a single conception of justice. Disputes over 
which conception of distributive justice we should accept can be resolved to 
the satisfaction of any reasonable citizen, but these sources of reasonable 
disagreement will mean that even if we can reach un-coerced agreement on a 
particular conception of justice, we may continue to disagree on questions of 
how it is to be interpreted. I suppose that the central question posed is whether 
the Aristotelian conception of justice help us bridge the gap which separates 
Nozick from Rawls in their respective approaches to the question of justice, as 
MacIntyre understands it here. On MacIntyre's view the gap cannot be bridged 
because Rawls and Nozick start from inconsistent assumptions. The question 
really here is, for MacIntyre, not of bridging the gap bu t of providing an 
alternative non-individualistic account.
From w hat we have seen, MacIntyre partly endorses a version of the 
'contestability' conception of political disagreement in the sense that he seems 
to believe that justice, which is a key political concept, can reasonably be 
interpreted differently and be used to express incom m ensurable ways of 
thinking. In that sense, for MacIntyre, the existence of political disagreement
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need not im ply that someone has m ade a mistake. But at the same time, 
MacIntyre w ants to challenge the relativistic claim according to which "no 
issue betw een contending traditions is rationally decidable".231 MacIntyre's 
response to the above challenge is that disputes between different traditions of 
thought w ith  their own norm s of rational inquiry m ay nevertheless be 
rationally resolvable in some cases. According to M acIntyre, a particular 
tradition T1 may face an epistemological crisis in which it fails to deal with an 
important incoherence and in which another tradition T2 can provide a cogent 
and illuminating explanation by the standards of T1 for w hy this incoherence 
has arisen.232
In Whose Justice, Which Rationality, M acIntyre argues th a t the 
correctness of the Thomist tradition—which synthesises Aristotelianism  and 
Augustinian Christianity and gives the notion of desert a central place in its 
conception of justice—can be dem onstrated from w ithin each of the other 
trad itions . In M acIntyre 's view , un less a tra d itio n  overcom es an 
epistemological crisis it is facing, it will be 'defeated' and adherents to it will be 
'compelled' to change allegiances.233 But, as Mason points out, "it is natural to 
think that there will almost always be scope for reasonable disagreement over 
whether some tradition has solved a set of problems, and over whether there 
are prospects for resolving these problems from the standpoint of any other 
tradition when they are interpreted in its terms. An epistemological crisis234 is 
unlikely to give conclusive reasons to abandon a tradition. When reasonable 
disagreement does occur over whether a tradition has been defeated, and over 
whether an alternative tradition is better able to deal w ith the problems faced, 
it is hard to see from the perspective of MacIntyre's theory how one of these
23  ^MacIntyre (1988), p. 352.
232 Mason (1993), p. 7.
233 MacIntyre (1988), pp. 364-5.
234 This idea is most likely borrowed by MacIntyre from Kuhn. Also, it should be noted that in 
the hermeneutics circles the overall coherence of a view  is what makes it plausible to us.
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traditions m ight be true and the others false, for MacIntyre denies content to 
the notion of tru th  independent of tradition".235
5. 3. 2 MacIntyre's appropriation of Aristotelian justice
Let's see though w hether MacIntyre's use of Aristotle is justified. On the one 
hand, it can be argued that M acIntyre's use of Aristotle is justified so far as 
Aristotle gives priority to a concept of desert. This concept seems possible only 
when there is a shared conception of the good. The notion of political 
friendship which will be discussed in the next chapter, also points in the same 
direction.
On the other hand though, there are various different points that could 
be raised against MacIntyre's appropriation of Aristotle's conception of justice, 
despite the tru th  of the previous point concerning desert. One point that can 
first be made against M acIntyre's appropriation is that—at least as it is most 
obviously dem onstrated in After Virtue—in his in terpretation of Aristotle's 
conception of justice he concentrates exclusively on the Nicomachean Ethics 
account. This account, as we have seen, is purely formal and leads, therefore, 
to a relativistic view, since many different conceptions of justice satisfy the 
formal requirem ents. If M acIntyre had dealt w ith  the account of justice 
presented in the Politics, he would have seen that Aristotle's account is in fact 
much less relativistic. A lthough Aristotle recognises in the Politics that there 
can be m any conceptions of justice, he believes that a com m unity's conception 
of justice is determined by its conception of the good. Since there is a correct 
conception of the good, there also is a correct conception of justice according to 
Aristotle. Therefore, according to A ristotle 's view it is the virtuous who 
deserve to receive offices and honours. Since virtue is determ ined by hum an
235 Mason (1993), p. 8.
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nature, there is a correct conception of justice. A lthough Aristotle recognises 
for example oligarchic and democratic conceptions of justice and desert, he 
clearly regards these as deviant.
Second, MacIntyre thinks justice m ust be dependent on a community's 
shared conception of the good. Therefore, on this view, there cannot be justice 
outside a community. Aristotle also agrees that each comm unity has its own 
conception of justice which is dependent on its shared understandings of the 
good. But Aristotle thinks there are w ell-organised and badly organised 
communities. For Aristotle the true conception of justice is that of the well 
organised community. So, justice is not relative for Aristotle. There cannot be 
distributive justice outside a comm unity, but some of A ristotle 's remarks 
suggest that there could be other forms of justice.
Third, A risto tle thinks that justice resem bles the o ther virtues. 
A ristotle 's position is not that the structure of society determ ines w hat 
qualities are virtues. He thinks that certain qualities are virtuous and that 
communities, which have no place for or do not encourage those virtues, are 
defective communities. Since the city exists for the sake of the good life, 
virtues are prior to the community. This can be illustrated, for example, in his 
treatment of the virtue of generosity.
Fourth, MacIntyre criticises Rawls for supposing that we can think of an 
individual as being isolated from his community (as dem onstrated in his 'veil 
of ignorance'). O ur self-identity, according to M acIntyre, depends on the 
narrative we would give of our lives and that in turn depends on the place we 
occupy in the community. This is what MacIntyre calls the "narrative unity of 
hum an life". According to MacIntyre it is the narrative form of our lives that 
gives them a certain teleological character and also provides the framework 
w ithin w hich we can attem pt to make rational choices concerning the 
conflicting dem ands of different practices.236 But Aristotle believes in a human
236 MacIntyre (1985), pp. 200-201.
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nature which does not depend on community. In fact, communities exist to 
satisfy the dem ands of hum an nature. So, although Aristotle would reject the 
Rawlsian approach to justice, he would do so for completely different reasons.
Fifth, the above point is m ade m ore explicit w hen we look into 
Aristotle's educational project. This is of course much stronger in the case of 
Plato, especially in the Republic. Education for M acIntyre depends on the 
assumption that we are all aware of canonical texts which are widely taught in 
Universities and on which all rely upon. Aristotle also thinks that we ought to 
have canonical texts but these should be the 'right' texts. On MacIntyre's view 
though we could in fact have in theory any texts provided these texts are 
embedded in the tradition of the community in question.237 Aristotle, on the 
other hand, w ould think that the virtues are p rio r to the text, though 
expressed in it.
One may argue against the above criticism of MacIntyre that this reading 
of his work is maybe too relativistic. I would like to respond that it is because 
of the way that MacIntyre himself insists that we should go back to small 
communities and forget the big nation state that his account seems more and 
more to be drifting tow ards relativism .238 Aristotelian m oral and political 
theory, w hen deprived of his metaphysics, becomes inevitably relativistic. 
Also, one could add that it is exactly this which is a fundam ental difficulty for 
MacIntyre as soon as he does away with Aristotle's metaphysical biology, as we 
have seen in the chapter on teleology.
5.4 Justice and moderation
It is interesting at this point to discuss Aristotle's advocacy of moderation, the 
m ixed constitu tion  and  the m an in the m iddle. A lthough  A risto tle 's
237 MacIntyre (1987), pp. 15-36.
238 See MacIntyre (1996).
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conception of the city as promoting virtue plays a part in this context, some of 
his arguments here are based on the idea that, in the world as we find it, where 
the ideal is not possible, we may have to choose the kind of constitution which 
is least prone to stasis. There are considerations which do not rest on a concept 
of desert, do not presuppose a thick theory of the good and could be recognised 
by a modern.
In add ition , A risto tle 's  advocacy of m odera tion  in the m ixed 
constitution in relation to justice is closely connected w ith  his view of 
'political friendship ', since-according to Aristotle's view —equality of means 
produces the right kind of relationship am ong the citizens (which is a 
friendship among equals) and encourages, therefore, not only the right kind of 
political com m unity bu t also a secure and stable political regim e.239 As 
Aristotle points out in Politics 1295b 20-27, where he discusses the problems 
arising from a polis in which the distribution of wealth is unequal:
The result is a city, not of freemen, but only of slaves and masters: 
a state of envy on the one side and of contem pt on the other. 
Nothing could be further removed from the spirit of friendship or 
of a political association. An association depends on friendsh ip - 
after all, people will not even take a journey in common with their 
enemies. A city aims at being, as far a possible, composed of equals 
and peers, which is the condition of those in the m iddle, more 
than any group.
I will no t refer in great detail here on the m erits of the mixed 
constitution, as presented by Aristotle, since I have already expanded on this 
subject in the previous chapters. My concern here is to point out the way that 
m oderation relates to justice. According to Aristotle, the polity is bound to 
have the best constitution, since it is com posed of the elem ents which 
naturally go to make up a city. The m iddle classes enjoy a greater security 
themselves than any other class, since they do not, like the poor, desire the
239 Hampton (1997), p. 154.
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goods of others; nor do others desire their possessions, as the poor covet those 
of the rich and since they neither plot against others, nor are plotted against 
themselves, they live free from danger. The best form of political association 
is, first, one where pow er is vested in the m iddle class, and, secondly, that 
good government is attainable in those cities where there is a large middle 
class-large enough, if possible, to be stronger than both of the other classes, but 
at any rate large enough to be stronger than either of them  singly; for in that 
case its addition to either will suffice to turn the scale, and will prevent either 
of the opposing extremes from becoming dominant. It is therefore the greatest 
of blessings for a city that its members should possess a moderate and adequate 
property. Where some have great possessions, and others have nothing at all, 
the result is either an extreme democracy or an unmixed oligarchy; or it may 
even be—as a result of the excesses of both sides—a tyranny. Tyranny grows out 
of the most imm ature type of democracy, or out of oligarchy, but m uch less 
frequently out of constitu tions of the m iddle order, or those w hich 
approximate to them.240
According to Ham pton, there is no better argum ent for distributive 
equality than the one that Aristotle provides us w ith in his account of the 
'polity'. Nevertheless, as H am pton argues, "contem porary political theorists 
have sought to m ount other, more complicated argum ents for this distributive 
conclusion as a way of trying to say not only that distributive equality is a good 
idea given its good consequences but also an idea required by the concept of 
justice".241 In H am pton 's view, Aristotle is attem pting to characterise what 
constitutes a 'good ' political system by relying on a consent-based theory of 
political authority: "a stable, effective, and just political society is one in which 
the political authority , how ever it is structured, operates in a w ay that 
recognises the equality betw een the rulers and the ru led".242 As H am pton
240 Politics, 4 , 1295b 30-1296 a 12.
241 Hampton (1997), p. 154.
242 Hampton (1997), pp. 32-33.
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points out, "although Aristotle insists that there is such thing as natural 
slavery, he is even more insistent that the political relationship among people 
who are equals in their capacity to reason effectively ought to be constructed so 
that this equality is acknowledged".243
Ham pton thinks that Aristotle's theory is a better alternative to 'welfare 
egalitarianism ' and to Ronald D w orkin 's 'resource egalitarianism ' since 
Aristotle does not take for granted that equality is sim ply part of our 
conception of what a 'just' distribution is:
Aristotle believes that it is both possible and necessary to defend 
the linkage betw een equal distributions and justice via m oral 
argum ent. On his view, distributive justice is a m oral concept 
whose content we derive rather than discover, and we do so by 
understanding  the way in w hich some distributions prom ote 
certain moral or social values better than others. So Aristotle first 
asks, What kind of society do we want? and after answering that 
question, he asks, What kind of distribution of goods promotes this 
kind of society?244
5. 5 Conclusion
There are in general three m ain points that can be m ade concerning the 
relation that the Aristotelian conception of justice m ight have to the liberal 
one. M acIntyre seems right in his view that an Aristotelian conception of 
justice w ould be based on a conception of desert which is fundam entally at 
odds w ith individualist conceptions of justice such as those of Rawls and 
Nozick.
First, Aristotle is obviously far from arguing for equality in distribution. 
But it should be noted that, unlike m odern w riters on justice, he is more
243 Hampton (1997), p. 33.
244 Hampton (1997), p. 158.
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concerned w ith distribution of offices than w ith wealth. His argum ents in 
Politics, book II suggests that he would object to wealth, partly because it is 
impracticable but also because they run counter to his conception of virtue. On 
the other hand his account of the ideal state suggests people need a certain 
m inim um  of wealth, though this does not seem to be seen as a m atter of 
justice. More fundam ental of course Aristotle is far from the idea that people 
have equal rights, or that they should be given equal opportunities.
Second, Aristotle's treatment of Lycophron, as we have seen, shows how 
far he is from the conception of the minimal state. It is also w orth noticing that 
he does not have any account of procedural justice. Thus, his account of 
rectificatory justice and of justice in exchange are based on fairness of outcome 
rather than fairness of procedure. So he could not have m uch sym pathy for 
Nozick. It is notable that even his account of oligarchic justice is based on the 
idea that the rich deserve office, so it is quite different from the ideas of justice 
that underpin m odern capitalism.
Third, democratic justice seems to have m uch more in common with 
m odern liberal theories, since it emphasises freedom, equality of opportunity 
and equal political right as for citizens. Aristotle dismisses the conception of 
democratic justice largely because it fails to embody a correct conception of the 
good.
Rawls assumes (a) that there are many different conceptions of the good, 
and, (b) that none of these conceptions is preferable on a priori grounds. 
Therefore, the fundamental structure of a just society m ust be neutral between 
competing conceptions of the good. Aristotle accepts that there are in practice 
many competing conceptions of the good, but he does think that one is to be 
preferred a priori. He, therefore, thinks that an account of justice m ust be 
founded on that conception of the good. This is related to the question, 
discussed in the previous chapters on com m unity and on teleology, of
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whether the polis, or the state, is a natural entity or an artifact that comes into 
being naturally.
First, as we have seen previously, according to the extreme holistic 
view, for Aristotle the polis is a substance, and not an aggregate. According to 
the "substance model", there exists a natural growth and developm ent that 
belongs to the city. The city, according to this view, grows naturally in the same 
sense that a living organism does. This view that the polis is a substance will 
generate an extreme holistic view that Aristotle does not hold. Although, 
according to Aristotle, it is natural for hum ans to form communities because it 
is in their nature to be w ith other people, the polis itself is not natural: it is an 
artifact that came to exist out of this natural need to be w ith other people. This 
is the way to reconcile the so-called inconsistency of Politics Book I, when 
Aristotle says that the man who first constructed the polis was the greatest of 
all benefactors. Unlike the extreme holist, Aristotle did not think that the polis 
is a substance; the polis is artificial not a living organism.
According to the Hobbesian view on the other hand (the extreme 
individualist view), individuals have tendencies to form communities, but 
they also have desires and in order to satisfy these desires you need a state. 
Locke on the other hand holds the view, as opposed to Hobbes, that there are 
different conceptions of the right of nature. The state is artificial but it is 
artificial because one has these rights. The state is artificial not in a kind of way 
as to overcome nature. The state is not a device in order to overcome nature.
But w hat are we to make of Aristotle's suggestion that m an is a political 
animal, and w hat bearing does this claim have on his conception of justice? 
Since it is in our nature to be social and to form associations, it is a necessary 
feature, and not a contingent one, that we live in a polis. Shared conceptions of 
the good are essential to the Aristotelian view, because otherwise one would 
not be able to form an association. It should be noted that both of the views 
that Aristotle examines (oligarchic, democratic) presuppose a conception of the
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good. The city itself should embody a conception of the good. This conception 
of the good could well be misguided, and hence a false one, as in the cases of 
democratic and oligarchic constitutions. If the polis is natural because it is 
essential for the good life, then one should know w hat the good life consists in 
and w ould have to be determ ined by the conception of the good life. The 
question posed here is whether society is merely a means to achieve our own 
good, or an essential element in our own good. For Rawls, though, rules of 
justice are neutral betw een the different conceptions of the good life. In 
Aristotle's case, rules of justice are determined by the notion of the good life; 
the notion of desert is determined by our conceptions of the good, and offices 
and honours have to go in accordance to virtue, or w ealth, or eq u ality - 
according to which conception of the good one holds. In Aristotle's view then, 
it w ould seem that, if the state is genuinely neutral betw een the different 
conceptions of the good, one could not really have justice, not even 
rectificatory justice. In conclusion, one should also point out that Aristotle 
presents a consequentialist argum ent in defence of the existence of the state; he 
defends that state on the advantages of that state. There is no individualism  
explicit in his argum ent, but neither is the idea of the value-based MacIntyre 
state; the Aristotelian state is based on a notion of w hat is the best way to 
govern.
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6. FRIENDSHIP IN THE CITY
When people are friends, they have no need of justice.
NE,  1155a 26-27
6.1 Introduction
A ristotle d iscusses friendsh ip  ((JnXf a ,  philia)  in the N ico m a c h ea n ,  the 
Eudemian Ethics and in the Rhetoric. In both versions of the Ethics Aristotle 
seems to give an im portant place to political friendship but strangely he says 
very little about this in the Politics. His account of friendship, and the bearing 
it has on his ethical and political theory, have been poorly discussed in the 
past, although there have been some recent valuable contributions to the
advancement of the subject (e.g. Telfer, Cooper, Annas, Nussbaum, Schofield,
Price and Stern-Gillet245). Most of the previous commentators though, have 
either thought that any discussion on friendship has little or no importance 
for moral and political theory and have considered Aristotle's treatm ent of the 
subject as sui generis, or else have focused entirely on the Nicomachean Ethics 
neglecting the account of friendship offered in the Eudemian Ethics. In
addition, there has been very little discussion about A ristotle 's notion of
'political friendship' (7To X i t i k t i  4>tXia) discussed in both the Nicomachean and  
the Eudemian Ethics and of the bearing that this conception m ight have on his 
political theory, as presented in the Politics, where the notion of 'political 
friendship' is not discussed at length, although it is mentioned, as we shall see, 
in some places. Most im portant, very little has been said on the relation 
between justice and friendship (something that Aristotle points to in both his 
accounts of friendship in the Nicomachean and in the Eudemian Ethics), and 
indeed this is left out from m ost—if not all—discussions about Aristotelian
245 Telfer (1971), Cooper (1999), Annas (1993), Nussbaum (1986), Schofield (1999), Price (1989), 
Stern-Gillet (1995).
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justice. It is not surprising, therefore, that, although there are studies of 
Aristotle on friendship, very little has been written specifically about his view 
on political friendship.
Moreover, strangely enough, communitarians seem to have paid little 
attention to friendship in relation to justice, or to the Aristotelian conception 
of friendship as such, despite the fact that it would seem to be a natural line for 
them to pursue, especially in view of w hat Aristotle says about "friendship 
holding the state together" (NE, 1155a 22-23). It is true that communitarians do 
m ention friendship either in passim or in relation to the Aristotelian notion 
of philia, stress its importance for the development of the state and complain 
about the lack of it in the liberal vision. But, nevertheless, in either case 
nobody seems to develop a coherent normative account of civic friendship or 
to successfully explain w hy civic friendship is incompatible w ith the liberal 
state. I shall also argue that comm unitarian appropriations of the Aristotelian 
notion of political friendship (e.g. M acIntyre) tend to develop instead a 
Platonic notion of political unity of the state that is not representative of the 
Aristotelian conception. In addition, it should be noted that recent discussions 
of the developm ent of the notion of friendship in general typically tend to 
focus on the value of friendship but not on the nature of friendship itself.246 
Aristotle's notion of political friendship, nevertheless, is im portant not only 
because it can help us develop a better understanding of his notion of political 
justice, bu t also because it can, if successfully applied to our notion of the 
modern state, contribute to its improvement.
Therefore, these Aristotelian pronouncem ents—if taken seriously—could 
in a w ay fu rther streng then  the com m unitarian  view. As we know, 
communitarians put forward a conception of the self diametrically opposed to 
that of the liberal atomistic self. Whereas the liberal self is pre-social and empty 
of all metaphysical content except abstract reason and will, the communitarian
246 A point made by Cocking and Kennett (1998), pp. 502-527.
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self is one whose identity  and nature are em bedded in particu lar and 
contingent social attachm ents. The com m unitarian self em erges to self- 
consciousness inside a social context defined by the com m unity and social 
relationships such as the family and friendly relations. Sandel argues that we 
cannot regard ourselves as independent— in the way that liberalism thinks we 
are—without great cost to those loyalties and convictions by which we live and 
understand ourselves as the particular persons we are, "as members of this 
family or community or nation or people, as bearers of this history, as sons and 
daughters of that revolution, as citizens of this republic".247 As Sandel points 
out in the last section called 'Character, Self-knowledge, and Friendship' of the 
conclusion of Liberalism and the Limits of Justice ,
Allegiances such as these are more than values I happen to have or 
aims I 'espouse at any given time'. They go beyond the obligations I 
voluntarily incur and the 'natural duties' I owe to hum an beings as 
such. They allow that to some I owe more than justice requires or 
even permits, not by reason of agreements I have m ade but instead 
in v irtue  of those m ore or less enduring  attachm ents and 
com m itm ents w hich taken together partly  define the person I 
am .248
Nevertheless, despite the strong commitment of the com m unitarian to social 
relations, including friendship, and to the encum beredness of the self, 
com m unitarianism  has not given friendship the im portance that Aristotle's 
account seems to imply. If Aristotle's account of 'political friendship' is proven 
to be feasible, then social relations and attachm ents could be seen as almost 
necessary, if not com pulsory, for the prosperity  of the state, and the 
communitarian would then be vindicated.
One of the most striking factors of Aristotle's account is that he sees an 
im portant relation betw een justice and political friendship. In his view, 
friendship is in some ways as im portant as justice—if not m ore—for the
247 Sandel (1982), p. 179.
248 Sandel (1982), ibid.
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prosperity of the state. As he says in Nicomachean Ethics, 1155 a 26-27: "when 
people are friends they have no need of justice, while when they are just they 
need friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is thought to be a 
friendly quality". The city is a partnership for the sake of the good and, in the 
same sense that justice is the good in the sphere of politics, friendship is also a 
good and holds the state together. Lawgivers, according to this argum ent (NE, 
1155 b 21-27), seem to care more for friendship than for justice, since friendship 
generates concord (6|u6voia)~i.e. unanimity of the citizens—which is similar to 
friendship. In that way, friendship can hold the state together—in the same 
sense that justice does—and can also expel faction. It is in this sense that, when 
people are friends, they have no need of justice, while when they are just, they 
need friendship as well, and the highest form of justice seems to be a matter of 
friendship. This is of course at first sight an odd claim for Aristotle to make, 
since one might say that friendship presupposes justice anyway.
The claim that friendship is necessary for justice comes out of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, when he discusses friendship at length in Books VIII and 
IX, and also in the Eudemian Ethics. There is very little m ention of 'political 
friendship' as such in the Politics, or its relation to justice. Aristotle discusses 
friendship in passing in some places in the Politics. First, in Book I, 1255 b 13 
when he talks about friendship between master and slave (a same point he has 
made in NE  VIII, 13. 1161 b 5). Second, he also mentions friendly feeling when 
he talks about common land in Politics VIII, 10, 1330 a 1 (rij X PO ^1 (J h X ik c o c  
Yivojuevqv Koivqv). Political friendship is also mentioned at Politics 1280b 38 
and 1295b 23; both passages claim that friendship is essential to the state but say 
little about it. Friendship is also mentioned in Book II where Aristotle criticises 
P lato 's R epublic  and refers to the kind of friendship evolving in such 
constitutions as 'w atery ' friendship. The passage in Politics book II is an 
im portant one—as will become apparen t later in this chapter—because it
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demonstrates the essential difference between the Platonic and the Aristotelian 
notion of the unanim ity of the state that political friendship makes possible.
The fact that political friendship is not explicitly discussed in the Politics 
is problematic, in a way, for the m anner in which Aristotle's ethical works 
relate to his political treatise. Perhaps, one could say that Aristotle saw no need 
to discuss it in the Politics, since he had already done so at length in the 
Nicomachean  and in the Eudemian Ethics. A nother w ay of justifying the 
absence of extensive discussion of 'political friendship' in the Politics would be 
to point out to the peculiarity of the Books of the Politics themselves which are 
not a consistent work but rather a num ber of originally independent essays, 
not completely worked up into a whole.249 So, one could say that somehow a 
discussion on 'political friendship' was left out from the Politics simply due to 
the general disorganisation of the treatise. But, another line of argum ent 
would be that a discussion of 'political friendship' was left out from the Politics 
because it w ould not seem essential when discussing a norm ative political 
theory, in the sense that, since there is no plausible way to legislate friendship, 
one cannot force people to become friends. If that is right, then despite the fact 
that friendship in general and 'political friendship' in particular were thought 
by Aristotle to be essential to justice and to the good of the polis and its citizens 
(let alone to the good of the individual), he may, nevertheless, have realised 
that there is no practical way of 'forcing people to be friends', to adapt a familiar 
Rousseaunean expression. Entering into friendship is som ething to be done 
voluntarily and no law could norm atively regulate that we should have 
friendship in our private or political life. It is true that Aristotle does seem to 
say at NE  1155a 23-24 that the lawgiver's aim is to try to create friendship in the 
state (eoixe 5e x a i r a c  7roXsic auvexsiv tl koci oi vojuoBerai
paXXov 7T6pi au irjv  a7roi)5d£eiv q r^ v  SiKaioauvtiv). But, nevertheless, 
there is nothing in either the Nicomachean  or the Eudemian  text to suggest
249 Ross (1995), p. 13.
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that there is a way for the lawgiver to actually regulate friendship—in the form 
of legislation for example. Aristotle there rather seems to suggest that the 
lawgiver should encourage friendly feeling among the citizens; but could not, 
nevertheless, force them  to be friends. In addition, as we have seen in the 
previous chapter, Aristotle points out in Politics 1280b 38-40 that, although 
friendship is necessary for social life—in the sense that the pursu it of a 
common social life is friendship—nevertheless, political associations exist not 
for the sake of social life but for the sake of the good life.250
6.2 Problems with Aristotle’s notion of political friendship
This view that Aristotle puts forw ard in both the Nicomachean and the 
Eudemian Ethics obviously needs further examination. W hat exactly does he 
have in m ind when he says that "when people are friends they have no need 
of justice" and that "concord" (ojuovoia) which comes from friendship "holds 
states together"?
One reaction to the above Aristotelian pronouncements is that the view 
they endorse seems bizarre, since justice and friendship seem to conflict. As 
Stern-Gillet points out, rem inding us of Cicero's De Amicitia—friendship is 
usually considered to be an obstacle to justice, since personal friendship could 
threaten the state instead of safeguarding it, when conflicts of loyalties are 
generated between political obligation and private friendship.251 This is true if 
we think that friendship involves partiality while justice is generally thought 
of as requiring impartiality.
A sim ilar criticism has been m ade by Kantians. They point out that 
acting morally and acting out of friendship does not necessarily come to the
250 f\ yap too  auCfjv Trpoaipeaic <t>iXia. TeXoc pev oi5v 7rdXeooc to  e^ ’CTfv, ra u ra  5e rou 
tsXouc xdpiv. (Polit ics, 1280b 38-40)
251 Stern-Gillet (1995), p. 149.
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same thing. They may even be inconsistent. Kantians think that friendship 
runs directly counter to accepted moral requirements, since "as the joke has it, 
a friend will help you move a house, a good friend will help you move a 
body".252 Kantians tend to criticise the neo-Aristotelian's claim that friendship 
is a virtuous relation between persons and that the trust and intimacy of close 
friendship m ust be based upon m utual recognition of another's virtue,253 
since they think that this is a highly m oralised account of friendship which 
does not take into account the fact that our friends are not norm ally or 
constitutively moral exemplars who thus inspire us to m oral grow th and 
improvement. As Cocking and Kenneth point out, "w hile a focus on the 
pursuit of the other's well-being from a particularised deeply felt care and 
concern might plausibly be thought of as both constitutive of close friendship 
and a central moral good of friendship, we shall miss m uch of the good of 
friendship, if we focus exclusively on our pursuit of the well-being of the 
other".254
Kantians see this as underm ining the neo Aristotelian position that 
links friendship and virtue. However Aristotle would deny that there can be a 
clash between the dem ands of morality and friendship properly understood. 
According to Aristotle, if someone was to ask me to do something immoral 
that would show that he was not a true friend.
One might reply that, in one sense, to say that "when people are friends, 
they have no need of justice" may not be a bizarre view to hold, since, in the 
first place, we are not going to be motivated by considerations of justice if we 
are friends w ith someone: we are not likely to think for example that 'It's my 
duty to send him a birthday-card' or 'It is only just that I treat him this way', if 
we are friends w ith someone. One does not tend to treat his friends rightly
252 Cocking and Kennett (2000), p. 278. See also Cocking and Kennett (1998), pp. 502-527.
!253 por such neo-Aristotelian accounts of personal friendship, see for example Sherman (1993), 
pp. 91-107, and Blum (1993), pp. 192-210.
254 Cocking and Kennett (2000), p. 296.
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because justice requires this; one treats one's friends rightly out of affection 
and concern for them, and in many cases one would say that one owes to his 
friends more than justice requires or even permits. Justice m ight be seen, 
nevertheless, as a condition of friendship bu t only under the surface, in the 
sense that, if one starts treating his friends unjustly, then the friendship will 
eventually dissolve. So, injustice could make friendship break. But it was not 
out of considerations of justice that one treated his friends justly in the first 
place; it was rather because they were his friends and had concern for them 
that his behaviour was just. Similarly, questions about justice arise when a 
friendship breaks up. We can only become and remain friends if we treat one 
another justly; when friends fall out, it is then that they appeal to justice, as for 
example in the case when a marriage breaks up, it is then that questions about 
justice (distribution of common property, money etc.) arise. Similar examples 
are offered by Aristotle in the Eudemian Ethics at 1243b 15-38. So, friendship 
(personal friendship  at least) and justice are connected, bu t not in a 
straightforw ard way. As Aristotle himself remarks in the beginning of his 
treatm ent on friendship in the Eudemian Ethics, "all say that justice and 
injustice are specially exhibited tow ards friends; the same m an seems both 
good and a friend, and friendship seems a sort of moral habit;255 and if one 
wishes to m ake people not w rong one another, one should m ake them 
friends, for genuine friends do not act unjustly" (1234b 25-30).256 "But neither 
will people act unjustly if they are just; therefore justice and friendship are 
either the same or not far different" (1234b 30-31).
Another problem  is w hether Aristotle's notion of 'political' friendship 
is a kind of 'advantage' or 'u tility ' friendship. These two issues are in a way 
connected. Friendship, viewed in that context, w ould suggest that Aristotle 
puts forward a conception of the state which is very m uch one of m utual
2 5 5 <jnXia Ti0iKTi t ic  e lv a i e£ic
2 5 6  o l  yocp aXr|0ivoi 4>iXoi o u k  a 5 i K o u a i v
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concern, where friendship in that state is of "interest in and concern for the 
well-being of every citizen just because the other is a fellow-citizen" to use 
John Cooper's words.257 If friendship is essential in that way to developing a 
conception of justice, then the liberal/individualistic conception of justice as 
impartiality could be seriously undermined, at least when the connection with 
friendship is made. On the other hand, it has been pointed out by Schofield 
and Annas that the notion of political friendship is a form of advantage 
friendship, and not the relationships of m utual other-concern that Cooper 
puts forward. In what follows, I will critically discuss both these interpretations 
of political friendship and try to define the notion of political friendship and 
its relation to justice.
In a way, both of the above issues are connected w ith each other, since 
what we decide about the kind of political friendship involved w ould affect 
our understanding  of the question about political obligation and private 
friendship (Cicero's objection), and vice versa. Cicero—having looked into the 
past history of the Roman State for cases where friendship had interfered with 
the affairs of politics—points out in De Amicitia  (XII, 40) that it does not 
advance the future state of the Roman Republic to force people in the name of 
friendship to act against their duty. He, thus, proposes that a law should be 
enacted concerning friendship that "one should not ask disgraceful things, nor 
do them  if asked; it is a bad and unacceptable excuse for any sort of 
wrongdoing, but particularly if a man says he has acted against the interests of 
the state for the sake of his friend". Therefore, according to Cicero, if good men 
fall unknowingly into a friendship that requires from them  to go against their 
duty, they m ust not think themselves bound by it to such an extent that they 
should not part company with their friends when the latter do wrong in some 
great m anner (VII, 42), since it is a law of friendship that we should ask only
257 Cooper (1999), pp. 356-377.
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honourable things of our friends, and do honourable things for their sake (VII, 
44).
In trying to understand Aristotle's position on these issues, we should 
notice two points. First, his notion of "political friendship" is not connected in 
any close way to the notion of personal friendship, at least in the sense that 
Cicero was thinking. Second, Aristotle's idea of friendship—either personal or 
political—involves im partiality anyway to start with. But this will become 
obvious later. Nevertheless, despite the apparent naivete of Cicero's point, its 
question about justice and friendship still rem ains an open one w hen 
discussing m atters of partiality  and im partiality in relation to justice and 
friendship and Kantian versus virtue-ethics accounts of moral obligation, as I 
will demonstrate at the end of this chapter. Cicero's point was that personal 
friendships can be an obstacle to justice, since they can interfere w ith our 
political judgem ents w hen these concern our friends. A ristotle 's notion of 
'political friendship ' is not associated—directly at least—w ith any notion of 
friendship between individuals, since friendship in the public sphere is quite 
different from friendship in the private sphere. But, nevertheless, Aristotle 
does not explain how disputes of justice are to be settled w hen personal 
friendships are concerned; in fact, he seems to have no answer to Cicero's 
question, since, even in the context of his political friendship, individual 
friendships are going to exist and one w ould have to deal w ith  the 
implications of justice.
There is also another kind of conflict that m ight arise from Aristotle's 
notion of political friendship. In what way, if at all, is the friendship of those 
who are citizens of the same com m unity different from those friendships 
which might exist between citizens of different communities? Since ideally - 
according to his view—in a polis, a community, a partnership of some sort, we 
should all experience feelings of friendship to our fellow citizens qua fellow 
citizens in order to achieve concord that will hold the city together in the same
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sense that justice does, should we have these feelings of friendship only for 
our fellow citizens or for other people as well? How does one account for 
relations w ith  citizens from other cities w hen one has to view  fellow 
Athenians qua citizens? And what about people much further away that one 
has never even heard of? Should we have friendly feelings for them as well, 
and should considerations of justice apply in their case? Surely, I do not refrain 
from going around the Philosophy Department nicking the A4 paper from the 
printers just because I might get caught; rather, I do not steal the A4 paper 
because it would frustrate the other members of our philosophical community 
when they w ould like to print but find there was no paper. Furthermore, if 
everybody nicked the A4 paper, then I would also be frustrated etc. etc., and in 
general it would be a very 'unfriendly' and 'uncom radely' thing to do. So, at 
the end of the day, I do what justice requires out of concern for my associates. 
But w hat about nicking the A4 paper from the Business Studies Department? 
Surely, I have no obligation to look after the well-being of the members of the 
Business Studies D epartm ent, and m aybe I have no friendly  feelings 
whatsoever towards them. So, how does one act towards people that one has 
no concern for? It is in cases like this where justice has to step in; I refrain from 
stealing the A4 paper from other D epartm ents, not because friendship 
prevents me from doing so, but because justice requires me not to. So, in this 
case Aristotle w ould have to show how  his account of political friendship 
w ould account for conflicts betw een different kinds of com m unities and 
associations.
A final question is whether it is possible today in a m odern nation state 
(with all its largeness, multi-culturalism and impersonality) for such a feeling 
to develop and flourish? Or, is Aristotle's account bound to the uniqueness 
and the limitations of the Greek city-state? Is his account unique to the polis or 
could it apply to other political associations as well as to m odern nation states?
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U nderlying all these problem s are questions about the relationship 
between friendship and the conception of the good. It seems that there are two 
plausible views that Aristotle could hold about the role of friendship. First, 
one could say, on the one hand, that friendship is a necessary part of the end of 
the state, since the polis exists for the sake of the good life. In order for hum an 
beings to flourish, there m ust be m utual concern. This view could even be 
taken to imply that at the end of the day friendship could even be part of the 
goal of the state. Second, one could also argue, on the other hand, that 
friendship is contingently necessary. Since society w ould break dow n very 
quickly if people did not have m utual concern, a degree of friendship is in 
practice necessary for its survival. This view does not suit the idea that 
friendship is the goal of the state. In support of this second view, one could say 
that since law is necessarily general, it leaves a lot of gaps. It cannot legislate in 
detail on every aspect of hum an life. So we m ust rely on relationships of an 
informal kind for the city to function at all.
W hich of these views does Aristotle hold? Is it possible that he is 
committed to both views? And how does he overcome Cicero's objection? We 
know that for Aristotle the function of the state is to enable us to live a good 
life. This is a view  of course that, sketched in th is w ay, neither a 
comm unitarian nor a liberal would object to. But it should be noted that the 
individualist and the communitarian position on the relation of friendship to 
justice w ould differ considerably, since the individualist w ould think that 
friendship, although desirable, is not necessary for justice. Rawls, for example, 
under the veil of ignorance has no place for friendship since w hat he is trying 
to establish is justice in a 'hostile' state. The assum ption behind the veil of 
ignorance is that we would not be in a position to know w hat place we will 
have in society, whether we will be rich or poor, talented or untalented, with 
friends or friendless, and justice is suppose to guarantee us fairness no matter 
which end of the pile we end up at. Friendship is not necessary for Rawls,
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because justice is supposed to protect us if we have no friends. As Sandel 
points out,
Not egoists but strangers, sometimes benevolent, make for citizens 
of the deontological republic; justice finds its occasion because we 
cannot know each other, or our ends, well enough to govern by the 
common good alone. This condition is not likely to fade altogether, 
and so long as it does not, justice will be necessary. (...) By putting 
the self beyond the reach of politics, (liberalism) makes hum an 
agency an article of faith rather than an object of continuing 
atten tion  and concern, a prem ise of politics ra ther than  its 
precarious achievement. This misses the pathos of politics and also 
its most inspiring possibilities. It overlooks the danger that when 
politics goes badly, not only disappointments but also dislocations 
are likely to result. And it forgets the possibility that when politics 
goes well, we can know a good in common that we cannot know 
alone.258
The com m unitarian, thus, could think friendship to be necessary, since he 
thinks that justice can only exist in a community that shares a common aim. It 
is difficult to see how people could share common aims w ithout being to some 
extent friends, so justice for the com m unitarian could not exist w ithout 
friendship.
6.3 Definition of friendship
In order to be able to understand Aristotle's notion of political friendship, we 
should, first, look into his notion of personal friendship and how this affects 
his conception of political friendship, as well as to try to clarify his view of the 
relationship between personal and political friendship.
First, it is im portant though to clarify the Greek notion of friendship 
(philia) which, at first, seems to be very different from the concept of
258 Sandel (1982), p. 183.
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'friendship' at least in its contemporary ordinary English use. If we look into 
the meaning and the definition of the Greek concept, the meaning of philia (as 
it has been pointed out by all the standard  treatm ents of Aristotle on 
friendship) is much wider than the English concept of 'friendship '259 and the 
equivalents in other m odern languages.260 As Cooper points out, the field of 
philia "covers not just the (more or less) intim ate relationships betw een 
persons not bound together by near family ties, to which the words used in the 
modern languages to translate it are ordinarily restricted, but all sorts of family 
relationships (especially those of parents to children, children to parents, 
siblings to one another, and the marriage relationship itself); the word also has 
a natural and ordinary use to characterise w hat goes in English under the 
som ew hat quain t-sounding nam e of 'civic friendship '. Certain business 
relationships also come in here, as does common membership in religious and 
social clubs and political parties."261
One could see therefore that friendship is not in all contexts an exact 
translation of the word philia, at least in its ordinary usage in English today.262 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that it w ould be a mistake not to 
translate philia as friendship. It would be a mistake not to, partly because it
259 See, Blundell (1989), pp. 39-49. Blundell discusses the many levels and varieties of philia  
under three main headings: family, fellow citizens and personal friends.
260 It seems though that the concept of (fnXia in m odem  Greek has retained some of its ancient 
wider meaning. A lthough usually used in the same casual w ay, as in English, to denote 
friendship, the word (JnXia and the verb <J)iXw still mean love in some contexts, either erotic love 
or not. $iX(j0 in m odem  Greek nowadays mostly means 'to kiss' which is an expression of love 
feeling in general; while <J>iXoc is always someone 'dear' to us.
261 Cooper (1999b), pp. 312-313. Examples of philia  describing family relationships such as 
those of parents to children, children to parents, siblings to one another, and the marriage 
relationship itself can be found in N E  VIII, 1161b 12, 1242a 1, 1161b 12.; also in Generation of  
A n im als ,  III, 2, 753al3
262 3>iXeTv m ostly denotes 'loving feeling', so in that sense philia  in some contexts at least is 
much closer to love in the m odem  sense than any other ancient Greek word, and indeed it does 
mean love in some contexts. It should be noted though that the Greeks used epcoq (eros) to denote 
'erotic love' (the state of being 'in love'), while the word dycnni (love) does not occur in Aristotle 
and was only put into usage much latter by Christian authors in the much celebrated notion of 
Christian love (agape). The word <XY(X7rdv does occur in Aristotle of course, but as a synonym of 
Tipdv and PouXeaOai, alpeiaGai, S i o o k e i v ;  it does not therefore denote 'love', not in the m odem  
sense at least. The connection between love and friendship was also made in Latin, as Cicero 
points out in D e A m ic i t ia  (VIII, 26): "For the first thing to bring people together in a 
relationship is love (amor), from which friendship (amicitia) derives its name".
172
would alienate the Greek conception of friendship from our contemporary one 
and attribute to it a purely historical interest, and partly  because it would 
conceal an im portant similarity between the Greek and the English concepts. 
The words 'friend ' and 'friendship ' resemble the Greek philos and philia in 
denoting someone who is 'd ear ' to us or someone w ho has kind feelings 
towards us without us necessarily being aware of these feelings;263 we tend to 
say, for example, "I thought you were my friend" or "He has a friend in the 
Senate", "He was a friend to her".
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle starts his discussion concerning 
friendship stressing that friendship "is a virtue or implies virtue" and "is most 
necessary with a view to living":
For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had 
all other goods; even rich men and those in possession of office 
and of dominating power are thought to need friends most of all; 
for what is the use of such prosperity w ithout the opportunity of 
beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in its m ost laudable 
form tow ards friends? Or how can prosperity be guarded and 
preserved w ithou t friends? (...) A nd in poverty  and other 
misfortunes people think friends are the only refuge.
Furthermore, as it has already been mentioned above, Aristotle—right from the
beginning of NE, Book III, 1154 b 21-27, where he starts discussing friendship—
makes the im portant pronouncem ent, relating thus friendship to justice and
the state:
Friendship also seems to hold states together, and lawgivers to care 
more for it than for justice; for concord (o jL io 'vo ia )  seems to be 
something like friendship, and this they aim at most of all, and 
expel faction as their worst enemy; and when men are friends they 
have no need of justice, while w hen they are just they need 
friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is thought to be a 
friendly quality.
263 As Telfer (1971, p. 223) points out, w e normally distinguish between "befriending' or "being a 
friend to' and "being friends' or "being a friend of'.
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As Annas points out, Aristotle is not concerned to dem onstrate that 
love and concern for others for their own sake is possible, either for ordinary 
people or for the virtuous, since he simply takes that for granted .264 This is 
clearly dem onstrated in Rhetoric 1380b36-1381a5 w here (when setting out 
various views not as part of w hat we all accept) he shows us that love and 
concern for others is part of the normal meaning of 'friendship':
We will begin by defining friendship (rfjv (JnXiav) and friendly 
feeling ( t o  (JnXeiv). Let friendly feeling, or loving, ( t o  4>iXeiv) be 
defined as wishing for someone what one thinks to be goods (ecrrto 
5ii t o  (J)iXeiv t o  |3oi5Xea0ai t i v i  a  o i s t c u  dyaQ d, e k e i v o u  
eveKa aXXa jurj auTob) for their own sake and not for one's own, 
and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about. A 
friend ((Jh Xoq) is one who feels thus and excites these feelings in 
return. Those who think they feel thus tow ards each other think 
themselves friends. This being assumed, it follows that your friend 
is the sort of m an who shares your pleasure in w hat is good and 
your pain in w hat is unpleasant, for your sake and for no other 
reason .265
According to some, this passage from the Rhetoric is the one that holds 
the key to the whole interpretation of Aristotle's notion of friendship, since it 
is in this passage that Aristotle indicates the core common to all friendly 
associations. It is suggested that the central idea contained in friendship is that 
of doing well by someone for his own sake, out of concern for him and not, or 
merely, out of concern for oneself. Cooper argues that this definition from the 
Rhetoric states the core of Aristotle's own analysis of friendship, since on 
Aristotle's account in perfect friendship "the parties love one another for their 
characters and not merely because they enjoy or profit from one another's
264 Annas (1993), p. 249.
265 -phe Greek, nevertheless, in the sentence above at 1380 b 36-37 (ecrreo 5f| to (JnXeiv to 
PooXeoOai t i v i  a  oleTai dyaOd, eiceivou eveKa aXXa pfj gcutoo) is thought by some to be 
ambiguous. Indeed, some have taken a  o iera i dyaOdc to mean (a) "what one thinks goods" 
(Annas 1993, p. 249, and Cooper 1999, p. 313), or "what you believe to be good things" (Rhetoric, 
trans. by Roberts 1984), while others translate as (b) "what he thinks goods" (Cooper 1999, p. 
313, n. 6).
174
com pany". This is w hat Cooper calls character-friendship (the prim ary 
friendship) which is distinguished from the other two forms of friendship in 
that the description under which one loves the other is a description of that 
other's whole. It should be noted here though that—although I adopt Cooper's 
interpretation—I do not think that the term 'character-friendship' successfully 
describes Aristotle's notion of this kind of friendship. Therefore, throughout 
this chapter I will use the term 'prim ary friendship' to refer to Aristotle's (JnXia 
koct’ a p e T T i v  or 'virtue-friendship' or 'friendship of the good'.
What in any case the Rhetoric account successfully demonstrates is that 
for Aristotle friendship in general clearly entails at least two im portant 
constitutive features: affection and an altruistic concern for the friend's good. 
This is quite im portant for the understanding of Aristotle's norm ative notion 
of friendship in both the Nicomachean  and the Eudemian  accounts. W hen 
examining his distinction betw een the three kinds of friendship and the 
notion of political friendship, one should bear in m ind this core common to 
all friendly associations, as described in the Rhetoric definition of friendship.
There are also several other passages where Aristotle stresses this. For 
example, in NE  Book IX, 1166al-10—where he discusses the origin of relations 
of friendship tow ards our neighbours and of the characteristics by which we 
distinguish the various kinds of friendship that seems to be in our relations to 
ourselves—Aristotle points out that,
some people define a friend as someone who wishes and does 
what is good, or what appears to be good, for the sake of his friend; 
or someone who wishes his friend to be and to live for his own 
sake—this is the attitude of m others tow ard their children, or 
friends who have come into conflict. Others define a friend as 
someone who spends time with another and chooses the same 
things as he does; or someone who shares in the sorrows and joys 
of his friend—and this quality too is found in mothers in particular.
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G oodw ill ( e u v o ia )  alone of course, as A ristotle points out in 
Nicomachean Ethics, 1166b 30-1167a 3, although it seems to be a characteristic 
of friendship, it still is not friendship, since goodwill can arise even towards 
people we do not know, and w ithout their being aware of it, but friendship 
cannot. In this sense, goodwill is not even affection (4>(Xr)cnc), since affection 
involves intimacy, while goodwill can spring up suddenly.
Some think that liv ing  together' is--either for Aristotle or in general— 
an essential requirem ent for friendship .266 However I do not think it should 
be part of the general definition of friendship offered above. It is true of course 
that Aristotle argues that in order to achieve prim ary friendship (which is of 
course the best kind of friendship) living together and sharing common 
activities in a daily basis is an im portant requirement. In fact, Aristotle thinks 
that ideally the best friends should spend their days together (NE, 1158a 9, 
1171a 5) or go through time together (NE, 1157b 22) since it is im portant in 
order to achieve a thorough experience of the other's character and habits to 
have this sort of day-to-day association. But, nevertheless, Aristotle also seems 
to think that it is not always important for friends to spend their days together 
in constant company, since he seems to be suggesting in several places that it is 
not always necessary that people we love be always with us. It is true that some 
people find their enjoyment in living in each other's company, and bestow 
good things on each other, but "others are asleep or separated by distance, and 
so do not engage in these activities of friendship, bu t nevertheless have a 
disposition to do so; for distance does not dissolve friendship w ithout
266 por example, Nussbaum (1986), pp. 357-359, and Telfer (1971), pp. 223-224. Nussbaum argues 
that there are in Aristotle eight 'requirements for friendship': 1) m utuality in affection, 2) 
independence (the object of philia must be seen as a being with a separate good, not as simply a 
possession or extension of a philos; and the real philos will wish the other w ell for the sake of 
that separate good), 3) mutual benefiting in action, insofar as this is possible, 4) living together, 
5) trust, 6) mutuality in pleasure, 7) mutual helping, and 8) mutual attraction; also, there are 
three mechanisms of friendship: 1) mutual influence, 2) shared activity, and 3) emulation and 
imitation (mirror friendship). According to Telfer, there are three types of activity which are 
all necessary conditions of friendship (the 'shared activity' condition for friendship): (i) 
reciprocal services, (ii) mutual contact and (ii) joint pursuits. But the 'shared activity' condition 
for friendship is a necessary but not a sufficient one.
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qualification, but it does dissolve its activity" (NE, 1157b5-13). Also, Aristotle 
seems to think that it is a rational and appropriate reaction which correctly 
corresponds to the value of personal affection in a good hum an life to value 
people who are dead as well as people who are alive .267 As he says, "we 
consider it a virtue in people, if they love their friends equally both present 
and absent, both living and dead" (Rhet., 1381b24-26).
So, in conclusion, taking into account the Rhetoric definition and the 
three books of the Nicomachean and the Eudemian Ethics, one could say that, 
according to Aristotle: x and y are friends iff
(1) x and y know each other
(2) x and y have m utual goodwill for the other's sake
(3) x and y feel affection for each other, and
(4) x and y recognise (2) and (3).
6.4 Three kinds of personal friendship
Aristotle distinguishes between three kinds (eiSri) of friendship (NE, VIII, 2-3); 
philia that arises either from (i) usefulness, or (ii) pleasantness, or (iii) 
excellence (5ia to xPB dJuov ,  S i ’ q S o v q v ,  x a r ’ dpSTqv).
It should be noted though that one should distinguish pleasure and 
advantage friendships from exploitative relationships in which the parties aim 
each at their own pleasure and not at all at the other's good. As Nussbaum 
points out, three things should be distinguished: the basis or ground  of the 
relationship (the thing 'th rough which' they love); its object; and its goal or 
end. Pleasure, advantage, and good character are three different bases or
267 Nussbaum (1986, pp. 361-362) interestingly points out the difference between a Kantian and 
an Aristotelian in this matter in the sense that a Kantian w ould tend to think that this reaction 
is an unfortunate psychological fact about many people. But, as Aristotle says in NE., 1099b2-4, 
"nobody w ill entirely live well, if he is both solitary and childless; still less, perhaps, if he has 
terribly bad children or friends, or has good ones who die".
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original grounds of friendship, but they are not the goal or final (intentional) 
end of the relationship. "The object of the relation in all cases is the other 
person; but the person will be conceived of and known in a way bounded by 
the basis: as someone who is pleasant to be with, as a person well-placed for 
useful dealings, as a person of good character. Thus the two inferior types aim 
at benefit for the other only under a thin and superficial description of the 
other".268 This is an important distinction which will prove useful later to our 
understanding of political friendship, since one should not think of advantage 
friendship—despite the fact that it is the lowest form of friendship—as not 
falling under the general definition of friendship offered previously.
In Nicomachean Ethics 1155b 17-1156a 5, Aristotle says that the kinds of 
friendship may perhaps be cleared up if we, first, come to know the object of 
love (to (JnXqrov). There are three grounds on which people love:
of the love of lifeless objects we do not use the w ord 'friendship', 
for it is not m utual love, nor is there a wishing of good to the other 
(for it would surely be ridiculous to wish wine well; if one wishes 
anything for it, it is that it may keep, so that one m ay have it 
oneself); but to a friend we say we ought to wish w hat is good for 
his sake. But to those who thus w ish good we ascribe only 
goodwill, if the w ish is not reciprocated; goodwill w hen it is 
reciprocal being friendship . Or m ust we add  'w hen it is 
recognised?' For many people have good will to those whom  they 
have not seen but judge to be good or useful; and one of these 
m ight return  this feeling. Those people seem to bear goodwill to 
each other; but how could one call them friends when they do not 
know their m utual feelings? To be friends, then, they m ust be 
m utually recognised as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each 
other for one of the aforesaid reasons.
Corresponding to the object of love, there are three kinds of friendship 
equal in num ber to the things that are loveable; "for with respect to each there 
is a m utual and recognised love, and those who love each other wish well to
268 Nussbaum (1986), p. 355.
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each other in that respect in which they love one another" (NE, 1158a6-10). 
The different reasons for loving someone depend on w hether one loves them 
for their utility, their pleasantness or their excellence:
Now those who love each other for their utility do not love each 
other for themselves but in virtue of some good which they get 
from each other. So too w ith those who love for the sake of 
pleasure; it is not for their character that m en love ready-witted 
people, but because they find them pleasant. Therefore those who 
love for the sake of utility love for the sake of w hat is good fo r  
themselves, and those who love for the sake of pleasure do so for 
the sake of w hat is pleasant to themselves, and not in so far as the 
other is the person loved but in so far as he is useful or pleasant.
And thus these friendships are only incidental; for it is not as being 
the m an he is that the loved person is loved, bu t as providing 
some good or pleasure. Such friendships, then, are easily dissolved, 
if the parties do not remain like themselves; for if the one party is 
no longer pleasant or useful the other ceases to love him. (1156al0- 
24)
Perfect friendship, on the other hand, is the friendship of people who 
are good, and alike in virtue .269 Such friends wish well alike to each other qua 
good, and they are good in themselves:
Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most 
truly friends; for they do this by reason of their own nature and not 
incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as long as they are 
good--and goodness is an enduring thing. And each is good 
w ithout qualification and useful to each other. So too they are 
pleasant; for the good are pleasant both w ithout qualification and 
to each other, since to each his own activities and others like them 
are pleasurable, and the actions of the good are the same or alike.
And such a friendship is, as might be expected perm anent, since 
there m eet in it all the qualities that friends should have. (NE,
1156b 9-19)
269 TeAeiot 5 ’ ear'iv fj roov dyaSoov ejnAia k o u  k c x t ’ expert)v opoicov o i S t o i  yap TdyaOd 
opolux; PouAovrai d A A T iA o ig  t| ayaOoi, ayaOoi 8 ’ elai K O t0 ’ ai3ro\5g. (NE,  1 1 5 6 b  6 - 8 )
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Aristotle, then, says that all friendship is either on account of the good 
or on account of p leasure-good or pleasure either in the abstract or such as 
will be enjoyed by him  who has the friendly feeling (7r a a a  yap (jnXia 5 i’ 
ayaOov ean v  r\ 5 i ’q5ovr)v, rf d7rXcoc, rf rco (JnXouvn). Friendship is also 
based on certain resemblances; and to a friendship of good men all the qualities 
we have nam ed belong in virtue of the nature of the friends themselves; "for 
in the case of this kind of friendship the other qualities also are alike in both 
friends, and that w hich is good w ithou t qualification is also w ithout 
qualification pleasant, and these are the most loveable qualities". According to 
Aristotle, love and friendship are found, therefore, most and in their best form 
between such people (NE, 1156b 19-24).
It should be pointed out here that Aristotle describes prim ary or perfect 
friendship to be 'on account of the good' (5i’ ayaOov), and not 'for the sake' of 
the good, as it is usually translated. Ross for example translates 5 i’dya0dv as 
'for the sake', and most, if not all, follow this line when referring to prim ary 
friendship as being 'for the sake of the good'. But, this is misleading, I think. 
'A id' does not necessarily always translate as 'for the sake of' anyway, since it is 
not the same as 'eveKa' which always translates as 'for the sake of'.
W hat is the meaning then of 'on account of the good' w hen Aristotle 
distinguishes between the different types of friendship? If one sees prim ary 
friendship as being 'on account of the good' instead of 'for the sake of the good', 
then his notion of prim ary friendship becomes less unintelligible and maybe 
more plausible. To translate 5i ’ ayaOov as 'for the sake of the good' would 
suggest that one loves his friend not for his sake, as the Rhetoric account 
suggests, bu t for 'w hat one thinks goods' or 'w hat one believes to be good 
things'. But, as Urm son points out, if one makes a sacrifice for another in 
order to attain a greater good, then it is not true that one has made the sacrifice 
for the sake of that other: "If this line of argum ent is correct, Aristotle has 
failed to reconcile his view of friendship as involving disinterested care for the
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friend's welfare with his general view that men seek w hat they take to be their 
highest good".270 One does not do a good thing for his friend or is someone's 
friend just for the sake of the good, since that would mean that he would not 
value that person and his welfare, but that at the end of the day he would only 
value his own welfare. If one though is someone's friend on account of the 
good, then this could include other-concern as well as self-concern, and 
concern for the good.
Aristotle's definition of prim ary friendship as friendship on account of 
the good could be further illuminated if we look at w hat he says in NE  1169a 
18-b 14 concerning sacrifices made for one's friend and country:
It is true of the good man too that he does many acts for the sake of 
his friends and his country, and if necessary dies for them; for he 
will throw away both wealth and honours and in general the goods 
that are objects of competition, gaining for himself nobility; since 
he would prefer a short period of intense pleasure to a long one of 
mild enjoyment, a twelvem onth of noble life to m any years of 
hum drum  existence, and one great and noble action to m any 
trivial ones. Now those who die for others doubtless attain this 
result; it is therefore a great prize that they choose for themselves.
They will throw away wealth too on condition that their friends 
will gain more; for while a m an's friend gains wealth he himself 
achieves nobility; he is therefore assigning the greater good to 
himself. The same too is true of honour and office; all these things 
he will sacrifice to his friend; for this is noble and laudable for 
himself. Rightly then is he thought to be good, since he chooses 
nobility before all else. But he may even give up actions to his 
friend; it may be nobler to become the cause of his friend's acting 
than to act himself. In all the actions, therefore, that m en are 
praised for, the good man is seen to assign to himself the greater 
share of w hat is noble. In this sense, then, as has been said, a man 
should be a lover of self; but in the sense in which most men are 
so, he ought not.
270 Urmson (1988), p. 116.
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This passage has been taken by some to imply that the sacrifice is not made for 
the sake of the friend but for a greater good; a sacrifice m ade for another in 
order to attain a greater good is not made for the sake of that other. Hence, 
according to this line of argument, as we have seen before, Aristotle has failed 
to reconcile his view of friendship as involving disinterested care for the 
friend's welfare with his general view that people seek w hat they take to be 
their highest good .271 But I do not see why Aristotle should be taken that way. 
He clearly says that a friend will give up all wealth and everything else to help 
a friend. He sacrifices all these things to his friend because he is noble and 
laudable for himself; because, at the end of the day, he could not live with 
himself if was not good to his friend. This is Aristotle's notion of self-love, a 
quite contrary one to the usual notion of self-love, as Aristotle himself 
acknowledges. But this is self-love for Aristotle: to assign oneself the greater 
share of what is noble for the good of others but also for the good of oneself, 
since one would not be able to live with oneself if he were not noble.
Aristotle is of course quick enough to point out straight away that such 
perfect friendships are rare, since such people are also rare, and also that such 
friendship requires time and familiarity: "as the proverb says, people cannot 
know each other till they have 'eaten salt together', nor can they adm it each 
other to friendship or be friends till each has been found loveable and be 
trusted by each"(NE, 1156bl9-28);
Those who quickly show the m arks of friendship to each other 
wish to be friends, but are not friends unless they both are loveable 
and know the fact; for a wish for friendship may arise quickly, but 
friendship does not. (NE, 1156b28-32)
Friendship, therefore, resembles hospitality in a way, "of which it has 
been said, aptly it seems, that one should have 'neither m any guests, nor 
no n e '"272 (NE 1170b21-22). As far as friendships which are based on either
271 Urmson (1988), p. 114.
2 7 2  JUT1T& 7toX i5£& ivoc iutix’ c x ^ e iv o c  (Hesiod, Works and Days, 715)
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utility or pleasure, it is obvious that one should not have too many, "since 
returning favours to m any people is laborious, and life is too short to do it" 
and "so more friends than suffice for one's own life are superfluous, and a 
hindrance to noble living"; also, in the case of friends for pleasure, "a few are 
enough, as a little seasoning in food is enough" (NE 1170b23-29).
But, also, as far as prim ary friendships are concerned, in the same sense 
that there is a limit to how m any people make a city, it is obvious that one 
cannot live in the company of many people and share oneself between them, 
since "it becomes hard to share personally in the joys and sorrows of many, 
because it is likely to tu rn  out that one shares the pleasure of one and the 
distress of another at the same time" (NE,1171a6-8). In fact, Aristotle even 
seems to suggest here that true primary friendship can only truly exist between 
two people, since, as he points out, "the celebrated cases are spoken of as 
between two people" (NE,1171al5-16). Aristotle has nothing but contempt for 
people who have too m any friends:
Those, however, who have too many friends and treat everybody 
they meet as if they were close to them  seem to be friends of 
nobody, except in the sense that fellow-citizens are friends. These 
people are called obsequious. In the way fellow citizens are friends, 
indeed, one can be a friend to many and yet not obsequious, but a 
genuinely good person; but one cannot have many friends for their 
virtue and for their own sake. We m ust be content to find even a 
few friends like this. (NE,1171al5-20)
These Aristotelian remarks that perfect friends are rare and that perfect 
friendship anyw ay requires tim e and fam iliarity are quite im portant in 
illum inating A risto tle 's notion of perfect friendship . A ristotle tells us 
something that we all intuitively already know: that true friendship is rare, if 
not impossible, and that it sometimes takes a lifetime to recognise a friend. 
Nevertheless, since Aristotle acknowledges this, he could not have intended
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this kind of friendship to be the only one that he counts as friendship, since we 
all have relationships we call friendships that do not match this ideal.
In general, there are several issues that arise from this distinction of the 
three kinds of friendship. First, w hat about the evolution of friendship? Can 
different kinds of friendship evolve, i.e. what does Aristotle have to say about 
friendships developing and changing from one kind to another? For example, 
can friendship start from m utual advantage and then develop into prim ary 
friendship? Second, w hat about combining the three kinds of friendship? 
Friendship that is primary but is also pleasurable and advantageous? Or would 
that fall under the definition of prim ary friendship anyway? Most likely, one 
could say that such friendship, which is prim ary bu t also pleasurable and 
advantageous, would fall under prim ary friendship, since Aristotle explicitly 
mentions pleasure in this context. This is a point Aristotle acknowledges in 
the Eudemian Ethics at 1240b 37-40 where he says that all friendships reduce to 
the prim ary kind (naoa i cd (jnXloci dvdcYovrai 7rpoc rriv 7rpc6Tr|v). Also, NE, 
1156b 15 suggests that primary friendship involves pleasure.
One could plausibly argue, I suppose, that this distinction between the 
three kinds of friendship may be a very interesting one, but perhaps it should 
only be used as a way of making the point that friendships vary greatly and 
should not be taken form ally in the sense of thinking that all kinds of 
friendship relations fall strictly under it. There is enough room in Aristotle's 
account, I think, to argue that he did not intend prim ary friendship to be the 
only kind of friendship recognised truly as such, or to be the only kind of real 
friendship. If he did, then w hy bother discussing the other two kinds of 
friendship on the first place? It is more likely that prim ary friendship is, for 
Aristotle, an ideal form of friendship—not always easy or plausible to be 
achieved—w hich serves as a m odel for the other kinds. Indeed, Aristotle 
himself includes family relations as forms of philia and illustrates philia by a 
m other's love for her child (NE 1159a27-1159bl), despite the fact that such
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relationships do not really fall under any of the three kinds of friendship. The 
other two kinds of friendship are classified as friendships because they 
resemble prim ary friendship which serves as the prototype of friendship, but 
this does not imply that Aristotle looks down on these kinds of friendship.
But, is this consistent with the definition offered previously [x and y are 
friends iff (1) x and y know each other, (2) x and y have m utual goodwill for 
the other's sake, (3) x and y feel affection for each other, and (4) x and y 
recognise (2) and (3)], and, as Cooper asks, what was it that inclined the Greeks 
to group all these different relations together under this common name? Ross 
suggests that the word philia "can stand for any m utual attraction between two 
hum an  b e in g s".273 But this account of Ross's seems to let in too much 
according to Cooper,274 since there are many forms of attraction that would not 
count as philia. So, for example, I could meet a stranger on the Edinburgh 
train, be m utually attracted to each other during our conversation, and never 
see him again for the rest of my life, but this m utual attraction could hardly 
qualify as friendship. One could also add to Cooper's point that 'attraction' 
anyway sounds w rong when discussing, for example, one's relations w ith 
fellow citizens. According to Cooper, the account of liking (to (JnXsiv) that 
Aristotle puts forward in the Rhetoric suggests that "the central idea contained 
in philia is that of doing well by someone for his own sake, out of concern for 
him (and not, or not merely, out of concern for oneself)".275 Cooper argues 
that this definition from the Rhetoric does state the core of Aristotle's own 
analysis of philia. In this sense, according to Cooper, for Aristotle "philia, taken 
most generally, is any relationship characterised by m utual liking, as this is 
defined in the Rhetoric, that is, by m utual well-wishing and well-doing out of 
concern for one another.276 In addition, as Cooper points out, "the different
273 Ross (1995), p. 235.
274 Cooper (1999), p.313.
275 Cooper (1999), ibid.
276 Cooper (1999), p. 314.
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forms of philia listed above could be viewed just as different contexts and 
circumstances in which this kind of m utual well-doing can arise; w ithin the 
family, in the state at large, and among business partners and political cronies, 
well-doing out of concern for other persons can arise, and where it does so, 
there exists a friendship".277
It is obvious from Aristotle's analysis that, from all three kinds of 
friendship, prim ary friendship (or friendship of the good, or virtue-friendship, 
or friendship of character) is the one to be preferred. Cooper thinks that the 
expression 'character-friendship' ('moral friendship'; qOncrj (JnXia) is the one 
that mostly represents w hat Aristotle had in m ind when discussing prim ary 
friendship, since this expression "brings out accurately that the basis for the 
relationship is the recognition of good qualities of character, w ithout in any 
way implying that the parties are moral heroes". Furthermore, Cooper adds 
that one should not overlook the significance of the fact that Aristotle himself 
prefers to characterise the central type of friendship by concentrating almost 
exclusively on the friendship of perfectly good men, since "it is an aspect of the 
pervasive teleological bias of his thinking, which causes him always to search 
out the best and most fully realised instance when attem pting to define a kind 
of a thing"; nevertheless "Aristotle does not him self m istake the perfect 
instance for the only member of the class, and there is no necessity for us to do 
so".27*
Furthermore, it is interesting to point out that Aristotle introduces a 
further distinction (ti0 ikti koci voiuiKr) (JnXia) in some places in both the 
Nicomachean and the Eudemian Ethics. This is a very interesting distinction, 
different from the one concerning the three kinds of friendship that Aristotle 
put forward previously. This distinction between moral and legal friendship is 
in a way one that can be applied to all three kinds of friendship. Aristotle in
277 Cooper (1999), p. 313.
27  ^Cooper (1999), p. 320.
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Nicomachean Ethics (1162b 21-23) is talking about a variety of utility friendship 
that depends on trust rather than legally binding agreement. But there is a 
discrepancy betw een the Nicomachean and the Eudemian Ethics in the sense 
that Aristotle seems to say in the Nicomachean Ethics that ri0iKr( cjnXia can be 
for utility whereas in the Eudemian Ethics he seems to say that it is not.
It should be noted though that q0iKq (jnXia should not be confused in 
any way w ith w hat Cooper calls "character-friendship7 which is the "primary7 
friendship, the friendship of the good. This is apparent from the Greek, since 
T]OiKrf (JnAfa is contrasted w ith v o p i K r )  cjnXia. Clearly the fact that the 
obligations of a particular form of friendship are not legally applicable does not 
mean that friendship m ust be a case of prim ary friendship. So, prim ary 
friendship, or w hat Cooper calls "character-friendship7, is merely a form of 
q 0 i K r j  (JnXla, but it is not identical with q 0 n c r j  (jnXla.
Aristotle distinguishes in Nicomachean Ethics 1162b 21-23 betw een 
moral and legal friendship: 77as justice is in two kinds, one unw ritten and the 
other legal, one kind of friendship of utility is moral and the other legal77 
( e o i K s  5s, K a 0 d b r e p  t o  S i k o u o v  e o n  S i t t o v , t o  p e v  dtYp(x<|)ov t o  5e koct& 
v o p o v ,  k o u  Tffc K(x t & t o  xp rfo ip ov  (jnXiotc f\ p e v  Tj0iKrj  r\ be v o p i K f )  
e i v a i ) .  In this passage, Ti0iKrj  (Jh X ioc is referred to as the type of friendship 
which is not on fixed term s in contrast to the legal type which is on fixed 
terms, in the sense that if one makes a gift it is not clear w hat should be 
expected in return  while in the case of legal friendship it is clear and not 
am biguous w hat should be expected in return . The sam e argum ent is 
presented in Eudemian Ethics 1242b-1243a. But in Eudemian Ethics 1242b 35- 
1243a 2, Aristotle, when referring to a kind of "political7 friendship, points out 
that this kind of "moral7 friendship is quite different from the "legal7 one, in the 
sense that "moral7 friendship in fact merely pretends to be "moral7, like that of 
good men that is. These kind of men wish to have both utility and excellence 
together, but in fact they really associate together for the sake of utility while
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representing their friendship as moral, like that of good men; by pretending to 
trust one another they make out their friendship to be not merely legal.
In the Eudemian Ethics he also refers to ti0ikt) cjnXia at 1241a 1-14 
where he discusses the relation of kindly feeling or goodwill (eu v o ia ) to 
friendship. Aristotle points out that, when we distinguish friendship according 
to the three sorts, s u v o ia  is found only in the prim ary sort. Since goodwill 
seems like to be not goodwill for him who feels the goodwill, bu t for him 
towards whom  it is felt, and if goodwill existed in the friendship towards the 
pleasant, then men would feel goodwill towards inanimate things, therefore, 
goodwill is concerned w ith the friendship that depends on character (r\0 iK rf). 
From this passage we can indeed see that Aristotle considers prim ary 
friendship to be a form of Tj0iKq (JnXla, but not identical w ith it.
6.5 Defining political friendship
A ristotle talks of political friendsh ip  in various places in both  the 
Nicomachean and the Eudemian Ethics. As he points out in the last chapter of 
book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics, "friendship is community, and as we are 
in relation to ourselves, so we are in relation to a friend" (1171b32-33).279 But 
what is the role political friendship plays in the city for Aristotle, and what is 
its relation to justice?
Relating justice to friendship was not an alien conception in Greek 
society. On the contrary, as we know from Plato's Republic, m ost Greeks 
thought that "justice is doing good to one's friends and harm ing one's 
enemies". Indeed, the contrast between friends and enemies was very strong in 
Classical Greece.280 Justice is also conceived by Plato and Aristotle primarily as 
the personal virtue of justice ( 5 i K a i o c n 5 v r | ) ,  "the m ainspring of the behaviour
2 7 9  K o i v w v i a  y a p  r\ k o u  goc 7 rpo c  e a u T o v  o u tg o  k o u  7 rpo c  t o v  (JnXov
280 See, Blundell (1989).
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of one individual towards another",281 and indeed we all know that Plato talks 
of 'justice in the city' and 'justice in the individual'.
For example, Creon in Sophocles's Antigone (182f) argues that loyalty to 
the city is an essential qualification for being a friend, a view that has been 
called 'a radical idea for a Greek' 282 Indeed, Creon—contrary to common Greek 
opinion, but reflecting at the same time the development of the patriotic spirit 
of democratic A thens—has no regard for anyone who values a philos, a 
personal friend or relative, above his native land .283 For Creon, friendship 
(either personal or familial) poses a moral danger to citizenship in this context.
But, as Schwarzenbach argues, Aristotle's notion of 'political friendship' 
should not be confused with the phenom enon of 'political patronage ',284 as 
presented by Polem archus in Plato 's Republic. Polemarchus, as we know, 
argues in Republic  332d that justice is nothing bu t "helping friends and 
harming enemies", and, when asked w hat he means by friends, he replies: "It 
is likely ... that one loves those one thinks good, and hates those one thinks 
wicked" (334c). According to Schwarzenbach, "although such highly partial 
friendship politics may indeed have been closer to the actual practice of the 
ancient Greek polis, it is im portant not to confuse political patronage w ith 
A ristotle's norm ative notion of political friendship", since "in the latter, 
impartiality and the rule of law are being advocated, even if Aristotle has not 
yet arrived at the idea of universal individual righ ts".285 This is a very 
im portant po in t no t only in relation to A risto tle 's notion  of political 
friendship but also as far as the conception of justice in Plato's Republic is 
concerned, since one could see the whole of the Republic as a response to the 
question of political patronage that the Polemarchus view advocates. In the
281 Schofield (1999), p. 83.
282 Blundell (1989), p. 118.
283 Blundell (1999), pp. 117-118.
284 It should be noted though that Plato never uses the term 'political friendship' in the 
Republic .
285 Schwarzenbach (1996), p. 105.
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same way, as Annas has pointed out, Aristotle's account of personal friendship 
can be seen as trying to answer the questions raised in Plato's Lysis concerning 
the altruistic nature of friendship and the relation between liking and thinking 
good .286
In general, A risto tle m entions several k inds of philia sim ilar to the 
political one: friendships of fellow -citizens, fellow -tribesm en, shipm ates, etc. 
(cJnXfcu 7 t o X i t i k o c i ,  <|)uXsTiKai, auju7rXoiKai, KoivcoviKai, N E ,  1161b 12). 
These, as he says, are m ore like friendships in a com m unity , because they 
appear to be based on a sort of agreem ent; in this sense, the friendship of host 
and guest could also fall into this category. C om m unities or associations like 
these—as w e have seen prev iously  in chap ter tw o—alth o u g h  sim ilar to the 
political com m unity, should  be d istinguished  from  it. It is the 'constitu tion ' 
(the system  of courts, a com m on set of laws and a shared conception of justice) 
w hich d istingu ishes the political com m unity  from  o ther associations either 
m erely contractual or commercial.
F riendship and  justice seem  to be concerned w ith  the sam e things and 
to be found in the same people:
For there seems to be some kind of justice in every community, 
and some kind of friendship as well. At any rate, people address as 
friends their shipm ates and fellow soldiers, and sim ilarly those 
who are members of other kinds of community or association with 
them. And the extent of their comm unity is the extent of their 
friendship, since it is also the extent of their justice. The proverb, 
'W hat friends have, they have in com m on', is correct, since 
friendship  is based on com m unity. But w hile b ro thers and 
comrades have everything in common, w hat the others whom  we 
have m entioned have in common is more lim ited—more in some 
cases, less in others, since friendship too differs in degree. (NE  
1159b25-1160a)
286 Annas (1977), pp. 532-554.
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Aristotle does not explicitly state exactly how  political friendship is 
related to the three kinds of friendship already m entioned, bu t it seems he 
regards it as a special case of advantage-friendship .287 He points out that the 
political com m unity is formed and survives for the sake of the common 
advantage derived by its members from it, in such a sense that it is essential to 
such a community that it aims at securing w hat is needed by its members to 
support their lives:
All communities seem to be parts of the political community, since 
people journey together w ith something useful in m ind, to supply 
something for life. And the political community seems originally 
to have come together and to continue for the sake of w hat is 
useful, since it is this that legistrators aim at, and it is said that 
what is useful, in common, is just. (NE, 1160a 11-12, a 21-23)
All these different small communities which exist w ithin the larger political
association seem to be subordinate to this political community, because the
political community aims not at w hat is immediately useful, but at w hat is
useful for the whole life. "All these communities, then, appear to be parts of
the political com m unity; and the particu la r k inds of friendsh ip  will
correspond to the particular kinds of community" (1160a28-30).
This is problematic for Aristotle's general notion of friendship, since if
one defines political friendship in this way, then there is a danger of it not
being friendship in any real sense. Political friendship, defined thus—it could
be argued—is friendship only in name; it has in fact nothing to do w ith the
definition of friendship offered previously.
But, as Cooper has argued, political friends nonetheless retain the
aspects of m utual awareness and liking, of the reciprocal w ishing the other
well for that other's sake, and of doing things for the friend, only now they are
evidenced in a general concern .288 The prim ary difference betw een personal
287 Cooper (1999), p. 333.
288 Cooper (1999b), pp. 356-377. Price (1989, pp. 179-205) offers an alternative interpretation, 
since he attaches the label of 'virtue' to civic friendship, disagreeing thus with Cooper. Stern-
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and political friends is that among civic friends intim ate knowledge of the 
friend and a close emotional bond are absent. In personal friendships the 
intimate knowledge of and the close emotional bond betw een friends allows 
for far greater contingent inequalities w ithout these destroying the friendship 
itself. The opposite, though, is the case with political friends. In the case of 
political friendship, there are norm ally no ties of intim acy, of personal 
knowledge or of individual affection. Also, since political friendship is based 
from the outset on reciprocal advantage, not only real, but perceived injustices 
or proportionate inequalities betw een the citizens will far more quickly 
threaten an end to the friendship relationship.
Prim ary friendship—being the central and basic kind of friendship— 
allows all sorts of interpersonal relations which involve m utual other-concern 
to fall under friendship. As Cooper points out, "civic friendship, then, as the 
special form of friendship characteristic of this kind of community, is founded 
on the experience and continued expectation, on the part of each citizen, of 
profit and advantage to him self, in com m on w ith  the others, from 
membership in the civic association".289 Civic friendship then exists when the 
fellow-citizens, to one another's m utual knowledge, like ((jnXsTv) one another, 
that is, where each citizen wishes well (and is known to wish well) to the 
others, and is willing to undertake to confer benefits on them, for their own 
sake, in consequence of recognising that he himself is regularly benefited by 
the actions of the others 290
In such a com m unity anim ated by political friendship, each citizen 
assumes that all the others, even those hardly or not at all known to him, are 
willing supporters of their common institutions and willing contributors to 
the common social project, from which he, together w ith all the other citizens,
Gillet (1995, pp. 147-169) also agrees with Price in this. I do not follow these interpretations in 
my discussion, since I agree with Cooper.
289 Cooper (1999), p. 333.
29  ^Cooper (1999), ibid.
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benefits. As Cooper points out, if this is w hat political or civic friendship is, it 
is not surprising  that Aristotle should rem ark that law givers are more 
concerned to foster friendship among their citizens than they are to put their 
relations on a footing of justice: "For justice can exist perfectly well among 
those who care nothing for one another and who w ould not lift a finger to 
help anyone else, except insofar as rules of justice m ay require; the sense of 
justice, understood as respect for fairness and legality, is compatible w ith a 
suspicious, narrow, hard, and unsympathetic character" (NE, 1155 a 23-24).291
In a general atmosphere of distrust and m utual ill-will, citizens can still 
perceive themselves to be unjustly treated even if they are not so—even if 
justice or 'proportionate' equality is being strictly adhered to. In aiming for 
unanim ity the task of the legislator is to manage perceived as well as real 
injustices, and, hence, to strengthen the political bond. Justice will not be 
experienced as such in a context of hostility and m utual ill-will. It is because of 
this that in order for a society to be stable and good—a society where the truest 
form of justice is not m erely m eted out, bu t recognised by all citizens 
involved—it should be animated by political friendship.
This is the account of political friendship offered in the Nicomachean  
Ethics. But, as Schofield points out, political friendship in the Eudem ian  
Ethics , VII. 10 is som ething quite different than the one presented in the 
Nicomachean Ethics account. It looks quite different from the 'civic friendship' 
that Cooper has sought to find in the N icom achean Ethics,  w here 'civic 
friendship' was a m atter of interest in and concern for the well-being of every 
citizen just because the other is a fellow citizen. Schofield's view is that 
political friendship  in the Eudemian Ethics is a m atter of contingent 
individual personal relationships and of straightforward advantage friendship.
Aristotle discusses political friendship in the Eudemian Ethics at 1242al- 
1243b 37. He refers to political friendship (the friendship  of kinsm en,
29  ^Cooper (1999), ibid.
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comrades, partners) as the one that "has been established mainly in accordance 
with utility ( t o  xprfc^juov); for men seem to have come together because each 
is not sufficient for himself (5id t o  jut) a u T a p K e i v ) ,  though they would have 
come together anyhow for the sake of living in company ( t o o  ouCfjv x^piv)" 
(1242a 6-9). The justice belonging to the friendship of those useful to one 
another is, according to Aristotle, pre-eminently justice, for it is political justice 
( ttoX i t i k o v  S I k o u o v ,  1242a 11-12).
Indeed, Aristotle in the Eudemian Ethics does not, as Schofield points 
out, "flatly assert that all justice is relative to a friend"; he presents it as the 
conclusion of a syllogism in which the middle term is K o i v c o v o g  (associate or 
partner):292
To inquire, then, how  to behave to a friend is to look for a 
particular kind of justice, for generally all justice is in relation to a 
friend. For justice involves a num ber of indiv iduals w ho are 
partners, and the friend is a partner either in family or in one's 
scheme of life. (EE, 1242 a 19-22)
The re la tionsh ip  betw een  friendsh ip  and  po litica l association  
( k o i v o o v i c c )  that Aristotle makes is quite im portant here. It follows that 
political friendship is based on mere advantage in this account, as Aristotle 
seems to include it as such a few lines later. As he says at 1242a 19-30:
For m an is not merely a political but also a household-maintaining 
animal, and his unions are not, like those of the other animals, 
confined to certain times, and formed w ith any chance partner, 
w hether male or female; but man has a tendency to partnership 
w ith those to whom  he is by nature akin. There w ould, then, be 
partnership and a kind of justice, even if there were no state; and 
the household is a kind of friendship; the relation, indeed, of 
master and servant is that of an art and its tools, a soul and its 
body; and these are not friendships, nor forms of justice, but 
som ething sim ilar to justice; just as health  is not justice, but 
som ething similar.
292 Schofield (1999), p. 85.
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Aristotle also argues there that it is in the household first where we 
have the sources and springs of friendship, of political organisation and of 
justice. This can be seen if we take into account that the friendship of man and 
wife is a friendship based on utility and that it is a kind of a partnership. Also, 
the friendship of a father and son is the same as that of god to man, of the 
benefactor to the benefited, and in general of the natural ruler to the natural 
subject. The friendship of brothers to one another, on the other hand, is 
eminently that of comrades, inasmuch as it involves equality (1242a 30-1242b 
2).293
This account of political friendship is, according to Schofield, focused on 
advantage, but it is also a form of egalitarian friendship (EE, VII. 10,1242 a 9-11, 
b 21-22, 27-31). There is a contrast w ith friendship based on superiority, 
hierarchy or deference. Justice is in the hierarchical cases a m atter of 
proportional equality, in the egalitarian it is one of num erical equality. As 
Aristotle says in Eudemian Ethics, VII, 10, 1242 a 9-11, "Only political 
friendship and the deviation corresponding to it294 are not just friendships, 
but associations which operate as friends do: the other sorts are based on 
superiority".
According to Schofield, Aristotle's295 comments on the equality of status 
characteristic of political friendship focus not so much on equality as such, but
293 It should be noted here that Fred Miller thinks that this passage in the Eudemian Ethics 
explicitly admits a non-political form of justice. The kind of justice discussed in that passage 
could be regarded, according to Miller, as a type of 'proto-justice', in view  of the subsequent 
statement: 'In the household first are the sources and springs of friendship, the constitution, and 
justice' (1242a 40-1242b 1). For Miller this is evidence that Aristotle in general recognises non­
political forms of justice and that the virtue of justice in all its forms is not only concerned with  
the community. But, I do not see how  Miller can infer this from a passage which explicitly 
discusses 'political' friendship, and is, hence, concerned w ith friendship and justice in the 
political association. I do not think that Miller's point is successful, although I do agree with  
the point made in the same section of his book concerning the scope of justice not to be confined to 
members of one's own political community, as I point out later in this section. (Miller 1995, pp. 84- 
86 .)
294 -phig refers according to Cooper to democratic friendship—that characteristic of a polis  in 
which there is self-interested popular rule.
295 It should be noted that Schofield does not accept the view  that Aristotle is the author of the 
Eudemian Ethics which is odd in the sense that one can ask, if Aristotle was not the author of
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on utilitarian motivation and the weakness of the bonding it creates: "I help 
out other citizens when I perform a liturgy, that is, undertake some service for 
the city. But I am only taking my turn, in expectation that I will get advantage 
back when others do theirs".296 Aristotle makes two observations. First, that 
w hen citizens see no more advantage in their friendship , they sim ply 
term inate it. There is a tacit contrast w ith hierarchical friendships: between 
king and subject, or father and son, or benefactor and beneficiary (EE, 1242 b 22- 
27). Second, the political equality of citizens under a polity means that the 
notion of rule is altogether thinner. Government is not based in nature nor is 
it kingly b u t som ething one undertakes in the sp irit of an economic 
exchange .297
Furthermore, at Eudemian Ethics, 1242 b 31-1243a 14 Aristotle draws the 
distinction that we have seen previously within advantage friendship between 
what he calls 'political' (7toXitikti) and 'ethical' (q0iKTi) friendship. According 
to this argum ent, political friendship could be either legal or moral. This 
opposition betw een political and ethical forms of advantage friendship is a 
function of a whole range of other contrasts. Thus, political is based on 
agreement, while ethical is based on trust; political looks to the transaction and 
to equality, while ethical looks to intention; political is legal, while ethical is 
companionable .298 As he says at 1243a 31-35:
Political friendship, then, looks to the agreem ent and the thing, 
moral friendship to the choice; here then we have a truer justice, 
and a friendly justice. The reason for the quarrel is that moral 
friendship is more noble, but useful (xpqaijuri) friendship is more 
necessary; men start, then, by proposing to be moral friends, i.e. 
friends through excellence; bu t as soon as some private interest 
arises, they show clearly they are not so. For the m ultitude aim at
the Eudemian Ethics, what does it matter anyway that his account of political friendship is 
different in the Eudemian Ethics from the account offered in the Nicomachean Ethics?
296 Schofield (1999), p. 90.
297 Schofield (1999), ibid.
298 Schofield (1999),p. 92.
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the noble only when they have plenty of everything else; and at 
noble friendship similarly.
Aristotle makes a very interesting point immediately after this passage 
when he discusses recriminations (eYKXquaTOt) in dissimilar friendships and 
how justice is to be distributed in such cases. What is really interesting is the 
explanation he offers concerning the occurrence of recrim inations in 
friendships, as well as the way he proposes to resolve these. As he says at 1243 b 
15-27,
Recrim inations are comm on in dissim ilar friendships, w here 
action and reaction are not in the same straight line; and it is not 
easy to see w hat is just. For it is hard to measure by just this one 
unit different directions; we find this in the relation of lovers, for 
there the one pursues the other at times for his utility. When the 
love is over, one changes as the other changes. Then they calculate 
the quid pro quo, thus Python and Pammenes quarrelled; and so 
do teacher and pupil (for knowledge and money have no common 
measure), and so Herodicus the doctor quarrelled w ith a patient 
who paid him only a small fee; such too was the case of the king 
and the lyre-player; the former regarded his associate as pleasant, 
the latter his as useful; and so the king, when he had to pay, chose 
to regard himself as an associate of the pleasant kind, and said that 
just as the player had given him pleasure by singing, so he had 
given the player pleasure by his promise.
This is interesting since it explains, or at least it tries to offer one kind of
explanation of w hy disputes and recriminations in friendships occur. This is
due to the fact that the friendship in which the recrim ination occurs was
dissim ilar; the parties did not enter the friendship w ith the same things
(utility, or pleasantness, or excellence) in mind. So, their friendship was not
one of pleasure for example for both parties concerned and this is why,
according to Aristotle, recrimination takes place.
In such cases of solving recrimination among dissimilar friendships the
role of justice is, according to Aristotle, that of proportion. In order to be able to
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decide in such matters, the measurement m ust be by one measure, only here 
not by a term  but by a ratio; one m ust m easure by proportion, just as one 
m easures in the associations of citizens. According to this, to all whose 
exchanges are not of the same for the same, proportion is the m easure (1243b 
26-38).
This is the account of political friendship presented by Aristotle in the 
Eudemian Ethics. It is true that it differs from that in the Nicomachean Ethics, 
as Schofield quite rightly has pointed out. Nevertheless, I do not think that its 
im portance is quite so grave as Schofield w ants us to think nor that it 
underm ines the Cooper interpretation. One could argue—trying to establish 
consistency between the two ethical treatises—that Aristotle merely discusses in 
the Eudemian Ethics an additional kind of political friendship based mainly on 
advantage that he did not discuss in the Nicomachean Ethics. This kind of 
political friendship is closer to w hat we could call economic friendship, as 
Aristotle refers to it in Eudemian Ethics, 1242 a 23: "For a m an is not merely a 
political bu t also a household-m aintaining animal". But this does not mean 
that the account of 'political' friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics is at all 
underm ined.
6.6 Political friendship, justice and the unity of the state
In w hat way, though, is political friendship related to justice, and w hat is it 
exactly that friendship can achieve for the state? More important, what kind of 
unanim ity of the state is it that Aristotle has in mind? How does friendship 
generate concord which contributes to the unity of the state in the same sense 
that justice can? How is the unity of the state to be understood? W hat kind of 
unity is Aristotle advocating here?
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Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's Republic in Politics Book II could help us 
illuminate further this notion of the unity of the state and its relation to 
friendship. As we know, Aristotle's remarks on Plato's Republic should not be 
taken at face value as direct criticisms of the Republic, but should rather be 
seen as expressions of Aristotle's own political position .299
Aristotle makes an im portant point w hen he complains that Plato's 
view would give rise to a 'w atery' friendship in Book II of the Politics where he 
criticises Plato's idea of community of wom en and children in the Republic. 
Indeed, his argument against such a 'w atery' friendship in the Politics—as it has 
been pointed out by Stalley300 and May hew 301— is essential for achieving an 
understanding of the notion of Aristotle's political friendship, and its relation 
to justice and the unity of the state.
As Aristotle points out, "the spirit of friendship is likely to exist to a 
lesser degree where wom en and children are in common; and the governed 
class ought to have little of that spirit if it is to obey and not to attem pt 
revolution"(1262b 1-3). Friendship, he argues, is the chief good of cities, 
because it is the best safeguard against the danger of fractional disputes, and, 
indeed, 'Socrates' himself particularly commends the ideal of the unity of the 
city which unity is the result of friendship. It is similar to w hat 'Aristophanes' 
in Plato's Symposium (191a, 192d-e) refers to when he speaks of lovers desiring 
out of friendship to grow together into a unity, and to be one instead of two. In 
the case of the lovers, it would be inevitable that both or at least one of them 
should cease to exist; but in the case of political association—Aristotle points 
out—there would be merely a watery sort of friendship, since a father would be 
very little disposed to say 'm ine' of a son, and a son would be as little disposed 
to say 'm ine' of a father: "Just as a little sweet wine, mixed w ith a great deal of 
water, produces a tasteless mixture, so family feeling is diluted and tasteless
299 Stalley (1991), pp. 182-199.
300 Stalley (19991), pp. 191-193.
3^1 Mayhew (1997), pp. 79-85.
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when family names have as little meaning as they have in a constitution of 
this sort, and when there is so little reason for a father treating his sons as sons, 
or a son treating his father as a father, or brothers one another as brothers" 
(1262b 17-22). Aristotle points out at the end of this discussion of 'w atery ' 
friends that there are two motives which particularly move people to care for 
and love an object: "the first is that the object should belong to yourself, while 
the second is that you should like it" (5bo y a p  e a n v  a  juaXiara 7roieT 
KrjSsaOai rou e  dv0pGO7rouc Kai 4>iXsTv, to re !5 iov  Kai to dya7rr|T6v). But 
neither of these two motives can exist among those who live in a constitution 
such as the one described above.302
As Stalley points out, according to Aristotle, "friendship is an essential 
ingredient in the good life, not just because it is useful bu t because it is the 
source of some of our greatest satisfactions". In addition, there is also a political 
dimension of friendship, since it is both w hat holds the city together and a 
main reason for its existence. The city—as Stalley suggests—"is formed for the 
good life which requires relations with one's fellows; it also involves parents, 
children wives and in general one's friends and fellow-citizens: thus the city is 
to be valued as providing the context for friendship".303
Thus, the Platonic notion of 'w atery' friendship renders friendship to be 
no friendship at all, either in the Aristotelian or in the contem porary sense. 
Plato, of course, does acknowledge the importance of friendship; the whole 
purpose of abolishing the family was after all in order to establish friendship in 
the city, to render the city into a unified whole. But, as Stalley argues, Plato 
differs from Aristotle in two quite essential points:
(1) He treats friendship as a means of preserving the state rather
than the state as a means of preserving friendship.
302 Aristotle's argument about 'watery' friends supports further the claim made previously in 
this chapter that it is not possible to legislate friendship.
303 Stalley (1991), p. 193.
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(2) He pays little attention to the fact that, since friendship is 
essentially a relationship betw een individuals, the num ber of 
friends is necessarily lim ited .304
Aristotle, of course, does not think that. He argues that there is a limited 
number of friends that one could have. Finite beings that we are, we can only 
be in a state of friendship with a limited num ber of people. In this sense, "it 
follows that only in a secondary sense can we enjoy friendship w ith a large 
number of people"; "for this reason, Aristotle attaches importance not only to 
the family but also to other forms of social organisation w ithin the state".305
The role of friendship in the city is, for Aristotle, to generate concord 
(the unanimity of the city) and to safeguard justice. As he points out though, 
"concord is not agreement in belief, since this can occur even among people 
unknown to one another". "Nor are people described as being in concord 
when they agree about just anything, for example, the heavens (since concord 
here has nothing to do with friendship), but a city is said to be in concord when 
people agree about w hat is beneficial, rationally choose the same things, and 
carry out common resolutions". (NE 1167a22-28)
Aristotle stresses that concord in a city, if achieved, does not in any case 
deprive the citizen body of its separateness and individuality, or its ability to 
deliberate on political decisions:
In the case of a city, concord exists when all the citizens think that 
public offices ought to be elective, or that they ought to make an 
alliance w ith Sparta, or that Pittacus ought to govern, w hen he 
himself is willing. But w hen each person, like those in The 
Phoenissae, wants the same thing all for himself, then there is civil 
strife. For being in concord does not consist merely in each person's 
having the same thing in m ind for the same person. (NE 1167a28- 
1167b2)
304Stalley (1991), ibid. 
3®5 Stalley (1991), ibid.
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It should be, nevertheless, pointed out that the relation between justice 
and friendship does not make friendship a necessary condition for justice. 
Justice can exist, in Aristotle's account, even if we had no political friendship 
in the city. The state might not have concord, but then again one would not 
expect all constitutions to have that; if they did, they would be no imperfect 
ones. Concord seems to be political friendship, since it is concerned with what 
benefits people and w hat affects their lives. This kind of concord is found 
among good people, since they are in concord with themselves and w ith each 
other, being as it were of the same mind wishing for and aiming in common at 
what is just and beneficial. As he points out,
Bad people cannot be in concord, except to a small extent; for they 
try to get more than their share of advantages, while falling short 
in difficult jobs and public services. And since each wishes this for 
himself, he keeps a sharp eye on his neighbour and holds him 
back, because if people do not look out for the common interest, it 
is destroyed. So w hat happens is that they are in civil strife, 
pressing one another to do w hat is just while not wishing to do it 
themselves. (NE 1167b9-16)
So, in conclusion—from what we have seen in the previous sections—for 
Aristotle it is impossible to have m any character and parental friendships. 
Although it is possible to have many friendships of varying intensities, very 
few of those will be intimate in the way that character and parental friendships 
are. According to Plato though, the citizens are supposed to feel close familial 
affection for one another similar to that experienced in the character and 
parental friendships that Aristotle describes in the Nicomachean  and the 
Eudemian Ethics. But, we have previously seen why Aristotle thinks that to 
feel close familial affection for one another in the city would be impossible.
The political friendship that Aristotle advocates in both the Politics and 
the Ethics could not of course be any sort of prim ary friendship, since this 
w ould mean that Aristotle w ould have m ade the same mistake he accused
202
Plato of; by attem pting to make political friendship as close as character or 
familial friendship, the citizens would have to feel close personal friendship 
for one another as if the whole city was a close family. But, as Aristotle points 
out, such a thing could not be feasible since it is not possible to be friends with 
so many people. So, at the end, Plato's solution will result in leaving affection 
out of the ideal city. Aristotelian political friendship does not require from us 
to feel the same strong feelings of affection and liking that prim ary friendship 
does. Aristotelian political friendship does, nevertheless, require us to have 
concern for our fellow citizens; 'concern for others' as opposed to 'respect for 
others' that liberalism advocates. Therefore, political friendship for Aristotle is 
a m uch w eaker version of prim ary friendship. Political friendship will, 
nevertheless, for Aristotle contribute to the unity of the state by creating 
agreem ent or concord (ojuovoia). But the unity of the state advocated by 
Aristotle is one where citizens agree on what the proper conception of justice 
would be, enabling them thus to make arrangem ents concerning the rulers 
and the ruled, the election of offices etc. As we have seen in chapter two, the 
unity of the city depends on the parts of the city being held together by a certain 
type of constitution.
6. 7 Political friendship and altruism
The above discussion brings us to another aspect of Aristotelian friendship 
bearing on the political and the moral that I w ould like to discuss in this 
section. Stern-Gillet argues that "Aristotelian fully-fledged friendship effects a 
harm onisation  betw een the self-centred notion of eudaim onia  and the 
altruism that m any a later philosopher claims to be central to the moral life. 
M otivating hum ans to feel for others, as well as to act in their interest, 
com plete friendsh ip  also uniquely  contributes to the cognitive self-
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actualisation of virtuous persons".306 Aristotle accepts the common belief that 
friendship involves altruism, and active goodwill, which requires—in the case 
of primary friendship at least—concern for the friend for the friend's own sake 
(NE,  1155b31-4). But, as we have previously seen, A ristotle's account of 
friendship is not limited to the ideal or prim ary one, and this also has bearing 
to the notion of political friendship.
This aspect of friendship is very important, especially since it can help 
us make sense of the role that friendship occupies in A ristotle 's moral 
philosophy in general and its connection w ith the notion of eudaimonia in 
particular. As Ross points out, Aristotle's discussion of friendship is a valuable 
corrective to an impression that the rest of Aristotle's ethical work tends to 
make:
For the most part Aristotle's moral system is decidedly self-centred.
It is at his own euSaijuovia, we are told, that man aims and should 
aim. In the account of justice there is an implicit recognition of the 
rights of others, but in the whole of the Ethics outside the books on 
friendship very little is said to suggest that men can and should 
take a warm  personal interest in other people; altruism  is almost 
completely absent. Traces of an egoistic view are present even in 
the account of friendship, as they should be, for friendship is not 
mere benevolence but demands a return. But justice is done to the 
altruistic element; loving is said to be more essential to friendship 
than being loved; a m an wishes well to his friend for his friend 
sake, not as means to his own happiness. The various forms of 
friendship m entioned by Aristotle are all illustrations of the 
essentially social nature of man. On the lowest plane he needs 
'friendships of utility ', since he is not economically self-sufficing.
On the higher plane, he forms 'friendships of pleasure'; he takes a 
natural delight in the society of his fellows. On a higher still, he 
forms 'friendships of goodness' in which friend helps friend to live 
the best life.307
306 Stem-Gillet (1995), p. 4.
307 Ross (1995), pp. 235-236.
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It is true that both friendship and justice help us view Aristotle's moral 
theory in particular, and Greek moral theory in general, as being much less 
egoistic than they usually seem. Since the m ain preoccupation of ancient 
moral thought has been an assessment of one's own life and the reordering of 
one's life in a reflective way, it is obvious why such an activity would seem 
essentially individualist and egoistic. Indeed, some claim that Aristotle's 
account of friendsh ip  is the only th ing  tha t rescues his otherw ise 
individualistic account of morality. It is because of the notion of friendship, 
that three possibilities are open for a moral agent: 'his own good life', 'the good 
life' and 'to share a conception of the good life with another'. It is because of 
the possibility of friendship that the moral agent is in a position to 'open ' 
himself to the existence of another and to pursue the good life w ith this other 
person.
It is also true of course that Aristotle does not think that we could have 
feelings of friendship for people who are remote from us or for people we 
know nothing about. As Annas correctly points out, for Aristotle "the pursuit 
of our final end does not directly im ply any concern for the 'fu rthest 
M ysian ',308 someone living in far-off foreign country, w ith whom we have no 
personal ties at all".309 Annas uses this example of 'the furthest M ysian'— 
finding it a suitable example to make the point about im partiality in moral 
theory—since the Anonymous Com mentator on the Theaetetus, in his note on 
Theaetetus 143d, introduces the furthest Mysian in the moral context of the 
requirem ent of justice, according to the Stoics, that one be im partial to 
everyone, even if you have no personal ties w ith them.310
308 piat0/ Theaetetus 209b; "the remotest peasant in Asia", according to M cDowell's translation 
of Plato's Theaetetus  (Oxford 1973). At Theaetetus  209b Socrates complains that the conditions 
introduced so far for distinguishing something in one's thought w ill not in fact distinguish  
Socrates' thought of Theaetetus or of 'the furthest Mysian'. This phrase is used to suggest 
proverbial remoteness, together with a certain contempt.
309 Annas (1993), pp. 250-251.
310 Annas (1993), pp. 250-251, n.7.
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Aristotle does not seem to discuss, under the heading of ethically 
required other concern, concern for the interests of others however close or 
d istant one's com m itm ent to them. His atten tion  is focused rather on 
friendship as other-concern restricted to those people to whom  one has a 
certain kind of commitment which can be deep, as w ith friendship based on 
excellence, or shallow, as in utility friendships. In all cases though, friendship 
involves some personal commitment, and thus cannot be dem onstrated to 'all 
hum anity' in the sense of caring for people about whom  we know nothing or 
to whom we have no special kind of personal commitment.311 For people we 
know nothing about, we could of course have 'goodwill', bu t goodwill alone— 
as we have seen—is not a sufficient condition for friendship.
Nevertheless, Aristotle does seem to think that the scope of justice, at 
least, is not strictly confined to members of one's own political community, as 
Fred Miller points out.312 Aristotle, in Politics 1324a 35-38, criticises those who 
"argue that the despotic and tyrannical form of constitution is the only one 
which gives happiness; and indeed there are cities w here the exercise of 
despotic authority over neighbouring cities is made the standard to which both 
constitution and laws m ust conform". Aristotle also points out at 1324a 35-38 
that cities like Sparta and Crete frame their education and the majority of their 
laws with a view to war. This view is criticised by Aristotle at 1324b 22-28 and 
1324b 32-36 where he claims that it is strange for the citizens of cities like Sparta 
and Crete to expect to be treated justly themselves while they are ready to act 
unjustly towards their neighbours against whom they make war. According to 
Miller, Aristotle, at least in these passages, is in a way anticipating the more 
explicit efforts of later moral theorists such as the Stoics to develop a moral 
point of view which includes all of hum anity in its scope.313
311 Annas (1993), p. 250.
312 Miller (1995), pp. 84- 86.
313 Miller (1995), p. 86.
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The above point about the 'furthest Mysian' is interesting if we consider 
recent discussions regarding the dem ands of m orality and the so-called 
problem of 'm oral saints', as put forward by Susan Wolf.314 It also points once 
more to the egoistic aspect of Greek moral theory. Moral saints, according to 
Wolf, would be unattractive, bland people; a society in which everyone was 
bent on acting for the common good w ould  be undesirable. For us 
individually, living a saintly life would mean giving up things that we value 
other than the moral good. But those other things, for example artistic or 
sporting activities, are part of a healthy good life, and at the end of the day it is 
also because we value these goods that we think that we live a good life. Our 
good life is constituted by these goods.
Finally, there is, also, a different kind of reference to friendship that 
Aristotle m akes w hen he refers to the virtues of social intercourse in 
Nicomachean Ethics IV, 1126bll-1127al2 that m ight help us acquire more 
insight into the way that some notion of friendship could be very im portant 
for social and political life. As he says, referring to the virtues of social 
intercourse, in the gatherings of people, in social life and the interchange of 
words and deeds, some people are thought to be obsequious ( a p e a K O i ) ,  viz. 
those who to give pleasure praise everything and never oppose, but think it 
their duty 'to give no pain to the people they meet'; while those who, on the 
contrary, oppose everything and care not a whit about giving pain are called 
churlish and contentious ( S u q k o X o i  K a i  5uaepi5ec). The above states are 
obviously culpable and it is obvious that it is the middle state of these two that 
is laudable which is the state in virtue of which a m an will pu t up with, and 
will resent, the right things and in the right way. But Aristotle points out that 
no nam e315 has been assigned to the above state, although it most resembles 
friendship:
314 Wolf (1997), pp. 79-98.
313 In this context, w e could, I suppose, in m odem  English use the word 'friendliness' today .
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For the person who corresponds to this middle state is very much 
what, w ith affection added, we call a good friend ( r o v  67neiKfj 
(JnXov, t o v  a r e p y e i v  7 r p o a X a |3 d v T a ) .  But the state in question 
differs from friendship in that it implies no passion or affection for 
one's associates; since it is not by reason of loving or hating that 
such a man takes everything in the right way, but by being a man 
of certain kind. For he will behave so alike tow ards those he 
knows and those he does not know, towards intim ates and those 
who are not so, except that in each case of these cases he will 
behave as is befitting; for it is not proper to have the same care for 
intimates and for strangers, nor again is it the same conditions that 
make it right to give pain to them. (NE,  IV, 1126b20-30)
This person, who resembles our dearest friend who acts with equity and
love, will associate with people in the right way and aim at not giving pain or
at contributing love by reference to what is honourable and expedient. "For",
Aristotle says, "he is concerned with the pleasures and pains of social life, and
wherever it is not honourable, or is harm ful, for him to contribute pleasure,
he will refuse, and will choose rather to give pain; also if his acquiescence in
another's action would bring disgrace, and that in a high degree, or injury, on
that other, while his opposition brings little pain, he will not acquiesce but will
decline". Also, "he will associate differently w ith people in high station and
with ordinary people, w ith closer and more distant acquaintances, and so too
with regard to all other differences, rendering to each class w hat is befitting,
and while for its own sake he chooses to contribute pleasure, and avoids the
giving of pain, he will be guided by the consequences, if these are greater, i.e.
honour and expediency. For the sake of a great future pleasure, too, he will
inflict small pains" (1126b31-1127a5). This is the person who, according to
Aristotle, attains the mean, but has no name, and resembles a friend. In other
words, to sum up, friendliness involves behaving as a friend would, but does
not include affection. The above account dem onstra tes tha t A ristotle
understood that drawing parallels between friendship and other virtues could
be useful in helping us realise how it is best to live our social life, and that he
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thought that the example of friendship could enhance the development of our 
social life.
In conclusion, one should point out that, in general, an Aristotelian 
account of friendship need not include an overmoralised view of friendship- 
seeing the concern for the friend's good as the central element in friendship— 
and neglecting thus the liking of the friend, the desire to be w ith him, the 
enjoyment of shared activities etc. So we could agree w ith Blum who points 
out, "one does not need to regard someone as a virtuous person in order to 
care for him as a friend; nor, in caring for him for his own sake need one focus 
primarily on whatever morally virtuous qualities he has".316 It is im portant to 
point out the altruistic aspect of friendship, in particular, and of the emotions 
in general, stressing at the same time that the Kantian view according to which 
the impartial perspective is required of us in all our actions can be refuted. As 
Blum suggests, "friendship is a relationship in which sym pathy and concern 
flourish, and an argum ent that beneficence prom pted by friendship is morally 
good is an argum ent tha t beneficence prom pted by altruistic em otion is 
morally good".317
6.8 Political friendship in the liberal-communitarian debate
In this section, I w ould like to explore the communitarian notion of friendship 
and to examine whether this agrees with the Aristotelian one offered above. It 
should be pointed out that, although communitarians do discuss friendship in 
various places of their work, their discussions, nevertheless, do not focus on 
the norm ative notion of friendship as such, but, instead, m erely mention its 
importance in relation to the community and the family. Also, it should be 
noted that no full discussion of the comm unitarian notion of friendship has
316 Blum (1993), p. 208.
317 Blum (1993), p. 209.
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so far been produced. As I w ill try  to dem onstra te  in this section, 
communitarian accounts of friendship seem to fall victim of the Aristotelian 
criticisms of Plato's Republic on the unity of state, as discussed in section six of 
this chapter.
First, I w ill briefly present M acIntyre's account being the m ost 
characteristic and the most Aristotelian. MacIntyre sustains w hat he claims to 
be an Aristotelian conception of friendship. Friendship is for him a network of 
relationships that unifies a political com m unity in v irtue  of a "shared 
conception of the good" and a "common project of creating and sustaining the 
life of the polis". MacIntyre's contrast is betw een a m odern and an ancient 
conception of friendship; he decries the weakness that he attributes to what he 
calls "m odern" friendship derived from its consignment to "private life", in 
contrast to the "social and political" friendship of the ancients. He also maligns 
the basis of m odern friendship in emotion and affection and regards it as, at 
best, " tha t inferior form of friendship  w hich is founded  on m utual 
advan tage".318 According to MacIntyre, it is only via the virtues of the right 
sort of friendship that we will be able to cement the political bonds of the 
com m unity.
Indeed, MacIntyre's reading of Aristotle's notion of friendship seems to 
be very controversial and quite different from the account of Aristotelian 
friendship offered above, or from any standard  treatm ent of Aristotelian 
friendship for that matter. MacIntyre is right to acknowledge that a community 
whose shared aim is the realisation of the hum an good presupposes a wide 
range of agreem ent in that com m unity on goods and virtues; it is this 
agreem ent that makes possible the kind of bond betw een citizens which 
constitutes a polis. That bond is the bond of friendship, as MacIntyre says, and 
"the type of friendship which Aristotle has in m ind is that which embodies a 
shared recognition of and pursuit of a good"; "it is this sharing which is
318 MacIntyre (1985), pp. 146-147.
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essential and prim ary to the constitution of any form of community, whether 
that of a household or that of a city".319
But M acIntyre seems to think that in order to reconcile Aristotle's 
notion of political friendship (taking into account the size of the population of 
a polis) w ith Aristotle's assertion that one cannot have many friends one must 
say that "we are to think of friendship as being the sharing of all in the 
common project of creating and sustaining the life of the city, a sharing 
incorporated in the immediacy of an individual's particular friendships".320 
Friendship is a bond between the citizens by being composed of a network of 
small groups of friends.
This notion of the political community as a common project is alien, 
according to MacIntyre, to the m odern liberal individualist world which has 
relegated friendship to private life. Despite the fact that MacIntyre recognises 
that for Aristotle friendship requires affection, nevertheless he thinks that 
affection is secondary, since it arises within a relationship defined in terms of a 
common allegiance to and a common pursu it of goods. But, a reading of 
Aristotelian friendship that excludes affection in that way seems indeed to be a 
very peculiar one. M acIntyre seems to think that liberal individualism  has 
given too much importance to affection and has abandoned the 'm oral unity 
of Aristotelianism ':
In a m odern perspective affection is often the central issue; our 
friends are said to be those whom we like, perhaps whom  we like 
very much. 'Friendship' has become for the most part the name of 
a type of emotional state rather than of a type of social and political 
relationship. E.M. Forster once remarked that if it came to a choice 
between betraying his country and betraying his friend, he hoped 
that he w ould have the courage to betray his country. In an 
Aristotelian perspective anyone who can formulate such a contrast
319 MacIntyre (1985), p. 155.
320 MacIntyre (1985), p. 156.
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has no country, has no polis; he is a citizen of nowhere, an internal 
exile wherever he lives.321
But—as we have seen in the previous sections of this chapter—this is not 
the kind of political friendship that Aristotle advocates. Aristotelian political 
friendship is a kind of m utual advantage friendship and quite distinct from 
the kind of the "social and political" friendship of the ancients that MacIntyre 
himself advocates. In addition, it should be pointed out that Aristotle does not 
denounce personal friendship or affection; on the contrary he considers it to be 
essential to the development of our private lives. It was at this point, as we 
have seen before, that Aristotle's disagreement with Plato was based. Plato paid 
little attention to the fact that, since friendship is essentially a relationship 
between individuals, the num ber of one's friends is necessarily limited. It is 
only in a secondary sense that we can enjoy friendship with a large number of 
people. MacIntyre in this case makes the same mistake as Plato. He advocates a 
kind of political unity which is one of the whole in such a way as to leave no 
room for political or any other kind of friendship at all.322
321 MacIntyre (1985), p. 156. MacIntyre (1999, pp. 147-154) puts forward a similar account of 
friendship (although more Thomist than Aristotelian).
322 Friedman (1993). In general, recently there has been an increasing feminist concern for civic 
friendship from similar neo Aristotelian standpoints. Another criticism of the communitarian 
notion of friendship has recently emerged from the feminist camp. Feminists have stressed the 
exclusiveness and divisiveness of friendship against the communitarian conception of the self 
which is too narrow. According to the feminist argument, it is urban communities and personal 
friendships, chosen on the basis of shared values, which provide social support to those who 
suffer intolerance from family or neighbourhood for their unconventional values or life-styles. In 
addition, personal friendships play an important psychological, moral and political role in the 
development of our personal and social lives in society. The communitarian vision of a society is, 
nevertheless, one whose citizens feel little or no friendship or sense of community with those 
outside of their chosen groups. The feminists argue, in a way similar to Aristotle's, that a good  
society is one united not only by commercial and contractual relations between different groups or 
individuals but also by civic friendship. This notion of friendship, if developed further, maybe 
could help us reconcile Aristotle's notion of friendship w ith  liberal theory. See, also, 
Schwarzenbach (1996), pp. 97-128. Schwarzenbach argues that a powerful resource for a renewed 
conception of civic friendship is the traditional activity of wom en (what she calls 'reproductive 
activity'). According to her argument, the traditional, reproductive activity of wom en not only 
consciously aims at philia, but has contributed much to binding even the modern state together. 
The implications of such reproductive activity, as w ell as philia, should be acknowledged for 
political life. Nevertheless, from what w e have previously seen, I think that it is obvious that 
such fem inist approaches to philia  does not do justice to the wider notion of Aristotelian  
friendship.
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MacIntyre's notion of friendship is quite similar to Sandel's (as we have 
seen in the introduction of this chapter), although Sandel does not claim his 
account of friendship to be an A ristotelian one. N evertheless, Sandel's 
acco u n t-b e in g  very sim ilar to M acIntyre 's—also underm ines personal 
friendship and renders it into a 'w atery' one. Walzer also discusses the sort of 
intimate relationships that could fall under the description of friendship when 
stressing the relativity of social meanings.323
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that I do not w ish to advocate 
here a notion of Aristotelian friendship that w ould be compatible with the 
impartial perspective required by liberal individualism.324 Liberals put forward 
the notion of 'm utual respect' that should exist among the citizens which is 
opposed to the notion of 'm utual concern' that the Aristotelian notion of 
political friendship advocates.325 On the contrary, my aim was to stress the 
peculiarity of Aristotle's notion of friendship, either personal or political, to try 
to explain it as clearly as possible, and to show its relevance to contemporary 
discussions.
6.9 Conclusion
In conclusion, one could argue that Aristotle's notion of political friendship as 
a form of advantage friendship poses no moral danger and does not relate to 
Cicero's concerns about the relation of personal friendship and the state. 
Aristotle, though, does not adopt Cicero's point as far as personal friendships 
are concerned. As Aristotle points out, there are indeed cases in which one has
323 Walzer (1983), pp. 227-248.
324 Although, as it has been argued by Blum (1990, pp. 173-197), the liberal-communitarian 
debate could be brought into closer relationship with moral theory by arguing that the 
'personal-impersonal' framework that forms the context of the debate about the legitimate scope 
of the personal domain presents a substantial obstacle to developing the kind of moral 
psychology capable of illuminating the liberalism-communitarianism controversy.
325 Yack (1993), Kalimtzis (2000) and Swanson (1992) have indeed tried to put forward a model 
of Aristotelian political friendship that w ould be compatible with the modern liberal state.
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to choose between his friends and his country where it is obvious that he has 
to choose the first. Nevertheless, although Aristotelian personal friendship 
could indeed pose a threat to morality (partiality), the Aristotelian normative 
notion of political friendship presupposes impartiality and the rule of law.
A risto tle 's  no tion  of frien d sh ip  develops beyond  the 'H elp  
F riends/H arm  Enem ies' conception, although it does not denounce this 
conception. It is true  of course that the 'H elp F rien d s/H arm  Enemies' 
conception of philia is very close—if not identical—to our contemporary notion 
of friendship and could indeed pose a moral danger for the moral agent, since 
it may clash w ith other moral norm s.326 But one should bear in m ind that 
Aristotelian friendship—either personal or political—will always retain the 
’Help Friends/H arm  Enemies' conception, since we could never feel affection 
for people we know nothing about. Aristotle does not of course go as far as 
E.M. Forster to suggest that "...if I had to choose between betraying my country 
and betraying my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my country". 
As Aristotle points out, it is not always clear how to act in circumstances where 
one wonders w hether he should help a friend rather than a good person or 
show gratitude to a benefactor rather than offer a service to a companion, if he 
cannot do both (NE,  1164b 22-25). One should take into consideration different 
factors when deciding w hat to do, since "discussions of actions and feelings are 
as precise as their subject-matter" (NE, 1165a 12-14); ethics is not a precise 
subject-matter.
Finally, it should be stressed once more that A ristotle's notion of 
political friendship is not the same as the Greek popular notion of 'helping 
friends and harm ing enem ies' that Polemarchus presented in the Republic. 
Also, as we have previously seen, Aristotelian political friendship does not 
aim to originate the kind of political unity that Plato envisages for his ideal
326 See Blundell (1989, pp. 50-59) for examples from Greek antiquity on what to do when a friend 
committed a murder or other injustice.
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state. The common mistake made by communitarians w hen appropriating the 
A ristotelian notion  of political friendship  is to equate it w ith  Plato 's 
conception of the unity of the state which allows no room for individuality (or 
personal friendship), and to relate it, thus, to the problems that the Platonic 
vision of the city as a whole is associated with.
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7. FREEDOM
F r e e d o m , th a t  f e e l in g  o f  m a n 's  d ig n ity . ..  
d is a p p e a r e d  f r o m  t h e  w o r l d  w i t h  t h e  G reeK S.
Karl Marx
7.1 Introduction
My aim in this chapter is to examine the key concept of liberty and to explore 
both ancient and contemporary political conceptions of it within the context of 
the liberal-com m unitarian debate. Liberty has p layed—and still does—an 
important role in the debate and is of course a central concept in contemporary 
political philosophy in general, bu t no sufficient analysis of it w ithin the 
context of the liberal-communitarian debate has so far been produced. There 
has been m uch discussion among liberals about liberty, bu t alm ost none 
concerning the com m unitarian conception of liberty. In addition, as far as 
ancient liberty is concerned—and Aristotelian freedom  in particu lar—little 
philosophical scholarship has been produced so far, m ostly because it has 
either been thought that the ancient conception of freedom is outdated and of 
no contem porary relevance, or that Aristotle's notion of freedom  is non­
existent. Therefore, far less obvious appropriation of the Aristotelian account 
of freedom  has been m ade w ith in  the liberal-com m unitarian  debate. 
N evertheless, an exam ination of the above debate and  of A ristotle 's 
appropriation in it would be incomplete if the concept of liberty were excluded. 
In addition, Greek political thought, and Aristotelian in particular, w ould 
seem to have very little to contribute to contemporary political philosophy if it 
had nothing to say about freedom.
In the first section of this chapter I will discuss different conceptions of 
liberty shaped around Isaiah Berlin's famous distinction between negative and 
positive liberty as these stand in contemporary political discussion, and I will
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try to indicate the difficulties surrounding the conception of freedom from 
each standpoint. I will also outline the so-called contrast between the "modern7 
and the "ancient7 conception of liberty made by Berlin and derived mainly 
from  Benjam in C onstan t's  account327 which will prove useful in my 
discussion of the Aristotelian conception of liberty.
In the second section of this chapter, I will look into three different 
representative in terpretations that have been form ulated on A ristotle 's 
conception of liberty and I will try to show some of the difficulties involved in 
them. I will also examine these accounts of Aristotle on liberty in relation to 
the different conceptions of liberty as they emerge from the Constant-Berlin 
distinction, and  I w ill try  to dem onstra te  the level of A risto telian  
appropriation involved in these accounts. In addition, I will investigate which 
of these views most accurately represent Aristotle's position.
Lastly, in the third section, I will outline Aristotle's conception of liberty 
as that can be found in remarks he makes in his ethical and political works 
having a bearing on freedom in the accounts on (i) property, (ii) family, (iii) 
economics and trade, (iv) citizenship, (v) the criticism of Plato, (vi) the 
conception of the good life and its implication for the concept of liberty, (vii) 
education, (viii) the discussion on the voluntary and choice in NE  Bk. Ill, Ch.. 
1-3, and (ix) in general, in any explicit rem arks he makes about freedom 
(eX euSsp ia) and its derivatives (eXeuBspog, eXeuOepiog, eXeuOepioTTig); and I 
will pu t forw ard an alternative interpretation of Aristotle's conception of 
freedom.
7.2 Conceptions of liberty
The discussion about liberty has been central in political philosophy. As has 
been mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis, the concept of liberty is one
327 Constant (1988), pp. 309-328.
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of the main parts of the cluster of ideas that both liberals and communitarians 
hold. In a way, it is possible, according to my opinion, to outline—easily and 
briefly at least, if not accurately—the whole liberal-com m unitarian debate 
around the distinction between negative and positive liberty as made in Isaiah 
Berlin's famous Inaugural Lecture "Two Concepts of Liberty" (1958).328 At first 
sight it may seem that, following Berlin's distinction, liberals hold a negative 
conception of freedom, while communitarians hold a positive one. It is not a 
coincidence that inevitably when one is discussing Berlin's essay, questions 
about liberalism and communitarianism always arise. It is as if the debate has 
been shaped around that distinction, but also as if the debate has been hostage 
to that distinction, constantly haunted by the extreme representations of the 
two concepts of liberty.
Both these accounts commonly guiding respectively these distinctions 
are in fact, despite first appearances, caricatures of themselves, since—as Charles 
Taylor has pointed out—""it is too easy in the course of polemic to fix on the 
extreme, almost caricatural variants of each family""329. Although it is true that 
there are times when one has to present abstract absolute accounts in order to 
be able to simplify matters and give outlines of issues, in this particular case 
one should agree with Charles Taylor that on both the positive and negative 
sides of freedom Berlin has placed, from w hat it seems, two corresponding 
caricatural versions of positive and negative freedom.
As Charles Taylor points out, positive freedom from that perspective is 
usually represented by ""some Left totalitarian theory in m ind, according to 
which freedom resides exclusively in exercising collective control over one's 
destiny in a classless society, the kind of theory which underlies, for instance, 
official C om m unism ".330 According to this caricatural version of positive 
freedom, "one can be forced to be free", since the freedoms guaranteed in other
328 Berlin (1969), pp. 118-172.
329 Taylor (1991), p.141.
330 Taylor (1991), ibid.
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societies are not recognised as genuine and coercion can be justified in the 
name of freedom if it is needed to bring into existence the classless society in 
which alone men are properly free. But, according to Taylor, "this is an absurd 
caricature if applied to the whole family of positive conceptions", since, the 
way Berlin described it, it includes "all those views of m odern political life 
which owe something to the ancient republican tradition, according to which 
men's ruling themselves is seen as an activity valuable in itself, and not only 
for instrum ental reasons". The conception of positive liberty as defined so 
widely by Berlin includes in its scope thinkers like Tocqueville and even J. S. 
Mill and "has no necessary connection w ith the view that freedom consists 
purely and simply in the collective control over the common life, or that there 
is no freedom  w orth  the nam e outside a context of collective control". 
Therefore, according to Taylor, it does not necessarily generate a doctrine that 
men can be forced to be free. 331
On the o ther hand  of course, in Berlin's p ictu re, there is the 
corresponding caricatural version of negative freedom  according to which 
freedom is viewed simply as the absence of external physical or legal obstacles. 
This view which goes mainly back to Hobbes—or according to Charles Taylor 
back to Bentham332 in another way—holds firmly to the view that to speak for 
instance of false consciousness or lack of awareness or repression or other 
inner factors of similar kind, is to abuse words. On the contrary, according to 
this extreme version of negative freedom, the only clear m eaning which can 
be given to freedom is that of the absence of external obstacles.333
331 Taylor (1991), pp. 141-142.
332 This is a point that Taylor (1991) makes.I suppose that the connection with Bentham could 
be explained in reference to his view  that nothing matters apart from the satisfaction of desire 
and that one desire is as good as another. Happiness, according to Bentham, is maximum  
satisfaction of desires, and, therefore, anything that inhibits the satisfaction of our desires is 
undesirable, and therefore, any restriction on liberty is also undesirable. This Benthamite view  
is about individuals w ho have desires and is in contrast w ith Aristotle w ho does not hold a 
similar conception of the good.
333 Taylor (1991).
219
What is very interesting indeed is that, as Taylor has pointed out, it 
seems that there is a strange asym metry in Berlin's view as well as in the 
views depicted in both sides of the liberal-communitarian debate. As explained 
above, these extreme caricatural views tend to come to the fore in the polemic, 
but "whereas the extreme 'forced-to-be-free' view is one which the opponents 
of positive liberty try to pin on them, as one would expect in the heat of the 
argument, the proponents of negative liberty themselves often seem anxious 
to espouse their extreme, Hobbesian view".334 Having this in mind, one can 
easily then notice that in the course the liberal-com m unitarian debate has 
taken, liberals have often been unfair to themselves, while at the same time 
being unfair to communitarians, and vice versa.
Another difficulty also lies in the fact that both these conceptions of 
liberty are not clearly defined, and few individual philosophers of either camps 
match either of these ideal types. In fact, as we shall see, it has been almost 
impossible for any individual philosopher to develop an account of liberty 
without drawing from more than one at the time different traditions of liberty. 
It is not of course always the case of mere inconsistency in someone's views. 
Often, and this is quite important, philosophers draw  on different approaches 
in formulating their views, keeping their affiliations w ith all different 'camps'. 
So, in that sense, it would be unfair to associate someone with one camp only, 
as it is clearly the case with J. S. Mill or T. H. Green for example.335
7. 2.1 The Constant-Berlin distinction
As well as the distinction between negative and positive liberty, a distinction is 
sometimes draw n between ancient and m odern liberty. So it may seem that 
there are four kinds of liberty to consider.
334 Taylor (1991), pp. 143.
335 gee Taylor (1991) and D. Miller (1991), pp. 1-20.
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I would like here to illustrate this further distinction, that of Constant's 
between the liberty of the ancients and that of the moderns, which will prove 
useful to our discussion of Aristotle's conception of freedom  later in this 
chapter. In this section I will merely raise the question w hether Aristotle 
would endorse Constant's account of liberty. But I shall try to answer it later.
The understanding of Constant's distinction between the liberty of the 
ancients and tha t of the m oderns will also prove im portan t for the 
comprehension of Berlin's distinction, since Berlin has based his distinction 
on the Constant one. But it is also necessary for the additional reason that 
Constant's distinction has shaped m odern and contem porary conceptions 
about ancient liberty  by challenging the sanity  of the appeal of his 
contemporaries to antiquity.336
It is clear that Berlin historically derives his distinction between positive 
and negative liberty from Benjamin Constant's distinction between the liberty 
of the ancients versus that of the moderns. Berlin in his 'Two Concepts of 
Liberty' names Constant together w ith J. S. Mill as the fathers of liberalism. 
Constant, "the m ost eloquent of all defenders of freedom and privacy",337 
stands in the same tradition of those liberal thinkers who believed that "there 
ought to exist a certain minimum area of personal freedom which must on no 
account be violated; for if it is overstepped, the individual will find himself in 
an area too narrow  for even that m inim um  developm ent of his natural 
faculties which alone makes it possible to pursue, and even to conceive, the 
various ends which men hold good or right or sacred".338 As he says, every 
in terpretation  of the w ord liberty, how ever unusual, m ust include a 
m inim um  of w hat he has called 'negative ' liberty, "but the fathers of 
liberalism—Mill and Constant—w ant more than this minimum: they demand a 
m axim um  degree of non-interference com patible w ith  the m inim um
336 Holmes (1984), p. 1.
337 Berlin (1969), p. 126.
338 Berlin (1969), p. 124.
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demands of social life".339 In fact, Berlin characterised Constant's approach as 
the model for a "negative theory of liberty, liberty being simply in this context 
the protection of individual experience and choices from external interferences 
and constrain ts".340 In this way, it can be argued that the negative-positive 
distinction has sustained  a h istorical narra tive  to go along w ith  the 
philosophical dichotomy of private and populist liberty.
But, first of all, let's tu rn  to Constant, to see how this distinction 
o rig in a te d .341 C onstant form ulated the distinction betw een ancient and 
m odern liberty in his famous 1819 lecture delivered to the Athenee Royal in 
Paris entitled 'The Liberty of the Ancients com pared w ith  that of the 
M oderns'.342 According to Constant, there is a distinction to be made between 
two kinds of liberty: "The first is the liberty the exercise of which was so dear to 
the ancient peoples; the second the one the enjoyment of which is especially 
precious to the m odern nations".343 Ancient liberty was active and continuous 
participation in the exercise of collective power, while m odern liberty consists 
of peaceful enjoym ent and p rivate  independence.344 "The aim of the 
ancients", according to Constant, "was the sharing of social power among the 
citizens of the same fatherland: this is what they called liberty". On the other 
hand, "the aim of the m oderns is the enjoym ent of security in private 
pleasures; and they call liberty the guarantees accorded by institutions to these 
pleasures".345
339 Berlin (1969), p. 161.
340 Berlin (1969), p. 163ff.
341 Holmes (1984) has challenged Constant's interpretation as an antidemocratic liberal thinker 
and has argued that Constant has been misinterpreted. Holmes argues that Constant does make 
allowances for the 'liberty of the ancients' contrary to what has usually being thought. By 
introducing this new  interpretation of Constant's liberalism, Holmes tries to defend a democratic 
version of liberalism. This is an very interesting interpretation indeed, since it tries to redefine 
liberalism and render it more attractive to supporters of ancient liberty, but I w ill not deal with  
this view  here, since m y aim is to examine the way that Constant's view  has traditionally 
influenced political theory.
342 Constant (1988), pp. 309-328.
343 Constant (1988), p. 309.
344 Constant (1988), p. 316.
345 Constant (1988), p. 317.
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Constant was critical of ancient liberty because it no longer seemed to be 
able to satisfy the needs of the m odern people. Constant sustains his view 
historically by dem onstrating it to us w ith examples in support of it from 
various historical Greek and Roman city-states, A thens and Rome in 
particular. In C onstant's w ords, the liberty of the ancients consisted in 
"exercising collectively, but directly several parts of the complete sovereignty; 
in deliberating in the public square, over war and peace; in forming alliances 
with foreign governm ents; in voting laws, in pronouncing judgem ents; in 
examining the accounts, the acts, the stewardship of the magistrates; in calling 
them to appear in front of the assembled people, in accusing, condemning or 
absolving them ".346 Ancient collective freedom  was compatible w ith the 
complete subjection of the individual to the authority of the community. All 
private actions were submitted to severe surveillance and no importance was 
given to individual independence, to opinions, to labour or to religion. The 
right to choose one's own religious affiliation w ould have seemed to the 
ancients a crime and sacrilege. The ancients had no notion of individual 
rights.347 The laws were sovereign and regulated all affairs. Also, because of 
the constant strife in the cities, commerce could not flourish. Thus, according 
to Constant, "among the ancients the individual, almost always sovereign in 
public affairs, was a slave in all his private relations; the individual was in 
some way lost in the nation, the citizen in the city".348
M odern liberty, on the other hand, consists of peaceful enjoyment and 
private independence. Liberty for a m odern Frenchman, Englishm an and a 
citizen of the United States of America is "the right to be subjected only to the 
laws, and to be neither arrested, detained, pu t to death or m altreated in any 
way by the arbitrary will of one or more individuals. It is the right of everyone 
to express their opinion, choose a profession and practise it, to dispose of
346 Constant (1988), p. 311.
347 Constant (1988), p. 312. Constant attributes this to Condorcet.
348 Constant (1988), p. 311-2.
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property, and even to abuse it; to come and go w ithout perm ission, and 
without having to account for their motives or undertakings. It is everyone's 
right to associate with other individuals, either to discuss their interests, or to 
profess the religion which they and their associates prefer, or even simply to 
occupy their days or hours in a way which is m ost compatible w ith their 
inclinations or whims. Finally, it is everyone's right to exercise some influence 
on the adm inistration of the government, either by electing all or particular 
officials, or th rough  representations, petitions, dem ands to w hich the 
authorities are more or less compelled to pay heed".349
Constant, thus, declares the death of ancient liberty. The individual, 
according to his verdict, can no longer "enjoy the liberty of the ancients", since 
"the share which in antiquity everyone held in national sovereignty was by no 
means an abstract presum ption as it is in our day". On the contrary, the will of 
each individual had real influence and the exercise of this will was a vivid and 
repeated pleasure. The ancient individual was compensated for losing out on 
individual freedom by being aware of his personal importance.350
But this compensation no longer exists for the m odern individual who 
is lost in the m ultitude, his will not im pressing itself upon the whole. As 
Constant points out351
The exercise of political rights, therefore, offers us but a part of the 
pleasures that the ancients found in it, while at the same time the 
progress of civilisation, the commercial tendency of the age, the 
communication amongst peoples, have infinitely m ultiplied and 
varied the means of personal happiness. It follows that we m ust be 
far m ore a ttached  th an  the ancien ts to ou r in d iv id u a l 
independence. For the ancients w hen they  sacrificed that 
independence to their political rights, sacrificed less to obtain more; 
while in making the same sacrifice, we would give more to obtain 
less. The aim of the ancients was the sharing of social power
349 Constant (1988), p. 310-1
350 Constant (1988), p. 316.
351 Constant (1988), p. 316-7.
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among the citizens of the same fatherland: this is what they called 
liberty. The aim of the moderns is the enjoyment of security in 
private pleasures; and they call liberty the guarantees accorded by 
institutions to these pleasures 352
The above distinction made by Constant is quite an im portant one in 
the sense that it m arks a turning point for the perception of the concept of 
liberty thereafter. As Pettit points out, "when Constant delivered his lecture, 
he saw only the alternatives of positive liberty, in particular the liberty of 
democratic participation, and negative liberty: liberty as non-interference", 
while "when Berlin came to present his own retrospective m usings on these 
matters, he could only suggest that those not attracted to positive liberty allied 
themselves invariably with the Hobbesian tradition".353
This of course was not a completely alien distinction at the time of 
Constant. Many people—like M ontesquieu, Hume, and Voltaire before him — 
had criticised the ancient polis 354 but Constant was the first to make the 
distinction in such a way. What Constant achieved was to make freedom break 
free from its ancient conception; for better or for worse, it remains to be seen.
7. 2 . 2  A trichotomy. Three families of traditions of freedom
In the light of the above, it is possible to argue that there are three kinds of 
classifications that one can make as far as different conceptions of liberty are 
concerned: negative liberty is freedom as non-interference; positive liberty is 
freedom  as self-m astery; ancient liberty is freedom  as dem ocratic self- 
governm ent.355
352 The emphasis is mine.
353 Pettit (1997), p. 50.
354 Voltaire (1961), pp. 731-38; Hume (1963), pp. 381-451. As Voltaire points out, "nous respectons 
Ciceron et tous les anciens qui nous ont appris a penser" (1961, p. 738)
355 Ancient liberty is usually defined as self-mastery, but I think self-government is a more 
accurate term including that of self-mastery, and it describes more precisely the nature of liberty 
f o r  the ancients in the 'rule and being ruled' elem ents (a p x e iv  k c u  apxeciOai). Plato’s
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It should be noted that these three kinds of liberty correspond in fact to 
three different families of traditions. Here, I will go along with David Miller's 
classification of these three main traditions, or 'families of ideas' of liberty, as 
he calls them. I will hold on to this distinction for the time being, for I find it 
to be an easy way to illustrate the different traditions of liberty involved in 
shaping the conception of liberty.
The three traditions in question are the republican356, the liberal and the 
idealist ones. David Miller calls them families of ideas, because they do not 
amount to three cut and dried conceptions of freedom, but are rather clusters 
of ideas held together by a family resemblance among their members. Also, as 
Miller illustrates, there can be fruitful interm arriages w here an idea of 
freedom combines elements from two or even perhaps all three of these 
lineages.357
According to this classification, M iller nam es the first trad ition  
'republican'. Both the conceptions of positive and ancient liberty correspond to 
this family. It would be true to say that the republican tradition corresponds 
closely to the ancient one and that Berlin fails to distinguish it from the 
idealist tradition. The republican family holds the m ost directly political 
conception of freedom, since it defines freedom by reference to a certain set of 
political arrangements. This is the tradition of freedom that originated with 
the Greek political philosophers. To be a free person is to be a citizen of a free 
political community which is self-governing. To be self-governing means that 
the political com m unity should not be ruled by foreigners, and that the 
citizens play an active role in government, in such a way as the laws that are
conception of freedom is more close to something like self-mastery, self-mastery though being 
again related to the notion of self-government.
356 I here use 'republican' in a broad sense to cover what Constant called 'ancient liberty'. For the 
purposes of this thesis I shall ignore the conception of 'republican' freedom, described for 
example by Skinner (1998) w ho draws heavily on Roman m odels. I shall also ignore the 
modernised version of this conception (freedom as non-domination) recently introduced by Pettit 
(1997).
357 D. Miller (1991), p. 2.
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enacted reflect in some sense the wishes of the people. In this tradition, 
despotism is the opposite of freedom; it is defined as the arbitrary rule of a 
tyrant who disposes of his subjects lives and possessions by means that they are 
powerless to resist.358
The TiberaT family or tradition  holds a view  on liberty in which 
"freedom is a property of individuals and consists in the absence of constraint 
or interference by others". Both the conceptions of negative and m odern 
liberty correspond to this family. A person is free to the extent that he is able to 
do things if he wishes—speak, worship, travel, m arry—w ithout these actions 
being blocked or hindered by the activities of other people. As far as politics is 
concerned, in the liberal view "governm ent secures freedom  by protecting 
each person from the indifference of others, bu t it also threatens freedom by 
itself imposing laws and directives backed up by the threat of force", while in 
the republican view freedom is seen "as being realised through a certain kind 
of politics". The liberal on the other hand "tends to see freedom as beginning 
where politics ends, especially in various forms of private life".359
Finally, in the 'idea list' family, the focus "shifts from the social 
arrangem ents w ithin which a person lives to the in ternal forces which 
determine how he shall act; the struggle for freedom is no longer directly with 
the external environm ent, b u t w ith elements w ithin the person him self 
which thw art his desire to realise his own true nature".360 A person is free 
when he is autonomous, meaning that he is able to follow his own authentic 
desires, or his rational beliefs about how he should live. This view is 
connected with politics since certain political conditions are identified as being 
necessary in order to be able to acquire such a freedom. Plato's conception of 
freedom is for example certainly idealist.
358 D. Miller (1991), pp. 2-3.
359 D. Miller (1991), p. 3.
360 D. Miller (1991), p. 4.
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I will elaborate on the three above clusters of views of liberty while 
discussing the liberal and communitarian conceptions. But, for the time being, 
having roughly outlined these three families, the question here is, as I 
mentioned above, to w hat extent there are intermarriages between the above 
families. In order for the above labels to reveal their corresponding cluster of 
ideas and in order to be able to make sense of what exactly each side advocates 
one has to look carefully into the distinctions made and to try to understand 
the multiple claims that each side makes.
7. 2. 3 Berlin’s dichotomy
The above distinction made by David Miller can be proven to be useful for an 
additional reason: it can make us view Berlin's dichotomy from a quite new 
perspective. Also, under the light of the Constant's account presented above, it 
should be pointed out that, although Berlin seems to think he is making the 
same point as Constant, their distinctions are different.
David Miller himself acknowledges this when he traces notions of his 
trichotom y in Berlin's dichotomy. Berlin's negative conception of liberty 
clearly corresponds to the liberal view of freedom; but his positive sense of 
freedom is far less clearly specified:
When he (Berlin) first introduces it, he identifies it as self-mastery: 
a person is free when he controls his own life, rather than being an 
instrum ent of someone else's will. As the concept is developed, 
how ever, it comes to em brace a num ber of quite different 
doctrines, of which three in particular may usefully be isolated: 1) 
Freedom as the pow er or capacity to act in certain ways, as 
contrasted w ith the mere absence of interference. 2) Freedom as 
rational self-direction, the condition in which a person's life is 
governed by rational desires as opposed to the desires that he just 
as a m atter of fact has. 3) Freedom as collective self-determination,
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the condition where each person plays his part in controlling his 
social environm ent through democratic institutions.361
As Miller points out, it should be apparent that the second positive view
corresponds to idealist freedom, while the third to republican freedom.
But, there is also a sense in which Berlin's negative conception of 
freedom is far less clearly specified: it is not clear to w hat extent the negative 
conception is related, if not identical, to the conception of m odern liberty 
described by Constant as "the guarantees accorded by institutions to the 
enjoyment of security in private pleasures".362 This is im portant if we take 
into account the fact that Constant's account of m odem  liberty is void of any 
echoes of democracy in the way of 'participating in governm ent', of having a 
'say' in the political decisions. Modern liberty presented in the Constant way is 
not necessarily attractive: one is free to look after one’s private affairs and to 
freely exercise commerce etc., to do whatever one likes in the privacy of his 
own home, but one has lost the political freedom to actively decide in the 
public sphere. W hat 'ancient' liberty meant (to take part in the public life of the 
state by means of institutionalised proceedings that secured your right to be 
heard and to participate in government by ruling and being ruled in turn) has 
been replaced by the conception of m odern liberty which is only concerned 
with the enjoyment of security in private pleasures. If this connection between 
negative and m odern liberty was explicitly m ade apparent from the very 
beginning in Berlin's essay, it is not certain that negative liberty would have 
appeared as attractive as it originally did.
In addition, as we can infer from the above Miller account, Berlin has 
included in the definition of positive liberty both the accounts of ancient and 
idealist liberty. He has thus succeeded in this way in attributing characteristics 
of idealist liberty to the conception of ancient liberty and vice versa. Berlin,
361 D. Miller (1991), p. 10.
362 Constant (1988), p. 317.
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when referring to positive liberty, in fact refers to two different conceptions of 
freedom: ancient and idealist. He contrasts negative to positive liberty, but 
when referring to positive he only criticises ancient freedom w ithout referring 
to its idealist part.363
But, let's turn  to Berlin's distinction to see how it has been formulated 
and which are the characteristics of the two accounts of negative and positive 
liberty. Berlin discusses the two concepts of liberty which, according to him, 
stand out as centrally important, positive and negative liberty. According to 
Berlin negative liberty is involved in answ ering the question of the area 
within which persons or group of persons should be left to do what they want 
w ithout interference by others. Positive freedom , on the other hand, is 
involved in answering the question what, or who, is or should be the source of 
control or interference that can determ ine someone to do or be one thing 
rather than another. Negative freedom in this sense is freedom from, whereas 
positive freedom is freedom to. Taking of course the definition of freedom as 
being "freedom from some possible restraint and freedom to do what you want 
or choose to do", it is difficult to say at first glance whether these two notions 
of freedom are one or two different concepts.
To be negatively free essentially means not to be interfered w ith in the 
pursuit of one's desires. As Berlin says, "I am norm ally said to be free to the 
degree to which no m an or body of men interferes w ith my activity. Political 
liberty in this sense is sim ply the area w ith in  w hich a m an can act 
unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from doing w hat I could 
otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by other 
men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it may 
be, enslaved".364 Liberty is in this way conceived as the absence of coercion or 
enslavement which are contained in the m eaning of unfreedom . Coercion
363 Berlin (1969), p. 166.
364 Berlin (1969), p. 122.
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though does not cover all sorts of inability since it implies the deliberate 
interference of other hum an beings within the area of action of the other 
human beings. Therefore, mere incapacity to attain a desired goal—when one is 
physically handicapped for example—is not lack of political freedom. According 
to Berlin, inability to do something could be a form of coercion, but only if it is 
due to poverty or weakness. Inability in that sense is used in the context of a 
particular social and economic theory about incapacities. As Berlin says.
The criterion of oppression is the part that I believe to be played by 
other hum an beings, directly or indirectly, w ith  or w ithout the 
intention of doing so, in frustrating my wishes. By being free in 
this sense I mean not being interfered w ith by others. The wider 
the area of non-interference the wider my freedom.365
Having illustrated negative freedom in this way, one can unders tand , 
according to Berlin, that complete social freedom contradicts itself unless 
people have nothing to do w ith each other. Liberty m ust obviously  be 
restricted if it is to be effective. The problem for political theory is how far the 
restriction should go. According to Berlin, since the area of man's free action 
must be limited by law, it is equally assumed that there ought to exist a certain 
m inimum area of personal freedom which m ust on no account be violated. 
Therefore, a frontier must be draw n between the area of private life and that of 
public authority.366
One could argue against this assum ption that there ought to exist a 
certain m inim um  area of personal freedom which m ust on no account be 
violated by saying that it is not clear that in order for someone to be 
autonomous, he would need a 'private ' area to exercise his autonomy. Why 
could not one be autonomous in the public sphere? One could say of course 
that, if one values autonomy, then it is obvious that one w ants an area to 
practice autonomy in. But why should a private sphere should be created in
365 Berlin (1969), p. 123.
366 Berlin (1969), p. 124.
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order for one to be able to practice autonomy in? Surely, if one is autonomous, 
then he would be so in both private and public spheres. So why can't we just 
have only one sphere? It is not clear whether this area of personal freedom, as 
Berlin describes it, can be draw n from the above reasoning, since it is not 
obvious that it is necessary for an area of personal freedom to exist merely 
because the area of man's free action m ust be limited by law. One might, for 
example, be free from outside constraint in m any of one's actions but be non- 
autonomous nevertheless (a slave to one's desires).
Berlin also distinguishes betw een the concept of liberty and the 
interference of the state in private life and questions such as (i) the belief that 
the freedom that m en seek differs according to their social or economic 
conditions and (ii) equality of liberty. According to him, these concepts should 
not be confused with one another: "everything is as it is: liberty is liberty, not 
equality or fairness or justice or culture, or hum an happiness or a quiet 
conscience".367 Since the freedom of some m ust at times be curtailed to secure 
the freedom of others, the real question that m ust be posed is upon w hat 
principle this should be done. From the feedback we can see that views on this 
matter diverge. Locke, Smith and Mill, for example, who shared an optimistic 
view on hum an nature and a belief in the possibility of harm onising hum an 
interests, believed that social harm ony and progress are com patible w ith 
reserving a large area for private life over which neither the state nor any 
other authority m ust be allowed to trespass; while Hobbes and others on the 
other hand  believed in increasing the area of centralised control and
decreasing that of the individual.
Berlin focuses on presenting Mill’s conception of liberty and by doing so
he, first, places Mill among the exponents of the concept of negative liberty 
and, second, he succeeds in showing the connection that he thinks exists 
betw een negative and positive freedom. Mill believed that the protection of
367 Berlin (1969), p. 125.
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individual liberty is very important, since he felt that unless m en are left to 
live as they wish in the path which merely concerns themselves, civilisation 
cannot advance; the tru th  will not, for lack of free m arket in ideas, come to 
light; there will be no scope for spontaneity, originality, genius, for mental 
energy, for moral courage. Society will be crushed by the weight of "collective 
mediocrity".
Against the above Millian pronouncem ent one could argue, first, that, 
although this is supposed to show a connection between negative and positive 
freedom, it seems to claim a connection betw een negative liberty and other 
virtues. Second, so far as positive freedom and its relation to autonom y are 
concerned, the obvious thought is that you can 't control your desires unless 
you practice making decisions. So far as positive freedom and republic freedom 
are concerned, there need not be any connection.
Berlin conceives Mill's notion of liberty as not being incompatible with 
some kinds of autocracy, or at any rate with the absence of self-government. As 
he says, "liberty in this sense is principally concerned w ith the area of control, 
not with its source". It is not, at any rate logically, connected with democracy or 
self-governm ent. Self-governm ent m ay, on the w hole, provide a better 
guarantee of the preservation of civil liberties than other regimes, and has 
been defended as such by libertarians. But there is no necessary connection 
between individual liberty and democratic rule. The answer to the question 
"Who governs me?" is, according to Berlin, logically distinct from the question 
"How far does government interfere with me?'. It is in this difference that the 
great contrast between the two concepts of negative and positive liberty, in the 
end, consists. For the positive sense of liberty comes to light if we try to answer 
the question, not "What am I free to do or be?', but "By whom am I ruled?" or 
"Who is to say what I am, and what I am not, to be or do?".368
368 Berlin (1969), pp. 128-129.
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This is the concept of positive freedom  according to Berlin: "not 
freedom from, but freedom to—lead one prescribed form of life—which the 
adherents of the negative notion represent as being, at times, no better than a 
specious disguise for brutal tyranny". Freedom in this sense consists essentially 
of rational self-determination or self-mastery. It derives from man's desire to 
be in control of his own destiny. A proponent of positive liberty wants his life 
and decisions to depend on himself, not on external forces. He wants to be an 
instrum ent of his own, not of another's acts of will; to be a subject, not an 
object; to be moved by purposes which originate w ith him, not w ith someone 
else.369
According to Berlin, the concept of liberty as self-mastery seems at first 
glance quite straight forward and understandable; but in fact the concept does 
naturally suggest and m any philosophers have in terpreted  it to imply a 
peculiar dualistic theory of the person according to w hich each of us is 
composed, on the one hand, of a real self, the transcendent, dom inant 
controller, and on the other of a bundle of feelings and passions to be 
disciplined and brought to heel. This "real" self is usually identified by this 
"idealist" concept of liberty with reason, w ith m an's higher or autonom ous 
nature and contrasted w ith his "lower" anim al nature w hich is m ade up 
entirely of irrational im pulses and uncontrollable desires. Rational self- 
mastery constitutes the only genuine purpose of man and therefore should be 
pursued at the expense of other goals which he m ight mistakenly think are 
equally important. Therefore, according to this notion of freedom, m an can 
and should be forced to be free in this positive sense, however violently his 
poor, unreflecting, desire-ridden self may cry out against this process.
But one could argue against the above description of positive freedom 
that Berlin describes that it is surely quite difficult on the first place to force 
someone to make autonom ous decisions. How can one force somebody to
369 Berlin (1969), pp. 130-131.
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show self-mastery? It seems quite impossible to force someone into that; one 
could encourage someone to be autonomous but never force him. And, even 
if one could do that, why should you force them to be free?
Berlin poses, therefore, two objections to this positive concept of 
freedom. First, rational self-mastery is not the sole nor even necessarily the 
most important goal in life; it is just only one among several possible goals not 
all of which are commensurable. Second, the contention that force utilised to 
achieve rational self-mastery can be justified, that anyone who does not realise 
what is truly good for him should be made to realise it, is morally bankrupt. To 
oppress, torture, or coerce men in the name of their freedom betrays the most 
dangerous kind of moral despotism. Power, for Berlin, can never be exercised 
rightfully over any mentally sane adult except to prevent him from harm ing 
others.
There are several issues emerging from Berlin's criticism of positive 
liberty. What is most interesting from the above criticism of positive liberty is 
Berlin's failure to distinguish betw een the different families of liberty, the 
republican and the idealist—that I have presented previously—which are 
clearly present in his account.
Therefore, from w hat we have seen above, it is clear that Berlin includes 
in the definition of positive liberty two different accounts of liberty: the 
'ancient' and the 'idealist' and conflates them into one. This integration would 
have been acceptable, if Berlin clearly distinguished betw een the two and 
discussed their differences. But he does not; instead, throughout his paper he 
refers to ancient liberty as if it were idealist liberty, and vice versa. But, by 
doing that, he also criticises ancient liberty on the grounds against idealist 
liberty; he provides, that is, argum ents against the conception of ancient 
liberty, while in fact these arguments are against the idealist conception. So, in 
the end, he presents an image of ancient liberty which in fact belongs to the
235
idealist account of liberty. By failing to distinguish ancient liberty from the 
idealist, Berlin commits a fallacy of equivocation.
7. 2. 4 Liberal and communitarian conceptions of liberty
Liberalism is all about liberty, some people say at least. Indeed, if there is one 
fundamental principle that every liberal--no m atter of w hat sort he might be— 
is deeply committed to, this is liberty. Even though the tradition of liberalism 
includes a spectrum  of m odern liberals ranging from welfare liberals to 
libertarians, one could nevertheless roughly say that they all in general agree 
with this "negative7 definition of liberty, following Locke's theory that the state 
should interfere as little as possible. Presumably the interference of the state 
has to be qualified in some way, and this depends on w hat kind of liberal one 
is. So, for example, some liberals would object to a state policy of "practising 
happiness at 3 am". They oppose the comm unitarian principle of community 
on the grounds that the state would violate the rights of individuals if it forced 
them to conform to popular morality, in the sense that the nature and the 
limits of the pow er which can be legitimately exercised by society over the 
individual should be clearly set in such a way as not to underm ine or threaten 
individuality and personal freedom. Indeed, it is interesting that most debates 
among liberals-like the one between Rawls and Nozick for example—have not 
focused on questions about liberty but equality.
A liberal w ould also endorse Mill's harm  principle; it should be noted 
though that negative liberty as such does not generate the harm  principle. 
According to the harm  principle, state interference should not be left to 
arbitrary custom and popular morality (Mill's greatest enemy), but limitation 
of a person's freedom of action is justifiable by the state only if it threatens 
harm  to another person: ""The only purpose for which power can be rightfully
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exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm  to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a 
sufficient w arrant".370
Related to the "harm princip le ' is the liberal conception of self- 
determination. Liberals believe that we prom ote people's interests by letting 
them choose for themselves w hat sort of life they w ant to lead, and that to 
deny people this self-determination is to fail to treat them as equals. Although 
liberals leave some space for acts of paternalism (in our relations with children 
for example), they insist however that every competent adult be provided with 
a sphere of self-determ ination which m ust be respected by others. The 
argum ent for self-determ ination, in its extreme form ulation could also be 
expressed as follows: ""For one thing, no one may be in a better position than I 
am to know my own good. Even if I am not always right, I may be more likely 
to be right than anyone else".371 It should be noted though that this is only one 
conception of self determination, since theorists of positive freedom would, of 
course, adjust it to mean "being determined by one's (true) self". Indeed, a point 
that can be made against this liberal notion of self-determination is that self- 
determination is essentially a positive libertarian's term.
The liberal notion of liberty has recently been associated with the view 
that the state should be neutral between competing conceptions of the good. 
According to this view, the state m ust exhibit a kind of impartiality to different 
conceptions of the good which is captured by an anti-perfectionist ideal of 
liberal neutrality . This is a Rawlsian argum ent according to which self- 
determination should lead us to endorse a "neutral state", i.e. a state which does 
not justify its actions on the basis of the intrinsic superiority or inferiority of 
conceptions of the good life, and which does not deliberately attem pt to 
influence people's judgements of the value of these different conceptions.372
370 Mill (1989), p. 135.
371 Kymlicka (1990), p. 203.
372 Kymlicka (1990), p. 205.
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Indeed, Rawlsian liberals in general hold that the state should respect 
and protect the rights of individuals by achieving some kind of neutrality 
between the different conceptions of the good. But this is not true for all 
liberals of course; not all liberals would hold Rawls's notion of neutrality. T. H. 
Green for example claims contrary to Rawls that "the better organisation of the 
state means freer scope to the individual (not necessarily to do as he likes, e.g. 
in the buying and selling of alcohol, but in such development of activity as is 
good on the w hole)".373 Mill likewise insists on the freedom  of self­
development—which seems to be distinct from Rawlsian neutrality.
So, in general one could roughly distinguish four sources of liberalism 
as far as liberty is concerned: (i) The Lockean m inimal state, (ii) The harm  
principle, (iii) The autonom ous indiv idual, and (iv) The neu tra l state. 
According to (i), the state exists to protect the basic rights of life, liberty and 
property, and transgresses its rightful authority if it seeks to do more than this. 
Checks and balances are needed to restrain state activity and protect individual 
rights. Of course, it should be noted that a rights-based theory which started 
from a more extensive list of natural rights might lead to a very different view. 
One might also get a different view if one saw the protection of rights as only 
one among a num ber of basic tasks of the state. The harm  principle (ii) implies 
that there is a private area of life w ith which the state and other agencies 
should not interfere. According to (iii), the good life is one of autonom y so 
society should be structured so as to promote autonomy. Finally, according to 
(iv) the state should be neutral between different conceptions of the good. In 
conclusion, as we have seen, m odern liberals may draw  on a num ber of these 
ideas. Aristotle seems to have no interest in (ii) or (iv). On some readings he 
may give some value to (iii). On Fred M iller's view he recognises some 
elements of (i). But even if he does see the state as protecting rights it is 
unlikely that he would interpret this in a way that leads to the liberal state.
373 Green (1997), p. 234.
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It is generally assumed that a communitarian account of liberty would 
follow Berlin's conception of positive liberty. It is true that neo-M arxist 
theorists put forward an account of positive liberty, but neo-Marxism is a quite 
distinct critique of liberalism from the communitarian one. One cannot really 
claim that there is a communitarian conception of liberty as such, since no 
communitarian philosopher has put forward a coherent and full account of 
freedom. One could guess w hat a communitarian account of freedom would 
be like if he looks into the communitarian responses to liberal accounts of 
liberty.
Indeed, most of the comm unitarian attention has been draw n to the 
liberal conceptions of liberty, and it is this part of liberal thought that they are 
more keen on criticising. Whereas liberals usually disagree among each other 
about equality, the d istribu tion  of w ealth and the w elfare state, the 
communitarian critique on the other hand has concerned itself rather with the 
freedom -related aspects of liberalism  than w ith  its equality-related or 
distributive aspects.374 As Mulhall and Swift argue,
In terms of substantive political issues, w hat this means is that 
where the debate between redistributive liberals and libertarians 
centres on the justifiability of the welfare state and the taxation 
requ ired  to pay for it, that betw een the liberal and  the 
comm unitarian concerns itself rather w ith the im portance of the 
individual's right to choose her own way of life and to express 
herself freely, even w here this conflicts w ith  the values and 
comm itm ents of the com m unity or society of w hich she is a 
m em ber.375
Com m unitarians complain that political life in a liberal state often 
resembles something like a Hobbesian account of the state of nature. But 
liberals have pointed out, that, although Hobbes's state of nature provides us 
with a very extreme and clear-cut account of liberty, it is not clear that liberal
374 Mullhal and Swift (1996), p. xvii.
375 Mulhall and Swift (1996), ibid.
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theories always have in m ind negative liberty in the strict Hobbesian sense. 
Rather they m ight seek to combine the accounts of positive and negative 
liberty. In fact, it is not clear that a liberal should accept the Hobbesian view at 
all. In the Hobbesian state of nature, although free from state control, people in 
a state of nature may be subject to many other forms of coercion. Liberals, on 
the other hand, accept that law is needed in order to preserve freedom. 
Hobbes's account of liberty is a useful device w hen trying to explain and to 
understand liberty in its extreme form, but it does not represent an accurate 
account of what actually liberals mean by liberty. It should also be noted that 
Hobbes, although being the father of social contract theory, is nevertheless no 
liberal thinker. It is not quite clear, for example, w hether m odern political life 
actually is really like a Hobbesian state of nature, as described by the 
communitarians, or rather that it is only presented as such by communitarian 
political thinkers. That is, is the problem that the m odern state resembles the 
Hobbesian state of nature, or is it we who assum e an Hobbesian view of 
man376 embedded in our everyday political and social practices?
The communitarian conception of liberty rests on its assum ption on the 
notion of the self. It rests on a particular metaphysical view about the self. 
"True freedom m ust be situated", as Charles Taylor says. Com munitarians 
criticise the individualist conception of the self which they take to underline 
liberalism. They oppose to it the view that the self is, at least in part, a social 
creation. According to Taylor, the desire to subject all aspects of our social 
situation to our rational self-determination is empty, because the demand to be 
self-determining is indeterminate: "it cannot specify any content to our action 
outside of a situation which sets goals for us, which thus im parts a shape to 
rationality and provides an inspiration for creativity".377 C om m unitarians
37  ^Hobbes's view of man puts forward a capitalist conception of human nature; see MacPherson 
(1962).
377 Taylor (1979), p. 157.
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cannot see liberty as an absolute value; rather the value of particular kinds of 
freedom rests, for them, on the values shared by society.
In conclusion, w hat w ould  a com m unitarian  view  of freedom  
presuppose? We could say that comm unitarians in general pu t forward the 
following views: (i) Liberty is not possible as an isolated individual good, (ii) 
Freedom presupposes some kinds of values (Taylor), and, (iii) The self is, at 
least in part, a social creation (Taylor, Walzer, MacIntyre). One should point 
out, nevertheless, tha t it could be argued  tha t the conflict betw een 
communitarians and liberals concerning liberty seems not to be on whether 
there are no really autonomous actions because we are at least partly socially 
created (a negative libertarian, as opposed to an idealist libertarian, w ould not 
be worried about that), but on the fact that 'doing your own thing' is less highly 
rated as an absolute value by the communitarian. But communitarians cannot 
see liberty as an absolute value; it is rather that the value of particular kinds of 
freedom rests on the values shared by society.
7.3 Aristotelian accounts of freedom
7. 3 .1  Three interpretations of Aristotelian freedom
Having the previously discussed distinctions in m ind, it w ould be u se fu l- 
before exploring more into the w ritings of Aristotle having a bearing on 
freedom —to investigate into some different in terpretations of A ristotle's 
conception of freedom (what I call here 'Aristotelian accounts of freedom').
Roughly, one can distinguish three m ain positions according to which, 
first, Aristotle had a 'socially dependent' conception of liberty tied to the 
specific social circumstances of the Greek polis (the 'Bradley-M ill' view), 
second, Aristotle did not really have a conception of liberty in the m odern 
sense (the 'Barnes' view), and, third, that Aristotle had a 'm oderate socially
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dependent' conception of liberty (the 'Fred M iller' view). These views have 
been respectively represented in the literature among others by Bradley and 
Mill, Barnes, and Miller.
These three interpretations of A ristotle 's conception of liberty are 
im portant because they indicate the different levels of appropria tion  of 
Aristotle's view according to the theory of liberty that is adopted. These 
accounts are relevant in the sense that their view s im ply criticisms of 
MacIntyre and in the case of most of them  Aristotle influences their own 
views of liberty. The Aristotelian text, in all these four cases, is analysed each 
time—and has being appropriated in the end—according to a specific conception 
of liberty that the 'appropria tor' has in mind. Each of these appropriators 
adopts a different conception of liberty when he refers to the text in examining 
Aristotle's view on liberty. These accounts of Aristotelian liberty spring from 
one or another conception of liberty that I have outlined previously. Indeed, it 
is interesting to see how the different distinctions of liberty shape these three 
interpretations of Aristotelian freedom.
7. 3. 2 The Bradley-Mill view
Both Bradley and Mill share a view of the ancient polis as an integrated 
community and w ould probably accept the idea that Aristotle is the main 
exponent of this idea of the polis.
W hen Mill in On Liberty placed liberty as the central principle of 
political philosophy, he did not think that this w ould be such an easy task, 
since—as he said—despite the "air of truism " that his position might seem to 
have, "there is no doctrine which stands more directly opposed to the general 
tendency of existing opinion and practice" and "society has expended fully as 
m uch effort in the attem pt (according to its lights) to compel people to
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conform to its notions of personal, as of social excellence".378 Mill in this 
passage draws attention to the difference between the ancient commonwealths 
and the m odern world and points out that in the ancient commonwealths the 
state had a deep interest in the whole bodily and mental disciple of every one 
of its citizens, while "in the m odern w orld the greater size of political 
communities, and above all, the separation betw een spiritual and temporal 
authority (which placed the direction of men's consciences in other hands 
than those which controlled their worldly affairs), prevented  so great an 
interference by law in the details of private life".379 As Mill says concerning the 
ancient commonwealths,
The ancient com m onw ealths thought them selves entitled  to 
p ractise, and the ancient ph ilosophers coun tenanced , the 
regulation of every part of private conduct by public authority, on 
the ground that the State had a deep interest in the whole bodily 
and m ental discipline of every one of its citizens; a m ode of 
thinking which may have been admissible in small republics 
surrounded by pow erful enemies, in constant peril of being 
subverted by foreign attack or internal commotion, and to which 
even a short interval of relaxed energy and self-command might so 
easily be fatal, that they could not afford to wait for the salutary 
perm anent effects of freedom.380
As we can see, Mill's view here is quite similar to that of Constant's 
about the 'liberty of the ancients'; since the Greek city-state was surrounded by 
powerful enemies, it had to rely on public authority  in order to survive, 
something which is no longer necessary in the m odern States. But, there is 
nothing more to this view of Mill's, in the sense that Mill does not w ant to 
make any particular claim about Aristotle's theory nor does he claim to have 
any special insight of Aristotle's account of liberty.
378 Mill (1989), p. 16.
379 Mill (1989), ibid.
380 Mill (1989), ibid.
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According to Bradley the specific character of the polis was such as to
allow:
an am ount of governm ental inspection and control of private 
affairs which, even if suited m odern ideas, w ould be scarcely 
possible in a nation. Such "interference with liberty" was not felt to 
be an interference. In the best days of Greece, to participate in this 
rapid and ennobling public life was enough for the Greek citizen. If 
his country was independent and himself an active m ember of it, 
this community satisfied him too completely for him to think of 
"using his private house as a state" (III. 9. 128026) or a castle. "To 
live as one likes"—this is the idea of liberty w hich Aristotle 
connects first w ith the most primitive barbarism (EN X.9.1180a24- 
9), and then with that degraded ochlocracy which marked the decay 
of the free governments of Greece (V. 9. 131a32-4, VI.2.1317bll-12, 
4.1319b30).381
Therefore, according to the Bradley-Mill account, Aristotle did not really 
have at all a modern conception of liberty but his concept of liberty was tied to 
the world of the Greek polis. This view is influenced by Hegel's distinction 
betw een Sittlichkeit  and M oralita t,  the form er encom passing the ethical 
principles that are specific to a certain community and the latter referring to 
the abstract or universal rules of morality. As we have seen in chapter two, 
according to Hegel, Sittlichkeit is a higher level of m orality since it represents 
the only way that genuine moral autonom y and freedom  can be achieved. 
Moralitat, on the other hand, is a higher level of morality according to liberal 
thought only, since it is tied to the notion of the abstract and universal 
individual who stands as an entity unto himself, the free and rational person, 
and to the priority of the right over the good. Hegel bases ethics on the 
morality of the society. The essential character of morality is to be found on the 
objective forms of family, society and the state which is the realisation of the 
ethical spirit and of the moral idea.382
381 Bradley (1880), p. 19.
382 Hegel (1991).
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As far as Aristotle is concerned, Hegel thinks therefore that Aristotelian 
ethics were prim arily a social m orality subjected to the particular special 
circum stances of the Greek polis  and tha t his political w orks w ere 
subordinated to his ethical thought. Aristotle's ethics is characterised by Hegel 
as belonging to the objective social m orality (Sittlichkeit)  and not to the 
subjective morality of the free and reflective personality (Moralitat). According 
to Hegel's interpretation of Aristotle, virtues and values express the shared 
understandings of Greek society about family, society and state, and are 
respected by all citizens.
In conclusion, it seems that Bradley and Mill assume that Aristotelian 
liberty would require an identification of the individual with the state. But, in 
fact, there is evidence against this view as we have previously seen in chapter 
two and four; in (a) Aristotle's account of koinonia (Politics I. I), in (b) Aristotle 
criticises Plato for treating the state as too m uch of a unity (Politics II), in (c) 
virtue is defined with respect to the individual (Politics VII. 1-3 + Ethics 10.9), 
and, in (d) Politics III. 4 where Aristotle distinguishes between good citizen and 
good man. A ristotle em phasises participation rather than  identification. 
Overemphasis on identification would be incompatible w ith Aristotle's view 
that the good life consists in rationally chosen activity.
7. 3. 3 The Barnes view
Jonathan Barnes has argued that there exists no conception of political 
freedom  in A ristotle 's w ork.383 Barnes has pu t forw ard the view that (a) 
Aristotle did not hold a conception of liberty and (b) that by thinking of people 
as parts of states Aristotle's theory is reduced to totalitarianism  which "rests 
ultim ately on a questionable inference from a m etaphysical untruism ".384 I
383 Bames (1990a), pp. 249-263 and Barnes (1990b), pp. 1-23.
384 Bames (1990a), p. 263.
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will present here his view, which is according to my opinion an extreme one 
and a quite unfair to Aristotle, but I will not discuss in detail all the points he 
is making, since m ost will be discussed later w hen Aristotle's account of 
freedom will be presented.
(i) Barnes's two red herrings: voluntary action and the critique of Plato.
Barnes starts his exam ination of Aristotelian freedom by spotting two red 
herrings, as he says.385 The first is Aristotle's account of voluntary action in 
the Nicomachean Ethics, and the second Aristotle's criticism of Plato in the 
Politics.
A fam iliar them e from the Nicomachean Ethics, often used in 
argum ents in favour of the view that Aristotle was sym pathetic w ith a 
libertarian or at least a liberal position, is the one associated with Aristotle's 
account of voluntary and involuntary action and rational choice in NE  Book 
III. According to this view, eudaimonia is achieved only if we act virtuously; 
we act virtuously only if we act Kara 7rpooupeaiv; we act Kara 7rpoaipeaiv 
only if we act exovTeg; we act exovTsg  only if we act freely. Eudaimonia, 
therefore, has freedom as a precondition.
According to Barnes, Aristotle's argum ent depends on a "childish 
confusion" because the freedom  that eudaimonia  requires is not political 
liberty. First, it should be pointed out that Barnes seems to distinguish between 
the general concept of freedom and the concept of political liberty.386 Second, it 
should be noted that Barnes stipulates the following:
(1) issues of a kind K are political questions just in case the State is 
entitled to intervene, directly and restrictively, in any question of 
the form "Shall x <f> ?" which falls within K.
385 Bames(1990a), pp. 251-2.
^86 Bames (1990a), pp. 249, 253.
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(2) x enjoys political liberty with regard to issues of kind K just in 
case the State does not intervene, directly and restrictively, in any 
question of the form "Shall x 0  ?"
Thus the main m atter is this: On w hat conditions and in w hat 
circum stances is a State en titled  to in tervene directly  and 
restrictively in questions of the form "Shall x 0  ?".387
As Barnes says, "x can 0 K a r a  7rpoaipsaiv even if the question 'Shall x
0 ?' is political". Evidently, for Barnes, this m ust be so; "for otherwise law-
abiding actions could never be virtuous—and that is absurd". Barnes also
argues that we cannot pretend that Aristotle mistakenly supposed 'free action'
to demand political liberty. On the contrary, according to Barnes, in the Ethics
and the Politics Aristotle regards it as one of the functions of the legislator to
outlaw wickedness and enjoin virtue. And for Barnes, "w hatever may be
thought of this view, it is not evidently self-contradictory".388
The second red herring is, according to Barnes, Aristotle's attack on
communism (as he calls it), that is Aristotle's critique of Plato in Politics Book
II. Barnes's thesis is quite peculiar here; he dismisses Aristotle's account with
an easiness unbecoming to an Aristotelian scholar, or any scholar for that
matter. He says that "Aristotle argues against Plato that women and children
should not be 'common', and he argues further that property should not be
held in common". Barnes seems to think that, looking into Aristotle's text,
one could infer that "he is against State intervention in certain areas of life".
But, to say that is of no importance to liberty for Barnes, since according to him
"women and goods do not raise political questions".389 It is unfortunate that
Barnes discusses Aristotle's private property theory and his criticism of Plato as
if one could formulate a view about these only from reading the headings of
Book II.
38  ^Bames (1990a), p. 250.
388 Bames (1990a), p. 252.
389 Bames (1990a), p. ibid.
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As far as Aristotle's view on property is concerned, he points out that "a 
clear analysis of the concept of property is needed in m any parts of political 
theory—not least in Aristotle's own defence of slavery". He criticises it as being 
'vague' ("it is better for holdings to be private and for us to make them 
common in their use", Politics, 1293a 24) and dismisses it quickly by saying that 
it is hard to see how private ownership can consist with common use and that 
anyway it will be regulated by public law, and concludes saying that "Aristotle's 
rem arks in the Politico, are too nebulous to sustain  any serious critical 
discussion".390
(ii) An one-sided conception of liberty
Barnes's article rests on an one-sided conception of liberty, an unusually 
narrow view of liberty. Barnes identifies liberty w ith a Lockean or a minimalist 
conception of the state and, w ith this definition in m ind, starts to examine 
Aristotle's conception. This is apparent throughout his paper. As he says, 
when for example he criticises Politics Z8, 1321b 12-18, "the passage shows 
(what hardly needs showing) that he was no adherent to a Lockean or a 
minimalist conception of the State".391
Barnes commitment to this conception of liberty is obvious right from 
the beginning of his paper, and—to be fair to him —he makes it clear that this is 
how he "intends the notions".392 He is concerned, as he says, w ith the issues 
arising from the question 'W hat questions are political questions?' which is, 
according to his opinion, an aspect of the problem  of political liberty. His 
concern lies w ith direct restrictive state intervention and in w hat conditions
390 Barnes (1990a), p. ibid.
391 Bames (1990a), p. 258.
392 Bames (1990a), p. 249.
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and circumstances is a state entitled to intervene directly and restrictively in 
questions of the form "Shall x </> ?'.
According to Barnes, Aristotle "scarcely touches on the question of what 
the limits of rule should be"; instead, "he occupies himself constantly with the 
question of who should rule whom". As he says,
Num erous other issues in political theory are not raised in the 
Politica. We should not expect to find there a discussion of the 
problem s of m ultinational corporations. But liberty  is not a 
m odern problem. Questions of liberty m ust impose themselves on 
anyone who is ruled—and on every decent ruler.393
It is true that, if liberty means "liberty from state interference' then the
minimal state will provide the greatest liberty, and indeed some liberals would
hold this view. There is indeed an argum ent from liberty to the minimal state,
but it would rest on the assum ption that the overriding value is liberty from
state control. But this is not the only definition of liberty, and indeed in order
to have a conception of liberty (or some conception of liberty), one does not
have to commit oneself to a m inimalist state. The m inim alist state is not a
pre-condition of liberty. A minimalist has a specific conception of liberty, but
this conception is a very specific one to try to impose as a general definition of
liberty. One can have (an extreme) conception of negative liberty based on the
minimalist state, but, as we all know, there are different conceptions of liberty
not based on the above definition. Therefore, one cannot simply argue that
Aristotle has no conception of liberty because "he was no adherent to a
Lockean or a minimalist conception of the State".394 So, it is clear that Barnes'
minimalist view arises from a negative view of liberty.
Barnes argues that the general notion of freedom  (eXeuOepia) as it
appears in Aristotle is not the notion of political liberty: "The citizens of an
unperverted State are free men: this says nothing whatever about the extent of
393 Bames (1990a), p. 250.
394 Bames (1990a), p. 258.
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their political liberties, it does nothing to determ ine the scope of political 
questions".395 He does not think that there is anything w orth keeping from 
Aristotle's notion of freedom (eAeuOepia) as it appears throughout the Politics 
because it is associated with the notion of free m an as opposed to slave and 
with the idea that someone is free if he is able to participate in government, 
and to rule and being ruled in turn. This conception of liberty (the very same 
conception of ancient liberty as described by Constant, and later incorporated in 
the Berlin account of positive liberty) is not according to Barnes the notion of 
political liberty. He has only accepted a narrow conception of negative liberty 
and rejected positive liberty. He makes his account of political liberty true by 
definition and offers a narrower account than either Constant or Berlin.
M oreover, as we have previously seen, Barnes has distinguished 
between the general concept of freedom and the concept of political liberty.396 
But, just by distinguishing between a general concept of freedom and one of 
political liberty, Barnes is already implying that there are other conceptions of 
liberty, not just the conception of political liberty, which he recognises as the 
only true form of liberty. But, surprisingly, he only seeks to find in Aristotle a 
conception of "political liberty" as he defines it; and when he does not find one, 
he accuses Aristotle for not having a conception of liberty at all.
(iii) Criticism of the democratic definition of freedom
Barnes also criticises the democratic definition of freedom presented in the 
Politics. This is the definition of freedom according to the democrats which 
Aristotle presents and criticises in the Politics. Barnes argues that "if democrats 
espouse freedom in the sense of doing what you wish, why do they conclude 
that it is best to rule and be ruled in turn?"; "why is that a form of freedom?
395 Bames (1990a), p. 253.
396 Bames (1990a), pp. 249, 253.
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Why don't 'dem ocrats' work out a m inim alist state, w here interference is 
reduced to the m inim um ?".397 This is, according to Barnes, a significant 
omission that Aristotle does not discuss.
But I do not see why the democrats should actually support the idea of 
the minimalist state on the first place. To begin with, the democrats are not 
simply concerned w ith liberty. At the same time, the democrats could also 
argue that the minimalist state will not provide effective liberty. They are 
democrats, they believe in democracy and in the equality of the demos. They 
want the people (bfjjuog, Xecog, o'xXog) to rule, to be in power, that is, the poor. 
The democrats do not advocate the minimal state and democratic freedom is 
not one of the kind implied in the minimal state. It is true that some of the 
Greeks did envisage a minimal state (as in the case of Lycophron) but this is 
not the conception put forward by the democrats which Aristotle criticises.
Aristotle on the other hand does not in any way envisage this kind of 
freedom: he opposes ochlocracy, that's w hy he criticises the democratic 
conception of freedom as "doing what you want", but he does not reject the 
"rule and be ruled in turn" notion of liberty. Barnes wants us to think that, 
from that, it then follows that Aristotle's account of the democratic view is 
confused. But Aristotle explicitly says in Z2,1317b 2-17 that there are two marks 
of liberty (ar|jL ielov eXeuOepiag):
The argum ent is that each citizen should be in a position of 
equality; and the result which follows in democracies is that the 
poor are more sovereign than the rich, for they are in majority, 
and the will of the majority is sovereign. This is then one m ark of 
liberty, which all democrats w ould agree in m aking the defining 
feature of their sort of constitution. Another m ark is 'living as you 
like'. Such a life, they argue, is the function of the free man, just as 
the function of slaves is not to live as they like. This is the second 
feature of democracy.
397 Bames (1990a), p. 256.
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It is clear enough from the text w hat Aristotle has in m ind when he refers to 
two marks of liberty, and I do not see why Barnes takes ar)jueiov to mean "two 
sorts of freedom" and w hy he wonders whether Aristotle recognises both the 
two sorts.398 Aristotle in this passage refers to two features of democracy 
associated w ith liberty, not to two different sorts of liberty. The first is a 
defining one on which all dem ocrats w ould agree, while the second, the 
Tiving as you like7 is associated with the function of the free man as opposed to 
that of the slave in the sense that only if one is a free man, is one in a position 
to Tive as he likes7. I do not see here any connection between the democratic 
mark of liberty as 'living as you like7 and the concept of negative liberty, as 
Barnes would like us to think.
Also, one would think that it is more than apparent in the Aristotelian 
text that Aristotle is "reporting and not endorsing a dem ocratic view", 
something that Barnes seems to be in doubt about.399 Barnes's point misses 
both Aristotle's and the democrat's points, since: (a) Aristotle wants dpxod to 
be norm ative and to govern the state, (b) the democrats w ant the people to 
rule, the poor majority to be in power. The whole point of having a state 
anyway is so that people cannot merely live, but live well, that is, flourish, and 
it is this flourishing that the lawgiver m ust secure.400 A minimalist state could 
not prom ote the interests of the poor, and so it cannot not be a democratic 
ideal, despite the fact that it could still be the most free state according to 
Barnes.401
398 Bames (1990a), p. 255.
399 Bames (1990a), p. 255.
400Sorabji (1990b), p. 266
401See also Sorabji's (1990b, p. 267-273) historical explanation of w hy Aristotle did not consider 
a minimalist state.
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(iv) The Aristotelian Axiom
Another thesis related to Aristotle's notion of freedom  is p u t forward by 
Barnes in his paper "Partial W holes' (1990b) where he discusses w hat he calls 
the 'Aristotelian Axiom'. Barnes attributes to Aristotle an extreme form of 
holism similar to the one that Popper finds in Plato. This position has been 
disputed by Fred Miller.402
Barnes criticises in this paper one version of w hat he calls 'collectivist 
philosophy'. He sets out to criticise Alexander Pope's version, a version that 
has been as popular and as widely supported as any philosophy of hum an 
nature. Barnes subjects to scrunity the anthropological aspect of Pope's 
philosophy and the axiological side of the theory which is, as Barnes claims, 
Aristotelian. According to Barnes,
Individualists like to think themselves as atoms, their trajectories 
causally dependent on collisions w ith other sim ilar entities but 
their essence resolutely independent and autonom ous. They are 
whole and entire in themselves: they are not elements or adjuncts 
of some greater whole. Collectivists take an opposite view. Their 
oddities and accidents may be individual and independent, their 
movements and machinations largely self-determined, but in their 
essence they are necessarily bound to others—for all are adjuncts 
and elements of a larger whole.403
Pope's axiological thesis states, according to Bames, that the good of any 
part is determ ined by its status as part of its whole. Barnes claims that a 
particular version of this thesis is endorsed by Aristotle in Politics 1337a 27-31. 
According to Barnes, Aristotle there urges that "one should not think that 
anyone of the citizens belongs to himself but that all belong to the State. For 
each is a part of the State; and the care of each part naturally looks to the care of 
the whole".404 Also, Barnes claims that Aristotle had already stated the thesis
402 This is basically F. Miller's (1995, pp. 196-197) point.
403 Bames, (1990b), p. 1.
404 Barnes, (1990b), p. 16. The translation is Barnes's.
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in perfect generality at the end of the first Book of the Politics: "Since every 
household is a part of the State, and individuals are parts of households, and 
since the excellence of the part must look to that of the whole, it is necessary 
for one to look to the State when educating children and wom en (Politics, 
1260b 13-17)".405
Barnes argues that the idea that we all belong to the state and that the 
good of the part depends on the good of the whole is found in Plato. Barnes 
claims that Aristotle's axiom has it that individual interests are determined by 
and depend upon the interests of the whole. According to Barnes, a rough 
version of the Aristotelian axiom might run as follows:
It is in the interest of a part that it be so-and-so if and only if it is in 
the interest of the whole that the part be so-and-so.406
The axiom could be written more narrowly as follows:
(1) If x is essentially (or naturally) an integrating part of some 
systematic whole y, then it is good for x  that Px if and only if it is 
good for y that Fx.407
A more sophisticated version of the Aristotelian axiom, according to Barnes,
would be:
(1*) If x is essentially an integrating part of some systematic whole 
y, then it is good for x that Fx insofar as408 it is good for y that Fx.
(2) If x is essentially an integrating part of some systematic whole y, 
then x ought to do A if and only if it is in the best interest of y that 
x do A.
(3) If x is essentially an integrating part of a system y, then all x's  
essential properties are determined by x's membership of y.
405 Bames, (1990b), p. 17. Again the translation is Barnes's and so is the emphasis.
406 Bames, (1990b), p. 17.
407 Bames, (1990b), ibid.
408 Bames presumably here taking 'insofar as' to mean 'iff and because'.
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(4) If P is an interest-generating or a duty-generating property of x,
then P is an essential property of x.
(5) If x is essentially 0  and accidentally yr, then
(i) if it is in x's interest qua 0  that Fx and in x's interest qua ip that
Gx, then
and
(ii) if x ought to do A qua 0  and x ought to do B qua yr, then x  ought
to do A rather than B.409
Two points can be made against Barnes's "Aristotelian Axiom". First, it is 
not clear that Aristotle's quotations support Barnes's "Aristotelian Axiom" (1), 
which says that interests of parts and wholes never conflict.410 ""Look to" 
suggests a more complex relationship. Second, even if Barnes can extract his 
(1), what entitles him to extract (3)? He strengthens "if and only if" to "are 
determined by and depend upon' which seems m uch stronger than "look to". "If 
and only if" in (1) is substituted by (the logically dubious) "insofar as" in (1*), so 
that the 'are determined by and depend upon' can be expressed; "insofar as" 
meaning in this context "if and only if and because".
As far as the first point m ade above, textual evidence also suggests 
otherwise from Barnes's translation (and inevitably interpretation). Barnes, on 
the one hand, translates (p. 17): the excellence of the part must look to that of 
the whole. But, Aristotle's text (1260b 14-15) reads: rrjv 5s rov juspovg npdg 
rrjv t o v  oXov 5sl pXs7rsiv dp srr j . On the other hand, m ost of the other 
scholars translate differently; Jowett translates: the excellence of the part must 
have regard to the excellence of the whole; B ark er/S ta lley  transla te : the 
goodness of every part must be considered with reference to the goodness of 
the whole; Saunders translates:f/ze virtue of the part ought to be examined in 
relation to that of the whole.
409 Barnes, (1990b), pp. 17-21.
410 Bames, (1990b), pp. 16-20.
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7. 3. 4 The Fred Miller view
Fred Miller, in his account of Aristotelian freedom makes Locke the starting 
point of his investigation of Aristotle's conception of liberty. In this Miller 
agrees w ith Barnes. The only difference is that, unlike Barnes, Miller sees 
Aristotle as having some affinities w ith the Lockean minimalist conception of 
liberty. As Miller asserts, "Aristotle is not a totalitarian who advocates total 
governmental authority at the expense of individual liberty".411 Miller points 
out that it is true that Aristotle's sketch of the best constitution in Politics, VII- 
VIII, contains many restrictions on individual liberty (Miller actually provides 
us with a list),412 but, as he says,
Aristotle does not justify such measures on the holistic grounds 
that individual interests may be sacrificed in order to promote the 
general good. Rather, he justifies them on the ground that the aim 
of the polis is to prom ote m oral perfection in the individual 
citizens. To achieve this goal the citizens m ust perform only those 
functions which are conducive to their m utual happiness.
Miller argues that "to some extent Locke agrees w ith Aristotle that
freedom is justly subject to certain constraints".413 Locke would agree with
Aristotle to some extent, according to Miller, because Locke rejects Robert
Filmer's definition of freedom as "A Liberty for everyone to do w hat he lists,
to live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any Laws".
It is true, as we know that Locke criticises Filmer throughout the Two
Treatises; in fact, the first treatise aimed at criticising T he  False Principles and
Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer7, as its title indicates. Locke—in chapter IV, 7Of
Slavery7, in the Second Treatise—says concerning Film er's defin ition of
freedom:
411 Miller (1995), p. 248.
412 Miller (1995), p. 248-249.
413 Miller (1995), p. 250.
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Freedom then is not w hat Sir R. F. tells us, 'A Liberty for every one 
to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tyed by any 
Laws': But Freedom of Men under Government, is, to have a 
standing Rule to live by, common to every one of that Society, and 
made by the Legislative Power erected in it; A liberty to follow my 
own Will in all things, where the Rule prescribes not; and not to be 
subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknow n, Arbitrary Will of 
another Man. As Freedom of Nature  is to be under no other 
restraint but the Law of Nature.414
Also, as Laslett points out, a similar point about law and freedom also appears
in Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (IV, iii, 18) where he says
that "No governm ent allows absolute liberty".415 In relation to Aristotle, as
Laslett points out, "Locke's state of nature, w ith its imm anent sociability and
its acceptance of man's dependence on his fellows, does in a sense incorporate
the Aristotelian a ttitude".416 In that context, maybe one could argue that
Locke's view could seem close to Aristotle, and is plausible that it echoes
Plato's Laws.
Miller's view focuses mostly on Filmer's definition of freedom which 
Locke criticises. According to his view,
Locke departs from Aristotle in making freedom central to natural 
rights, when he characterises the state of nature as 'a state of perfect 
Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose their Possessions, and 
Persons as they think fit, w ithin the bonds of the Law of Nature, 
w ithout asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other 
Man'. Locke implies that freedom is a central defining condition of 
the hum an end. Thus, for Locke natural rights provide a self- 
limiting, inalienable sphere of liberty for the individual right­
holder.
M iller thinks that A ristotle had a "m oderate socially dependent" 
conception of liberty; freedom has its place in Aristotle's account, but a much
414 Locke, (1988), IV. 22.
415 Laslett (1988), p. 283n.
416 Laslett (1988), p. 100.
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more m odest one than in Locke's account who im plied that freedom is a 
central defining condition of the hum an end. According to Miller, liberty is for 
Aristotle "an external good necessary for virtuous activity but which can be 
possessed in excess".417 Miller seems to see a sim ilarity betw een Locke's 
criticism of Filmer and the democratic definition of freedom which Aristotle 
criticises. According to Miller, for Aristotle when this external good, freedom, 
is defined by the ancient democrats as "doing whatever one wishes" (Pol. V 10 
1310a31-2), then  libe rty -possessed  in excess in this w ay—becom es an 
impediment to personal moral perfection and a threat to constitutional order. 
Miller thinks that Aristotle's critique of democratic freedom is revealing and 
that w hat Aristotle says about democratic freedom in Politics V 10 1310a 32-6 
supports his view: "The result of such a view is that, in these extreme 
democracies, each individual lives as he likes—or, as Euripides says, 'For any 
end he chances to desire'. This is a mean conception [of liberty]. To live by the 
rule of the constitution ought not to be regarded as slavery, rather as salvation 
(aco rrip fav )" .418 Thus, according to Miller, for Aristotle "the aim of the 
individual should not be unlim ited liberty but m oral perfection, which is 
achieved through conformity to the constitution. Freedom is an external good 
subject to the Aristotelian m ean."419 Miller concludes by putting forward two 
claims: one about Aristotle's conception of the democratic ideal of liberty and 
another about justice and its relation to liberty:
Aristotle's repudiation of the democratic ideal of liberty (and the 
im plied rejection of the m odern  ideal of pu rely  'negative' 
freedom) is entirely consistent w ith the interpretation defended 
throughout this chapter: that justice, the political good, consists in 
the m utual advantage, i.e. the perfection of each of the citizens.
417 Miller (1995), p. 250. In support of this claim, Miller refers to Aristotle's N E  X 8 1178a28-33.
418 Miller (1995, p .150) translates the above passage slightly different: "So that in such 
democracies each person lives as he wishes and 'for what he craves', as Euripides says; but this 
is base; for [he] should not believe that living in relation to the constitution is slavery, but 
preservation".
419 Miller (1995), pp. 250-1.
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Here again, illiberal features of Aristotle's best constitution result 
from controvertible premises which are logically distinct from his 
theory of justice.420
Miller also puts forward two passages from the Politics (V 12 1316b21-27 and VI 
4 1318b38-1319al) in support of his claim that excessive liberty becomes an 
impediment to personal moral perfection and a threat to constitutional order, 
but there is little evidence that these passages that Miller has in mind point to 
the direction he wants.
The key in understanding Aristotle's conception of freedom  in this 
context lies in what Aristotle takes the democratic notion of liberty as "doing 
what one likes" ( t o  o n  a v  |3ouXr|Tai rig 7 t o i £ i v / t 6  Crjv cog PouXerou rig) 
to be. This is also important for Barnes"s account of Aristotelian freedom. The 
crucial issue concerning the notion of liberty as "doing w hat one likes" is 
whether Aristotle intended to criticise negative libertarians and w hether 
"doing what one likes" should be taken to denote a negative conception of 
liberty. I will analyse in detail the meaning of liberty as "doing what one likes' 
in the following section of this chapter w hen I will discuss Aristotle's 
conception of freedom.
Nevertheless, for the moment, it should be pointed out that there are 
two things that stand out almost straight away as unsatisfactory in Miller's 
account as presented above. First, the connection that he has tried to establish 
between Aristotle and Locke, and second, quite different from the first, his 
classification of liberty as an external good.
Miller, in my opinion, has not successfully established the connection 
between Aristotle and Locke. It is true that one could say that Miller merely 
contrasts Locke to Aristotle but obviously Miller wants to do more than that: 
he wants to show that there are some affinities between the two philosophers. 
Indeed, Miller says that Locke agrees to some extent w ith Aristotle that
420 Miller (1995), pp. 251.
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freedom is justly subject to certain constraints. But of course to say that is too 
vague: anyone—unless he were an anarchist—could have in that context 
affinities with Locke, from Plato to Hegel.
This is why Miller tries to establish that connection by drawing a parallel 
in their accounts against Filmer in the case of Locke and the ancient democrats 
in the case of Aristotle. He takes both criticisms to be against a negative 
conception of liberty, at least in the case of Aristotle as Miller clearly points out. 
But if this parallel was true, then Locke should also be rejecting the negative 
conception of liberty, if Locke were to have any affinities w ith Aristotle. But 
Locke is in fact rejecting a very peculiar notion of negative liberty pu t forward 
by Filmer which very few, if any, negative libertarians w ould endorse. 
Aristotle, on the other hand, as I will try to show in the following section, did 
not have a negative conception of liberty in m ind when he was criticising the 
ancient democrats.
Returning to the second point mentioned above, Miller's use of external 
good is quite problematic. As we have seen above, according to Miller "for 
Aristotle liberty is an external good necessary for virtuous activity but which 
can be possessed in excess (see EN  X 8 1178a 28-33)".421 R. T. Long argues that 
Miller takes 'external good' to mean in this context a good external to well 
being. As Miller says elsewhere, "Aristotle evidently relegated liberty to the 
status of a mere external good".422 It is clear though in Miller's text from the 
Nicomachean Ethics quotation that he refers to external goods as defined by 
Aristotle.
In conclusion, as far as the Miller view is concerned, one could argue 
that in Aristotle's conception of freedom Miller sees affinities w ith Locke but 
these are superficial. Locke's conception of freedom is founded on rights while 
Aristotle's is founded on the good life. For Aristotle liberty is an essential
421 Miller (1995), pp. 250.
422 Miller (1995), pp. 356.
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requirement in order to live a good life. The good life requires social activity; 
liberty that enables you to take part in the life of the polis. Man is for Aristotle 
a social animal, so the good life requires him  to participate in government. 
Therefore, Miller by eliminating Aristotle to Locke misses the crucial point 
about Aristotle.
7. 3. 5 Which view?
Both Bradley and Mill share a view of the ancient polis as an integrated 
community and would probably accept the idea that Aristotle is the main 
exponent of this idea of the polis. If they are right, then Barnes w ould be 
correct to the extent that he denies to Aristotle the "modern7 conception of 
liberty (even if this is just an account of "minimalist7 liberty), but not if he 
denies that Aristotle has any conception of liberty. Miller could also be correct 
to claim that Aristotle might have some affinities w ith Locke but he has no 
comprehensive m odern account of freedom.
But, as we have seen, Bradley and Mill assume that Aristotelian liberty 
would require identification of the individual w ith the state. But there is no 
real evidence for this. A ristotle em phasises partic ipa tion  ra ther than 
identification. Overemphasis on identification w ould be incom patible with 
Aristotle's view that the good life consists in rationally chosen activity. 
Barnes's view on the other hand assumes that the only kind of liberty is 
negative liberty. Miller sees affinities of Aristotle's conception w ith Locke, but 
these are superficial, since Locke's conception of freedom is founded on rights 
while Aristotle's is founded on the good life.
So, the question posed here is "Who is right?". Does Aristotle (a) have no 
conception of liberty as a value, (b) support the "ancient" conception, but not 
the m odern one, or, (c) provide some room for the m odern concept? Also, if
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Aristotle does provide some room for the m odern concept, the question we 
should ask here is which of the m odern concepts that I have outlined in 
section one? In addition, having in m ind Constant's account of "ancient7 
liberty, as outlined previously, we should also ask w hether Aristotle would 
endorse Constant's account of "ancient" liberty. Further to this, one should ask 
w hether C onstant's account of "ancient" liberty  is indeed  in general 
representative of accounts of freedom among the Greeks.
Therefore, it w ould be useful to investigate more thoroughly which of 
these views most accurately represent Aristotle's position. This can only be 
achieved by going back to the Aristotelian text and from there to try to 
coherently reconstruct Aristotle's account of freedom. In fact, w hat I will try to 
sustain in the following section of this chapter is that none of the above views 
accurately represents Aristotle's conception of freedom.
7.4 Aristotle's conception of freedom
So, finally, w hat is Aristotle's conception of freedom (eX eu0epia)? As we 
know, Aristotle presents us with no formal account of freedom. He does not 
discuss freedom extensively anywhere in his work. So, in order to be able to 
see w hether Aristotle has anything interesting to say about freedom, one is 
only left to look at passing rem arks that he makes having a bearing on 
freedom.
Aristotelian remarks having a bearing on freedom can be found in both 
his ethical and political works in the accounts on property, family, economics 
and trade, citizenship, the criticism of Plato, the conception of the good life and 
its implication to the concept of liberty, education, the discussion on the 
voluntary and choice in N E  Book III, 1-3, and, in general, in any explicit
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remarks he makes to freedom (eAsuSepfa) and its derivatives (eXeuOepog, 
6Xeu0spiog, eXeuSepiorrig).
When discussing Aristotle's conception of freedom, it should be noted 
though that—from what we have already seen from the previous examination 
of the different interpretations of A ristotle's conception of liberty—it is 
important to try to find an Ariadne's thread to guide us out of the labyrinth of 
liberty, since from what seems to be the case each individual interpreter of 
Aristotle attributes to him one or the other view about freedom according to 
the modern conception that he already has in mind.
First, let's briefly look into the ancient conception of liberty that 
Constant discussed and see whether his views correspond with the conception 
of liberty among the ancient Greeks. As Mulgan says, "Freedom at all times 
throughout the ancient world stood primarily for the status of the free person 
rather than the slave".423 This is the original sense of freedom  which, 
according to Mulgan, provides the most obvious contrast w ith the social and 
political context of m odern liberalism.
Indeed, as we know, for the ancient Greeks the m ain m eaning of the 
words eXeu0epla and eXsi50epog has been not to be ruled by others, to self-rule, 
to have a share in ruling, to be able to rule and be ruled in turn, to be, in other 
words, a free man. This was the main meaning of eXei50epog: not a 5oi3Xog, a 
free man as opposed to slave. As Festugiere points out, "when we speak of a 
Tree m an' and wish to analyse this notion, we are im m ediately led to the 
contrary idea: 'captivity'" 424
Freedom as self-rule is, in this sense at least, equivalent to freedom as 
participation in government. There are at least two ways in which one can lack 
participation in government: (a) if he has no democratic self-government, or at 
least some kind of participation in the political and social activity of the polis,
423 Mulgan (1984), pp. 8-9.
424 Festugiere (1987), p. 3.
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and (b) if he has no national independence. Lack of national independence for 
the ancient Greeks usually ended up in enslavem ent (which was common 
practice of the time), since it m eant the end of the freedom of the polis. As 
Festugiere indicates, "the citizens of the fifth-century Greek states fought with 
might and main for the freedom of their fatherland which was identical with 
their own liberty".425
So, there are two senses in which one can fail to have self-rule: (a) if he 
has no control over the political decisions of the governing body of his 
political association, and (b) if he has no national independence, if he is that is 
subordinated to alien rule. Having (b) is of course a prerequisite for being able 
to have (a). But, since there can be cases—in theory at least—where a particular 
nation  m igh t lack na tional independence, b u t still have po litical 
independence, one could argue that all that is really required at the end of the 
day in order to have freedom as self-rule is political independence.
Both these ideas of ancient liberty have been present in historical 
m odernity  in several occasions, the m ost obvious being the French 
Revolution (the revolution that C onstant com plained about that led to 
catastrophic results for the French nation because of the insistence of its 
aspirators on the ideal of ancient liberty), and the various national revolutions 
in the nineteenth century (the so-called Century of Revolution).
Some have, therefore, argued that the meaning of freedom (eXeuBepioc) 
is more that of freedom and m uch less of liberty; taking freedom, in this 
context, to be a general concept, and liberty to mean 'political liberty' in a 
negative sense. Barnes, as we have seen, in his account of Aristotle on freedom 
has clearly, even if not successfully, distinguished between a general concept of 
freedom and that of political liberty.’Freedom (eXsuOepiot), it can be argued, is 
about self-rule and political independence, and not about individual or 
negative liberty.’ EXeuOepia refers to the public sphere and not to the private.
425 Festugiere (1987), p. 4.
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But, I do not see how this is possible: the concept of political liberty (even in 
the restricted sense that Barnes attributes to it) is included in the general 
concept of freedom. It is not possible to distinguish the public from the private: 
if there is no freedom in the public sphere one can hardly see how any liberty 
can be really granted in the private sphere.
So one could say that even if we define eXeuBspia as having a share in 
ruling, it is obvious that negative liberty is part of the general definition of 
freedom. W hat Aristotle says about the democrats, that they espouse freedom 
in the sense of doing what you wish, but nevertheless choose as 'second best' to 
rule and be ruled in turn, shows exactly that: participation in ruling brings 
political liberty.
If one is participating in ruling, that means that he has a say in political 
decisions, he is able to put forward his views, he is at liberty to choose. Ruling 
in turn is a form of freedom, as Sorabji notes, because "it promotes my being 
able to do w hat I like".426 The basic assum ption behind this idea is that 
negative liberty w ould never be secured unless political participation in 
government is guaranteed. W ithout being able to participate in government, 
negative liberty will almost always be arbitrary and subject to the good will of 
the occasional 'benevolent' sovereign or sovereign body.
But w hen did freedom start losing its meaning? Well, according to 
Pettit, since Constant's lecture. In fact, w hen ancient freedom was replaced 
with the liberal one, a kind of a strange shift occurred, as if a compromise was 
made, a 'new  deal' about being free: it is alright if you are not able to have 
political freedom (to participate in government); instead you'll have personal 
freedom (you'll be able to do w hat you like in private). But w asn't personal 
freedom something one already had when he had political freedom? The 'new 
deal' of m odernity consisted in rendering 'free politically active citizens' to
426 Sorabji (1990b), p. 266.
265
'idiotic citizens' ( iS iG O T sg / iS iG O T S U o v re g ) .  In that context, Berlin would have no 
problem with a totalitarian regime if it allowed personal freedom.
From w hat it seem s, in Berlin's account the negative-positive 
distinction has susta ined  a historical narra tive  to go along w ith  the 
philosophical dichotomy of private and populist liberty. According to Pettit, 
Berlin provided his view  on the two concepts of liberty w ith  a false 
historicism, a false historical view to back up his view:
Constant's m odern liberty is Berlin's negative liberty, and his 
ancient liberty—the liberty of belonging to a democratically self- 
governing com m unity—is the most prom inent variety of Berlin's 
positive conception. Modern liberty is being left to the rule of your 
own private will, ancient liberty is sharing in the rule of a public, 
dem ocratica lly  d e te rm in e d  w ill. The m o d ern  idea l is 
characteristically liberal, the ancient characteristically populist.427
Athenian democracy, despite all its faults (slavery, limited citizenship, 
suppression of women), provided its citizens—the ones that would qualify for 
citizenship—w ith freedom  of expression. The A thenians drew  a circle; 
whoever was inside that circle and qualified for citizenship enjoyed the goods 
and liberties of democracy. It is unfair to say that Athens was not a democracy 
simply because not everybody was a citizen. That would imply that no modern 
nation state is a democracy either, since citizenship is nowadays also limited; 
not everybody is a citizen in the United Kingdom today either. One could 
hardly be in a position to accuse Aristotle, or Athenian democracy, for the 
position of women and slavery etc., w hen wom en acquired the vote in the 
twentieth century in Europe, and still do not really have equal rights, and 
slavery was abolished in the USA in 1868.
Aristotle speaks of the free man (sX euO epog) as being "av0pco7rog o 
a u io u  evsKa Koti prj aXXcov cov" (Metaphysics, I. 2. 982b 26). A m an is called 
free, if he exists for himself and is not dependent on others:
427 Pettit (1997), p. 18.
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Clearly then it is for no intrinsic advantage that we seek this 
knowledge; for just as we call a m an free who exists for himself 
and not for another, so we call this the only free science, since it 
alone exists for itself. For this reason its acquisition might justly be 
supposed to be beyond hum an pow er, since in m any respects 
hum an nature is servile; in which case, as Simonides says, "God 
alone can have this privilege", and m an should only seek the 
knowledge which is within his reach.
The free man is defined as one who can rule himself. So, the free man is self­
ruling. There is a distinction to be drawn, according to Aristotle, between men 
who are rulers and men who are being ruled. The virtuous, according to 
Aristotle, are genuinely free, and have practical wisdom.
One of the keys to Aristotle's conception of liberty lies in his criticism of 
democratic liberty. Aristotle, like Plato, is opposed to the democratic ideal of 
freedom and criticises it on several occasions throughout his work. This 
criticism of democratic liberty by Aristotle has often been, as we have seen 
previously, the focus of attention by various scholars in trying to understand 
Aristotle's conception of liberty. But what is Aristotle actually in favour of, and 
is his criticism of democratic liberty able to provide us with an answer?
Aristotle refers to liberty directly in the Politics in the occasions where 
he discusses aristocratic, oligarchic and dem ocratic  conceptions of 
constitutions. Indeed, it should be noted that the only direct references that he 
makes to liberty are always in relation to democracy, since liberty is after all the 
defining factor of democracy, as Aristotle mentions on more than one occasion 
in the Politics (1280a5, 1291b30, 1294all, 1316b21-7, 1318b27, 1318b38-1319al, 
1319b). In all the above passages Aristotle critically discusses the features that 
are generally held to define democracy, but at the same time he also makes 
remarks about the conception of liberty in general. Liberty is the end of 
democracy, as Aristotle says in Rhetoric 1366a:
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Nor should the end of each form of government be neglected, for 
people choose the things which have reference to the end. Now, 
the end of democracy is liberty, of oligarchy wealth, of aristocracy 
things relating to education and what the law prescribes, of tyranny 
self-protection.
According to Aristotle, the democratic conception of liberty is defined by two 
features: (i) the interchange of ruling and being ruled and (ii) living as you 
like. Politics, VI, 2. 1317b 2-17 is the passage where Aristotle discusses at length 
the idea that e X e u O s p ia  is the precondition of a democratic state (t)7ro0eaig rfjg  
SrijuoKpariKffg 7ro X ire ia g  e X e u O e p ia ) .  Aristotle here defines the democratic 
conception of liberty. The passage is as follows:
The underlying principle of the democratic type of constitution is 
liberty. Indeed it is commonly held that liberty can only be enjoyed 
in this sort of constitution, for this, so they say, is the aim of every 
democracy. Liberty in one of its forms consists in the interchange 
of ruling and being ruled. The democratic conception of justice 
consists in arithm etical equality, rather than  p roportionate  
equality on the basis of desert. On this conception of justice the 
masses must necessarily be sovereign and the will of the majority 
m ust be ultim ate and m ust be the expression of justice. The 
argum ent is that each citizen should be in a position of equality; 
and the result which follows in democracies is that the poor are 
more sovereign than the rich, for they are in a majority, and the 
will of the majority is sovereign. This then is one m ark of liberty, 
which all democrats agree in making the defining feature of their 
sort of constitution. Another m ark is "living as you like". Such a 
life, they argue, is the function of the free m an, just as the 
function of slaves is not to live as they like. This is the second 
defining feature of democracy. It results in the view that ideally 
one should not be ruled by any one, or, at least, that one should 
[rule and] be ruled in turns. It contributes, in this way, to a general 
system of liberty based on equality.
The conflict of course between liberty and equality that Aristotle finds at 
the root of democracy is still unresolved. As he points out in Politics 1318a 6- 
10, equality is for the poorer class to have no larger share of power than the
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rich, and not for the poorer class alone to be suprem e but for all to govern 
equally. In this way the worst-off would feel that the constitution possessed 
both equality and liberty. But, as he says in Politics 1318b 39-41, unfortunately, 
liberty to do whatever one likes cannot guard against the evil that is in every 
man's character.
Aristotle has already argued in 1310a 26-38 that democracy usually rests 
on a false conception of liberty. As he says, there are two features which are 
generally held to define democracy: the sovereignty of the majority and the 
liberty of individuals. Justice is assumed to consist in equality in regarding the 
will of the masses as sovereign; liberty is assumed to consist in "doing what 
one likes". But the result of this view is that in extreme democracies each 
individual lives as he likes and "he chances to desire for any end", as Euripides 
says. But, according to Aristotle, this is a false conception of liberty, since to live 
by the rule of the constitution ought not be regarded as slavery, but rather as 
salvation. W hat is important in the city is for preservation and stability to be 
ensured, and this will not be achieved if the form of the constitution is based 
on such a conception of liberty.
As Barker notes, Aristotle assumes that the idea of liberty, on its political 
side, is ultimately based on the conception of justice. Aristotle w ould agree 
with Taylor that liberty does not come first; liberty is not a good to be pursued 
for its own sake; it is not prior to other values, like justice for example. For 
Aristotle, justice comes first. As we have seen, Aristotle opposes Plato's 
conception of the city as unity. As Aristotle points out in Politics 1324a5, where 
he examines the question of whether the happiness of the city is the same as 
that of the individual, or whether it is different:
Those who believe that the well-being of the individual consists 
in his wealth, will also believe that the city as a whole is happy 
when it is wealthy. Those who rank the life of a tyrant higher than 
any other, will also rank the city which possesses the largest 
empire as. being the happiest city. Anyone who grades individuals
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by their goodness, will also regard the happiness of cities as 
proportionate to their goodness (1324a9-13).
The happiness of the city is the same as that of the individual only in the sense
that in the same way that it is important for the individual to be wealthy, good
etc., it is also important for the city too to be wealthy, good, etc.
From the above, we can draw  the following conclusions regarding
Aristotle's conception of liberty. Liberty in one of its forms consists in the
interchange of ruling and being ruled. (Pol., 1317b2-3) This contributes to a
general system of liberty based on equality (Pol., 1317M5-17). But while the
dem ocrats adopt arithm etical equality, A ristotle supports proportionate
equality. One form of liberty, as he says, is to govern and be governed in turn.
This is the conception of liberty that Aristotle accepts while he denies the one
form according to which liberty is to do whatever one wants that the extreme
democrat advocates. The idea of liberty, on its political side, is ultimately based
on the conception of justice. But justice for A ristotle should consist in
proportionate equality on the basis of desert and not in arithmetical equality as
in the case of the democratic conception of justice. (Pol, 1317b2-ll)
Although ideally one should not be ruled by any one, this is not possible
since the state w ould resolve into anarchy. In order to preven t this, a
compromise should be made at the expense of liberty: one should live by the
rule of the constitution. Living by the rule of the constitution ought, therefore,
not to be regarded as slavery but as salvation (Pol, 1310a33-39). Aristotle, as we
have seen, argues that it is slavish to live for another w ith  the crucial
exception of a friend. If the ideal city rests on an extension of the best type of
friendship (as we have seen in the previous chapter), the virtuous person's
relationship to the city is not slavish.
The greatest of all the means for ensuring stability of constitutions is the
education of citizens in the spirit of their constitution. The citizens should be
attuned, by the force of habit and the influence of teaching to the right
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constitutional temper. It is true that to some extent Aristotle agrees that 
freedom is living as one wishes; but he denies that living as one wishes 
requires freedom from the constraints of law or moral education. Although 
being a free man as opposed to a slave is considered to be the greatest good, a 
free man is in a way worse than a slave because he has only responsibilities, 
does nothing at random and has no leisure (Met., 1075a).
7. 5 Conclusion
Having illustrated Aristotle's conception of freedom, the question we are left 
with is whether Aristotle would endorse Constant's account of ancient liberty. 
I have successfully, I hope, shown in the first section of this chapter that 
Berlin's conception of negative liberty involves some kind of fallacy. Also, that 
another mistake of interpretation is m ade in Aristotle's conception of the 
democratic notion of liberty "as doing what you want". Constant's account of 
ancient liberty, while not free from m isinterpretations, is the one most 
accurately representing Aristotle's conception of liberty as participation in 
government and as self-rule. Constant's account is correct in spirit at least, if 
not in its letter.
Aristotle's account of the good life requires that we should exercise self- 
government and be ruled in turn; but it does not imply that there is not room 
for a private sphere (household, family, contemplation). Aristotle's account of 
liberty rather concentrates on the public sphere, and it is from there that his 
conception of freedom is derived. An argum ent about liberty in the private 
sphere w ould be a different argum ent from Aristotle's. All the discussion 
about liberty in Aristotle refers to the public; it is an account of freedom 
described in social terms. Mill's account on the other hand is described in 
moral terms.
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It is apparent that Aristotle, in the Politics, in the first sentence of Book I 
and in the opening sentences of Book VII, is committed to a thick theory of the 
good. It follows that, for Aristotle, the state could not be neutral between 
different conceptions of the good. For Aristotle man is a political animal, and 
the good life requires him to participate in government. The good life requires 
social activity and the kind of liberty that enables you to take part in the life of 
the polis. Liberty is an essential requirem ent in order to live a good life. 
Aristotle, therefore, w ould agree w ith the Taylor view according to which 
liberty is not prior; the value of liberty depends on other values. The question 
that comes first for Aristotle, as for Taylor, is 'w hat values are important?'. 
Once this question is settled, then the definition of liberty will follow.
Aristotle is, thus, advocating pretty much w hat Constant called ancient 
liberty. This means that he is definitely not a liberal in his conception of 
freedom. He surely is though no negative libertarian either, as Fred Miller 
would like him to be. W hether a communitarian can find support in Aristotle 
depends on what the comm unitarian view is. Liberty as participation requires 
some shared values and one could not be free in this sense outside a society. 
Aristotelian liberty as participation is not alien to the positive conception of 
liberty, since it is also defined as obedience to rightly constituted law. We have 
already seen that Aristotle thinks that "to live by the rule of the constitution 
ought not to be regarded as slavery, but rather as salvation" (Pol. 1310a34-36). 
Therefore, one could argue that there is common ground betw een Aristotle 
and the com m unitarian  position. N evertheless, if the com m unitarian  
conception of liberty is trying to restate a Hegelian view of liberty as self- 
mastery, then the com m unitarian position introduces ideas which w ould be 
alien to Aristotle.
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8. CONCLUSION
The ancients had political greatness, 
for, unlike Frenchmen, they had politics.
Voltaire
In this thesis I have exam ined six key concepts (com m unity, teleology, 
happiness, justice, friendship and liberty) which can be found in Aristotle, but 
w hich also are key concepts of both com m unitarianism  and liberalism , 
although they get to be very differently interpreted in each case. My aim was to 
show that neither the communitarian nor the liberal appropriations do justice 
to Aristotle's political theory. Both seem to attribute their own aspirations to 
the Aristotelian text and to rely on Aristotle's authority in order to substantiate 
their arguments.
Fundamental to Aristotle's position is his account of the good life and 
his view that m an is a political animal. Aristotle believes that there is an 
objectively best form of life, that this form of life can only be achieved in the 
polis, and that the polis exists in order to make it possible. These doctrines 
determine his treatment of all the concepts discussed in this thesis.
His concept of teleology is very different from that of the liberal- 
individualist because he thinks of the state as natural rather than artificial. 
This does not mean that cities develop of their own accord but rather that only 
in the city can hum an beings achieve the kind of life that constitutes their 
flourishing. This conception is obviously different from that of the liberal- 
individualist but it also differs from any account that could be pu t forward by a 
m odern com m unitarian because the com m unitarians do no t accept the 
Aristotelian view of hum an nature. They cannot, therefore, agree that there is 
one objectively best form of life. For the same reason the com m unitarian 
could not accept the Aristotelian view of the state as the highest community 
because it aims at the most sovereign good. They may agree that a community
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requires a shared conception of the good, bu t they believe that there are 
different conceptions of the good and that no one good can therefore be 
sovereign.
The Aristotelian view of the good also shapes Aristotle's conception of 
justice. This differs from that of the individualists because it gives a central 
role to the idea of desert which in turn  requires that a conception of justice 
must be underpinned by a conception of the good. In the Nicomachean Ethics 
Aristotle gives a purely formal account of the good as treating equals equally 
and unequals unequally. This w ould allow different comm unities to have 
different conceptions of justice depending on their conceptions of the good and 
could be accepted by a m odern communitarian. But in the Politics Aristotle 
makes it clear that there is one true account of justice which is based on the 
correct account of the good for man. Conceptions of justice which rest on other 
conceptions of the good, such as the democratic and oligarchic conceptions, are 
not stric tly  speaking  correct. H ere A risto tle  p a rts  com pany w ith  
comm unitarians who w ould hold that a conception of justice has only to 
conform to the conception of the good of a particular historical community.
The same considerations apply to friendship. A liberal would no doubt 
see friendship as desirable but it is not an essential feature of the state. 
Com munitarians may emphasise the importance of feelings of community. 
Aristotle's view that political friendship holds the city together may seem very 
similar to this. But it comes to seem rather different w hen we investigate his 
conception of friendship, resting as it does on the idea that true friendship is 
friendship for the sake of the good.
Aristotle clearly cannot accept the negative conception of liberty which 
seems to be implicit in the political philosophy of liberal individualism . A 
mere absence of constraint w ould not help one to lead the good life. One 
might, therefore, be inclined to think that he m ust be adopting a positive 
conception of liberty. A lthough com m unitarian thinkers have little to say
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about freedom there are indications that they too m ight favour some version 
of positive liberty. But, again, on closer examination Aristotle's position comes 
to seem rather different. His view of liberty is more like Constant's ancient 
liberty or republican liberty. It is essentially the condition of one who shares in 
ruling and being ruled according to law.
The upshot is then that Aristotle would certainly reject most of the key 
ideas of liberal individualism . But this does not make him an ally of the 
communitarians. Because Aristotle's views are founded on a metaphysical and 
moral conception of hum an nature which w ould not be accepted by the 
communitarians, they cannot claim his authority for their doctrines.
But this does not m ean that Aristotle has nothing to contribute to 
contemporary political discussion. His views on the value of friendship and, 
in particular, his notion of political friendship as 'concern for others' has a lot 
to contribute to a contemporary discussion that seems to be dominated merely 
by the liberal notion of 'respect for others'. So has his conception of liberty; the 
ancient notion of 'freedom  as participation in governm ent' could help us re­
evaluate the role of political activity and its importance for self-determination. 
This need not imply that the negative conception of liberty would have to be 
ruled out. Aristotle's political philosophy is not hostage to the historical 
circumstances of the Greek city-state. It was m eant to be a model that—as 
Thucydides would say—could guide us in running the state's affairs for ever 
( e a a s i ) .
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